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THE FUNCTION OF THE HOMERIC SIMILE.¹

A study of the function of the Homeric simile must begin with a short discussion of certain general principles concerning the status of the simile as a device of oral poetry, its date, and the relationship between simile and context. It is necessary to include the short comparison which has no finite verb of its own as well as the long simile which contains one or more finite verbs. There are two main forms of short comparison and two main forms of simile. The most rudimentary form of "short comparison" is that based on the comparative of the adjective, for example: *θάσσοντας ἰρήκων . . . ἵππους* (XIII, 819).² Such expressions are usually of a proverbial kind.³ Most of the short comparisons, however, consist of an introductory word such as *ὥς*, followed by a noun which is often qualified by an adjective or a participle.⁴ We may properly apply the term "simile" to cases in which one or more clauses containing a finite verb or verbs are attached to the original phrase of comparison,⁵ e. g.:

¹ I am greatly indebted to Professor and Mrs. T. B. L. Webster and Mr. E. W. Handley for help in the preparation of this article.

² In quotations from Homer Roman numerals refer to books of the *Iliad* and Arabic numerals to those of the *Odyssey*.

³ See P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique*, II (Paris, 1953), p. 151, and H. Thesleff, "Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek," *Soc. Scient. Fennica: Comm. Hum. Litt.*, XXI, 1 (1954), p. 127.

⁴ The comparison may involve two nouns, e. g.: XII, 292 f., where *λέονθ'* and *βουσιν* correspond to *Σαρπηδόνα* and *Ἀργεῖοισι*.

⁵ Compare the use of adjective and relative to produce enjambement. See Milman Parry, "Studies in the Epic Technique of Oral Verse-

λάρῳ ὄρνιθι ἐοικώς,
ὅς τε δέεται (5, 51 ff.).

Distinct from this again is the long simile which consists of a separate sentence introduced by ὥς ὅτε or similar words.⁶ It is generally assumed by scholars today that the long simile developed out of the short comparison, but it would be unwise to insist on a rigid theory of the historical development of the simile as a linguistic form.⁷

The short comparison as found in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* has certain marks which suggest that it was a formula to assist the process of improvised oral composition. The miniature lay of the Trojan Horse recited by Demodocus contains one short comparison (8, 518). The short comparison is found most frequently at the end of the line, the most convenient position metrically. The repetition of the same formulaic comparison within the same book is possibly the result of the conditions of a single improvised recitation in which such a comparison was uppermost in the bard's mind.⁸ In *oratio recta* the short comparison sometimes suggests the language of everyday speech; this is particularly noteworthy in expressions of abuse, as when Irus compares Odysseus' talk to that of an old baking woman

Making," *H. S. C. P.*, XLI (1930), p. 127, and A. B. Lord, "Homer and Hsuo III," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIX (1948), pp. 113 ff.

⁶ The paratactic simile (6, 162 ff.), in which the picture is presented without any formal words of introduction should be added. It is clear from the form of the words at the resumption of the narrative that such an expression is to be regarded as a simile. This simile is unique in Homer, both in its paratactic form, and in its subject matter, in that it takes as criterion of beauty a real and individual tree at Delos that was the object of wonder. For the paratactic simile in tragedy see W. Hörmann, *Gleichnis und Metapher in der griechischen Tragödie* (Munich, 1934), pp. 5 ff.

⁷ On the linguistic development of the simile see G. P. Shipp, *Studies in the Language of Homer* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 81, and H. Fränkel, *Die homerischen Gleichnisse* (Göttingen, 1921), p. 111. The latter work, still the most important study on the subject, contains a most sensitive examination of the individual similes. Both of these works will be referred to hereafter by the author's name only.

⁸ E.g. the repetition of the formula, θεόφιν μῆστορ ἀτάλαντος (3, 110 and 3, 409), which is followed by a similar expression, δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοῖος at 3, 468.

(18, 27).⁹ This comparison occupies the first half of the line up to the caesura. Similar abusive comparisons at 18, 29 and 240 fill the space from the caesura to the end of the line. Such comparisons seem to contain elements of the vocabulary of the everyday speech of Ionia, but their metrical shape is that of the old formulae of epic.¹⁰

The short comparison is found in most oral epics of other literatures.¹¹ The use of the long simile, however, seems rare in oral epics other than the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.¹² There seems no reason why long similes could not have been produced in the conditions of purely oral composition; there is no intrinsic need to postulate writing or slow-speed dictation, though such procedures are not to be dismissed as impossible or even unlikely.¹³

While the short comparison is to be regarded as a device with a long ancestry, the long simile seems to belong to one of the latest strata of the Homeric language. Shipp's linguistic analysis

⁹ On this comparison see H. G. Oeri, *Der Typ der komischen Alten in der griechischen Komödie, seine Nachwirkungen und seine Herkunft* (Basel, 1948), p. 89 and p. 13. On colloquial elements see also Fränkel, p. 70 (on beast fable), and compare the view of I. Waern, Γῆς 'Οστρά (Uppsala, 1951), esp. pp. 19 ff. and pp. 45 ff., that certain kennings have a colloquial origin.

¹⁰ Such colloquial elements seem yet another indication of the difference in style between speeches and narrative; compare the demonstration by P. Krarup, "Verwendung von Abstracta in der Direkten Rede bei Homer," *Class. et Med.*, X, 1 (1949), pp. 1 ff., that abstract nouns are much commoner in *O. R.* Simile in *O. R.* is part of the rhetoric of the speech, and is intended to make an impact on the character who listens to it; often in speeches of abuse and expostulation a warrior is compared to something incongruous such as a woman or a child. See p. 128.

¹¹ Cf. F. Dirlmeier, "Homerisches Epos und Orient," *Rh. M.*, N. F., XCVIII, 1 (1955), pp. 22-3; Shipp, p. 80 f.

¹² See Sir Maurice Bowra, *Heroic Poetry* (London, 1952), pp. 268 ff.; U. Sprenger, "Der Vergleich in der Germanischen, Grossrussischen und Griechischen Heldendichtung," *Lewis*, III, 1, pp. 135 ff.

¹³ See A. B. Lord, "Homer's Originality: Oral Dictated Texts," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIV (1953), pp. 124 ff. Lord believes that the piling up of similes and the extended simile in Homer are a result of the method of dictation. This theory, though attractive, is open to the objection that the piling up of similes is to be found in other oral poetry (cf. Bowra, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 ff.). On dictation and writing see also Sir Maurice Bowra, *Homer and his Forerunners* (Edinburgh, 1955), pp. 10 f.

has confirmed that the similes of the *Iliad* are late, and that archaisms in them are extremely rare.¹⁴ It seems also that most of the subject matter of the similes belongs to a late date; this is particularly likely with "unique" similes, e.g. the sandcastle (XV, 362), in contrast to those which are "typical," i.e. those which, though in many ways individual compositions for their context, draw on a stock class of subject matter, such as natural phenomena. The ancient commentators insisted that some of the similes did not belong to the Heroic age of the narrative of the *Iliad*.¹⁵ The animals seem to have belonged to the world of the coast of Asia Minor; some of the details of the observation of inanimate nature too are appropriate to that coast.¹⁶ This accords with the view of Nilsson that in the similes Homer incorporated the most recent elements of life and civilization.¹⁷ In general the bard derived his similes from things within his own and his hearers' experience, though not necessarily their everyday experience; but one should not reject the possibility that occasionally older elements were transmitted in similes.¹⁸

¹⁴ Shipp, esp. p. 79. The conclusions of his analysis are accepted by L. R. Palmer in (ed.) Platnauer, *Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford, 1954), pp. 22 ff.

¹⁵ E.g. Σ to XVIII, 219. H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge, 1952), p. 2 and n. 5 (p. 62), assigns a late date to this trumpet simile, and associates the simile of the dyed ivory (IV, 141) with the revival of the ivory trade in the ninth and eighth centuries, quoting R. D. Barnett, *J. H. S.*, LXVIII (1948), p. 3. Familiar knowledge of iron (IV, 485; 9, 393) is not earlier than the Protogeometric period (D. H. F. Gray, *J. H. S.*, LXXIV [1954], p. 14).

¹⁶ On animals see O. Körner, *Die homerische Tierwelt*, ed. 2 (Munich, 1930), who has brought an expert zoological knowledge to the study of Homeric fauna. He states (p. 2) that every animal mentioned in the similes belongs to the time of Homer on the coast of Asia Minor, and that the life of the lion is portrayed with more understanding in the *Iliad* than in anything until the middle of the nineteenth century. Note also the reference to Asia Minor in the simile of the cranes at the Cayster (II, 459). On observation of nature see the graphic description of a storm near Icaria in R. Hampe, *Die Gleichnisse Homers und die Bildkunst seiner Zeit* (Tübingen, 1952), pp. 7 f.

¹⁷ M. P. Nilsson, *Homer and Mycenae* (London, 1933), pp. 276 f.; cf. Shipp, p. 83.

¹⁸ Fränkel, p. 98, argues that similes may contain things that were rare in the life of the hearer, e.g. a lion hunt, and (pp. 99 ff.) that

Though the short comparison usually has one point of contact with the immediate context, which may fairly be described as a *tertium comparationis*, the relevance of a great part of the long similes cannot be explained in such simple terms. Fränkel has shown that the whole picture of the simile explains the whole picture of the event.¹⁹ The simile is related to its context in a variety of ways. The description of the blinding of the Cyclops contains a simile which corresponds to the situation at several points. Odysseus and his men whirl the sharpened stake in the Cyclops' eye in the way that a man drills a hole in a ship's timber (9, 384). Odysseus stands leaning on the drill from above, so does the craftsman; Odysseus' companions like the workman's mates whirl it round from beneath. The last clause of the simile: τὸ δὲ τρέχει ἑμμενὲς αἰεὶ corresponds to the continuously whirling movement of the stake.²⁰ Sometimes details which are logically unessential enhance the total picture. In the simile of the felled poplar (IV, 482) the additional details—the growth of the tree, and the purpose for which it has been felled—have a graphic value. As a result one is more interested in the tree, and so feels more sympathy for the fallen warrior to whom it is compared.

Consequently, as the correspondence between simile and context is multiple and complex, it is often difficult to assign a single function to a given simile. Sometimes a simile describing a warrior in battle which has a movement as its demonstrable point of comparison also describes his appearance. Further in

some old elements may be preserved in certain similes. Ajax' shield "like a tower" (XI, 485, etc.) must be the body-shield (D.H.F. Gray, *C. Q.*, XLI [1947], p. 120).

¹⁹ Ch. I *passim* and pp. 104 ff.; cf. also A. Sévérins, *Homère*, III (Brussels, 1948), pp. 157 ff., and M. Riemschneider, *Homer Entwicklung und Stil*, ed. 2 (Leipzig, 1952), p. 137.

²⁰ In the same way the simile describing Achilles' rush at Aeneas as like that of a lion (XX, 164) corresponds not merely to the immediate context, but by implication to a wider context. The ten-line simile describes the village turning out. At first the lion ignores them, but then one of them wounds him, and he attacks them with terrible fury. All these details correspond to the story. Achilles had for a long time been ignoring the Trojans; he was then wounded by the death of Patroclus, and so attacked them with unrestrained anger. By the terms of a single *tertium comparationis* most of these details would be superfluous; the point of contact would be a fierce attack alone.

some examples a distinction can be made between the function performed by a simile in relation to the surrounding lines and that performed in relation to a wider context.²¹ However the present inquiry is concerned mainly with the primary function of the simile in its immediate context. For example, in the simile of the trumpet (XVIII, 219) the primary function of the comparison is to illustrate Achilles' roar: ἀριζήλη φωνή in the simile is repeated at the resumption of the narrative (221). To classify this simile as simile to illustrate sound is not to deny the relevance of the poetical overtones in the mention of the besieged city.²² The primary functions of the comparison and simile will be considered according to what they illustrate in the following order: the *movement* of an individual warrior, of gods, of an individual not connected with fighting, of masses of men, and of things; the *appearance* of a single warrior, of a group, or of a thing; the *sound* of battle or of something not connected with war; the *measurement of space, time and numbers*; a *situation*, and finally *psychological characteristics*.

The first and most obvious short comparison that describes *movement* illustrates the attacking movement of an individual warrior, and is, as is to be expected, almost confined to the *Iliad*. The comparison δαίμονι ἴσος is used nine times in the same metrical position with a verb of attacking movement.²³ Akin to this formula is the comparison of a warrior in his rushing attack to Ares (e.g. XVI, 784). Attacking movement is also frequently compared to that of a predatory animal²⁴ and to violent

²¹ For example XXII, 26, where the primary function of the simile is to illustrate a warrior's appearance. But by implication the psychological reaction of Priam to the appearance of Achilles is illustrated.

²² On this simile see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Ilias und Homer* (Berlin, 1916), pp. 168 f., who discusses the implication of help for the Achaeans.

²³ This comparison occurs seven times preceded by ἐπέσσυτο to make up a formula filling the space from the caesura to the end of the line (V, 438; V, 459; V, 884; XVI, 705; XVI, 786; XX, 447; XXI, 227), and twice at the end of the line with other words preceding (XX, 493; XXI, 18). On this formula see Elisabeth Brunius-Nilsson, *Δαίμονι* (Uppsala, 1955), pp. 127 ff. On formulae from caesura to end of line see Milman Parry, *op. cit.*, pp. 86 ff.

²⁴ Lion (XI, 129; V, 299; XII, 293); bird of prey (XIII, 531; cf. XVII, 460).

natural phenomena such as flames or storms.²⁵ These clearly belong to families of stock comparisons intended to illustrate attacking movement. There are also many short comparisons to illustrate other kinds of movement: retreating movement (XI, 546); spinning movement (XIV, 413); falling movement (XII, 385). The writhing movement of the wounded Harpalion on the ground is compared to that of a worm (XIII, 654). Together with these may be taken comparison to illustrate ease of movement (XIV, 499) and lack of movement (17, 463). In the former example Peneleos lifts a severed head off the ground as if it were a poppy head, and in the latter Odysseus, hit by a foot-stool thrown by Antinous, stands his ground like a crag. In all these instances the comparison stands in an adverbial relationship to a finite verb or participle, or, as for example at XIII, 295, as a further qualification to a verb that is already qualified by an adverb of the same kind of meaning.

It seems that from comparisons of this kind there developed the long simile to illustrate the movement of an attacking or retreating warrior; the subject matter is usually from the same sources as that of the short comparisons: predatory animals, fire, and storms.²⁶ Where alternative animals are mentioned (e. g. VIII, 338), it is clear that movement, not appearance, is the primary function of the simile. However, as the long simile to illustrate movement often corresponds in a complex way to the narrative, some of the details in similes of this kind are visual, for example, the comparison of Paris leaving his house to a horse that breaks loose from the stable (VI, 506). The impression of brilliance is also important here; note *τεύχεσι παμφαίνων* of Paris (513) and *ἀγλαΐηφι πεποιθώς* of the horse (510).²⁷ Sometimes unusual movement is described by a unique simile: Ajax' jump from ship to ship is illustrated by the unparalleled simile of the trick-rider who leaps from horse to horse (XV, 679).

The movements of divine beings are frequently illustrated by comparisons and similes: the speed of Hera is compared to that

²⁵ Flame (XIII, 53; XX, 423); storm (XI, 747; XII, 40).

²⁶ V, 161; XI, 113; XV, 690; XX, 490; XI, 297.

²⁷ According to Fränkel, p. 9 this example alone is enough to overthrow the old theory of a single point of contact, a *tertium comparationis*.

of thought (XV, 80); here the adverb *κραίπνως* in the resumption of the narrative is noteworthy.²⁸ In the comparison of the dive of Iris into the sea to the fall of a lead weight into water the primary point of comparison is a falling movement into water (XXIV, 80), just as in the comparison of Apollo's descent to the dive of a hawk (XV, 237) the emphasis is on speed of movement. Hermes skims over the waves with the movement of a cormorant (5, 51). But in this last example, as in other bird comparisons, it is possible to take the expression as implying not a likeness but an identity. Athene departs from the palace of Nestor *φύγη εἰδομένη* (3, 372). This may be interpreted as meaning either "departing with a quick movement like that of a bird" or "having undergone a metamorphosis into a bird." It is perhaps unwise to press either interpretation too hard, as it is possible that old notions of gods in animal forms may have combined with the comparison to express movement.²⁹

Simile is also used, mostly in the *Odyssey*, to describe men's movements other than those connected with battle. Odysseus sits astride a plank of the raft like a rider (5, 371). The Phaeacian slave women weave and spin the threads, and are compared to the leaves of poplars (7, 106); the point of the comparison is the quick movement of many hands, an interpretation found in the Scholia. The dancers on the Shield move lightly round and round like the potter's wheel when he tests it (XVIII, 600). Comparisons of this kind are not "typical"; the movements described are much more individual than those of battle, which occur many times, and so each comparison seems to be created for its context.

²⁸ I, 359 has the adverb *καρπαλλίως* in the context. See A. Lesky, "Homer" (Bericht III), *Anzeiger für Altertumswiss.*, VI, 3 (1953), col. 137.

²⁹ This problem requires more detailed treatment than is possible here. In both 5, 353 and 22, 240 too close an insistence on a metamorphosis leads to inconsistencies and absurdities (see Σ to 22, 240). Modern scholars hold a variety of views: Chantraine, *Le Divin et les Dieux chez Homère (La Notion du Divin [Fondation Hardt, Geneva, 1954])*, p. 62, and Körner, *op. cit.*, p. 57, accept a metamorphosis; W. F. Otto, *The Homeric Gods* (Eng. tr., London, 1954), p. 209, rejects a metamorphosis; P. von d. Mühl, *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, col. 703, line 58, is undecided. Oriental parallels do not help, as they do not seem to allow the distinction to be made between "as a bird" and "like a bird"; cf. Dirlmeier, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 f.

The formulaic comparison is found as a description of the movement of a group of warriors or of a mass movement, e. g. the whole-line formula:

Ὡς οἱ μὲν μάρναντο δέμας πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο.³⁰

The storm comparison used of individual heroes is also used of a mass attack (XII, 375; XIII, 39). But usually it is the long simile that illustrates mass movement. Many of these belong to stock groups in point of subject matter, such as waves, lions, or wolves.³¹ Others have no connexion in subject matter with other similes, for example the comparison of the Trojans penned in by the river to locusts caught by a fire (XXI, 12), followed by the comparison of them to fish that flee from a dolphin (XXI, 22). Animal similes to illustrate trapped or fleeing warriors are common; it is the kind of animal in the last two examples that is unusual. Similes describing mass movement often have more than a single point of comparison: the comparison of the woovers fleeing in terror to cattle driven to stampede by gadflies illustrates not merely the mass movement of flight but also the helplessness of their panic. The small size of the attacker is also relevant, as Odysseus and his helpers are few against many.³² In examples of this kind the illustration of mass movement passes over into description of the nature of the situation. Further examples of this will be considered later.

The formulaic comparison to illustrate speed of movement is used of things as well as of men: birds and the wind are formulae to illustrate the speed of horses (II, 764; XVI, 149). Among short comparisons to describe things in movements of various kinds are the following noteworthy examples: the Phaeacian ships are swift as a wing or a thought (7, 36);³³ a limbless and

³⁰ XI, 596; XIII, 673; XVIII, 1. Similarly V, 782-3 occur again at VII, 256-7.

³¹ Waves: IV, 422; XIII, 795; XV, 381; lions: XI, 172; XV, 630; wolves: XVI, 156; XVI, 352.

³² In the same way the simile of the snared birds (22, 468) implies the degradation of the death of the unchaste maidservants as well as their kicking movement.

³³ This unusual short comparison may possibly have been derived from the long simile XV, 80.

headless body goes rolling rapidly like a mortar (XI, 147);³⁴ the Titaessos flows into the Peneios, but as the waters do not mingle, it continues in its course floating on top like oil (II, 754). This last comparison is almost didactic and explanatory. Long similes perform a function similar to that of these comparisons: arrows jump off Menelaus' breastplate, as beans jump on the threshing floor (XIII, 588). Here the details in the simile, the force of the wind and the energy of the winnower, enhance the description of the movement. Odysseus' raft is driven by wind and waves like burs in autumn (5, 328), and a little later the wind scatters the raft's planks as wind scatters a heap of chaff (5, 368). In the last two examples there is a depiction of picturesque movement in a spirit that is less usual in the *Iliad*; this is particularly noticeable in the Fifth Book of the *Odyssey*, which contains many elements of *Märchen*.

As with comparisons to describe the movements of men there are a number of short comparisons belonging to stock families which illustrate the *appearance* of a hero, for example, comparisons with a flash of flame or fire or with a star.³⁵ The divine comparison is used to illustrate the pre-eminent appearance of a hero, and the comparison with a goddess, such as Aphrodite, is used to describe female beauty.³⁶ In all such comparisons something brilliant or divine is used as a criterion for a person of brilliant or beautiful appearance. Sometimes, however, the point of the comparison is more particularized, and refers to the unusual appearance of some individual, as the ironical comparison of Amphinachos going to battle decked out like a girl (II, 872). This simile is unusual in that the incongruous comparison is usually found in abuse in O. R. (see note 9); one may compare the abusive description of Thersites in the narrative (II, 212 ff.). The extended simile is used to describe the appearance of a hero, particularly at the moment of or just preceding his *aristeia*: Hector is compared to a baleful star early in *Iliad* XI (62);

³⁴ For the meaning of *δαμος* see L. R. Palmer, "Mortar and Lathe," *Eranos*, XLIV (1946), pp. 54 f. On this simile see W. Schadewaldt, *Iliasstudien* (Leipzig, 1938), p. 47; he ascribes the simile to the poet's desire for "Steigerung" and to suggest the inner event of Agamemnon's determination for revenge.

³⁵ Flame: XIII, 330; XIII, 688; XVII, 88; star: VI, 401; 15, 108.

³⁶ Divine comparison: III, 230; 2, 5; 3, 468; 4, 310; and in an extended form II, 478. Comparison with goddess: III, 158; VIII, 305; XI, 638; with particular goddess named: XXIV, 699; 4, 14.

Achilles has light shed by Athene round him, and is compared to a beacon in a beleaguered city (XVIII, 207). The simile of the ram (III, 196) describes the physical appearance of Odysseus that distinguishes him from all the other Greeks. The simile does not show Odysseus' conformity to a high standard of general excellence, but marks him as a unique individual. The simile is used by a speaker to illustrate Odysseus' appearance, his physical sturdiness and the external manifestations of his qualities of leadership.

Similes are used to describe the appearance of more than one warrior in battle or of some manoeuvre. The Achaeans whitened by dust are compared to chaff heaps (V, 499). Sometimes the visual simile is used when a group or army is welcome to their friends and allies: the troops of the Ajaxes look like a black cloud, and Agamemnon is pleased to see them (IV, 275). The sight of the bristling weapons enjoyed by Athene and Apollo is compared to that of the bristling surface of the sea (VII, 63).³⁷

There are stock formulae to illustrate the appearance of things, particularly of armour and weapons: a tower, a star, the sun and the moon.³⁸ The comparison of the twelve axes in a row to the upright props supporting a keel (19, 574) is different from these stock comparisons. This seems to be a unique creation for its particular place. Long similes also are used to illustrate the appearance of things: the flash of Achilles' spear-point is compared to the brightness of the evening star (XXII, 317), and the flash of his shield to fire seen by sailors out at sea (XIX, 375).

Comparisons to illustrate *noise* are somewhat less frequent. Ares shouts *ἔρεμνῇ λαίλαπι ἴσος* (XX, 51); the personified river-god Scamander raises his flood-water and bellows like a bull (XXI, 237). Extended similes from bulls describe the shouts of warriors (XVI, 487; XX, 403). The battle cry of the Earth-shaker is measured in terms of the noise of the shout of nine or ten thousand men (XIV, 148).³⁹ The roar and battle cry of the

³⁷ On the meaning of *φρίξ* in this simile see M. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter* (Basel, 1950), p. 62, n. 30.

³⁸ Tower: VII, 219; XI, 485; star: VI, 295; XIX, 381; sun: XIV, 185; 18, 296; moon: XXIII, 455; XIX, 374.

³⁹ There is a good discussion of this and other acoustic similes in Hampe, *op. cit.*, p. 15. He shows that the function of the simile here is not merely to describe noise, but also to emphasize the superhuman power of the god.

warring forces is the object of a number of similes (e. g. XVII, 263). In one example (XIV, 394) the simile is expressed in the form, unusual in Homer, of a series of negative criteria: "the swell of the sea does not make so much noise, nor does . . . , as does the shouting of the Trojans and Greeks."

The simile also illustrates sounds other than those of battle. The chatter of the old men on the walls is compared to the sound of cicadas (III, 151). The roar of the Achaean mob in the assembly evokes two similes taken from the noise of the sea (II, 209; II, 394); in both of these mass movement is implied as well.⁴⁰ In the *Odyssey* the noise of the door of the store containing the great bow is like that of a bull (21, 48), and the twang of the bow like that of the sound of a nightingale (21, 411). Such similes in the *Odyssey* occur at points of high tension in the narrative: the booming noise of the movement of the door helps to create an atmosphere of impending doom; the twang of the bow is emphasized, as it is the weapon that brings vengeance.

In addition to illustrating movement, sight, or sound the simile provides criteria for the *measurement* of space, time, and numbers. Simple comparisons are used when Odysseus is describing the marvellous in his long narration to measure *space*, sometimes in hyperbolic terms: the staff of the Cyclops is as big as a ship's mast (9, 322), and a Laestrygonian woman is as big as a mountain (10, 113). Extended similes illustrate distance in the Funeral Games of *Iliad* XXIII: Polypoites' weight passes beyond those of his competitors like a herdsman's throwing staff (XXIII, 845); Odysseus is as close to Ajax in the foot-race as is a weaving rod to a woman's breast as she weaves (XXIII, 760).⁴¹ Such similes are used to intensify the excitement of the narrative of the Games. Other similes to illustrate measurement of size include the comparison of the distance covered in one bound by the horses of the goddesses' chariots to the distance to the horizon from a watchtower (V, 770).

Measurements of *time* by means of the simile are of two kinds. Firstly they state the speed with which an action takes place: the wound of Ares is healed with the speed with which milk is curdled (V, 902); this is obviously closely akin to description

⁴⁰ Fränkel, p. 20 (on II, 394) regards the rocks in the simile as corresponding to the princes, and suggests the further implication that, as the winds change, so also do the emotions of the mob.

⁴¹ Similarly XXIII, 431 and 517.

of speed of movement. Secondly the time of day at which some part of the action occurs is illustrated by the picture of some ordinary human occupation. The middle of the day is described as the time when the woodcutter prepares food (XI, 86), and the evening as the time when the judge rises after judging many disputes (12, 439). These pictures indicate the times respectively when the Greeks broke the Trojan phalanxes, and when Charybdis sent up timbers. Formally they are not similes, but may be included here, as their technique is that of the simile.

Simile to illustrate *numbers* is much more common. There are a few short comparisons, as the comparison of Odysseus' words when he spoke in the assembly to wintry snow flakes (III, 222). Though the primary point of comparison here is numbers, eloquence also is implied. There is rhetorical exaggeration in Achilles' statement that Agamemnon's gifts would not buy him even if they were as numerous as the sand or dust (IX, 385). Numbers of weapons are frequently illustrated by the simile of snow driven by the wind.⁴² The Achaean throngs in *Iliad* II are compared to myriads of flies (469), myriads of bees (87), and flocks of birds (459); in the last two there are also notions of movement and of noise. Finally the words:

φύλλα καὶ ἄνθεα γίγνεται ὥρη

are used twice to describe numbers, once of the Greek army (II, 468) and once of the attacking Cicones (9, 51). All these seem to be stock subjects from the bardic tradition.

So far the primary correspondence between simile and context lies in at least one point of sensible data, a physical movement, appearance, sound; or the simile has expressed something measurable: space and distance, time or numbers. But often the relationship is too complex to allow the function of the simile to be formulated in such terms. In many of these measurement is the basis of the comparison, but there is a series of movements or a nexus of different kinds of movements, and so here the function may be described as illustrating a *situation* or the status of a series of actions.

Some of these similes arise out of those illustrating the movements of an individual hero. Hector's forward thrust to the

⁴² E. g.: XIX, 357; with the additional notion of a driving movement: XII, 156.

ships as he leads the Trojans is like that of a rock sent loose by floods; its course is unstayed until it reaches the plain, and there it stops (XIII, 137). In the same way Hector's attack is stopped by Greek resistance (145-6). The function is not merely to describe the forward movement of Hector and the damage he does, but also the effectiveness of the Greek resistance in spite of his eagerness: *μεμαώς* (137) corresponds to *ἐσσύμενός περ* in the simile (142). So here the function is to illustrate the battle situation of Hector's attack and the Greek resistance to it.⁴³ Sometimes the illustration of an action includes an illustration of its purpose: Odysseus is compelled by his needs to go among Nausicaa's companions, just as a fierce lion is compelled by hunger to go among domestic animals (6, 130): *χρειὸν γὰρ ἴκανε* (136) corresponds to *κέλεται δέ ἐ γαστήρ* (133). Odysseus appears to the companions of Nausicaa as a predatory monster, and so they run in terror. Their conduct is in contrast to that of Nausicaa herself.

The situation illustrated by simile sometimes develops out of a series of mass movements rather than those of an individual warrior: the Greeks pursued so far, but they feared and lost courage when Hector appeared (XV, 271); this is parallel to the events of the simile: for a time dogs and men pursue a stag or wild goat, but they are put to flight by the appearance of a lion. The situation has much in common with that of XIII, 137 considered above; it consists of a series of actions that corresponds to a series of actions in the simile.⁴⁴ The simile at X, 183 is somewhat different. The Greek guards are awake like farm dogs that hear a lion; ⁴⁵ the element of noise gives the atmosphere. The real function is to illustrate the watchful state of the Greek guards at night: the situation is one in which a raider might suddenly attack the Greek camp.⁴⁶ It is not merely a series of actions, but the reaction of men in a situation in which something violent *might happen* at any moment; the simile helps to create suspense.

⁴³ Similarly XVII, 657 and XX, 164.

⁴⁴ XVII, 725 is a similar instance of a description of complicated mass movement that has become a description of a situation.

⁴⁵ *Θηρὸς κρατερόφρονος* can hardly be anything other than a lion; cf. Körner, *op. cit.*, p. 11 f.

⁴⁶ Cf. Fränkel, p. 75, n. 1, who comments that there is no word for danger in Homer.

Some similes describe a battle situation in which neither side makes headway. In the battle at the wall neither side makes headway. The situation is compared to a boundary dispute carried on by two men in a narrow space (XII, 421). The narrowness of the space corresponds to the words in the narrative:

ὥς ἄρα τοὺς διέεργον ἐπάλξεις.

The simile therefore corresponds to the concrete facts of the battle. A few lines later the efforts of the Greeks to hold the battle line firm are compared to the care of a woman weighing wool, who balances the wool and the weight (XII, 433). She is keeping her family by this work, and so the situation is urgent for her, just as the situation is urgent for the combatants. The simile is immediately followed by the line (436):

ὥς μὲν τῶν ἐπὶ ἴσα μάχῃ τέτατο πτόλεμός τε.

The function therefore is not to describe the movement of men, but a situation of a particular quality, one of even balance. XII, 436 is repeated at XV, 410, where it follows the simile of the carpenter's line; this simile also describes an evenly stretched battle line, and even illustrates an abstract notion of equally opposed forces; for there is a greater degree of abstraction in this simile than in the former example, as the subject of the main verb in the simile is a thing and not a person.⁴⁷ In the comparison of Apollo confounding the work of the Greeks to a child that pushes over a sandcastle (XV, 362) the simile provides a parallel situation, one which involves wanton destruction by a force out of scale with the object destroyed, and that, rather than an abstract notion of confusion, is the point of the comparison.

The concrete comparison of men to leaves in point of numbers has already been considered (p. 125 above). The comparison of the generations of men to leaves is more abstract. The comparison is stated at VI, 146:

οἷη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.

This simple statement is amplified in the next two lines, where

⁴⁷ It would however be going too far to suggest, as P. Cauer does, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*, ed. 3 (Leipzig, 1921 and 1923), p. 461, that such a simile is the substitute for an abstract noun expressing the notion of equality.

the fall and growth of leaves are mentioned. The simile differs from all that we have considered so far in that it does not arise out of an immediate action or situation. It is preceded by the rhetorical gambit: *τίη γενεήν ἐρεείνεις* (145), a gambit which occurs in a speech at XXI, 153, where there is no general comment, but merely an answer by Asteropaeus to Achilles' question about his lineage. It seems to be a general "example" to illustrate an attitude towards human affairs, though it arises out of a specific question concerning lineage, and is possibly a statement of popular wisdom. The point of the comparison is something abstract, the notion of a quick succession of generations and so the notions of impermanence and futility and also of success and failure alternating, as they are shown to do in Bellerophon's career. It is the statement of a general principle that makes this simile together with XXI, 464, which is to be closely associated with it, exceptional among Homeric similes.⁴⁸

Similes that illustrate *psychological characteristics* of individuals and groups are of many kinds. The most simple is the formulaic comparison that expresses personal excellence in terms of the gods either in general or by the mention of a specific god. Often these comparisons are purely adjectival, in that they are not associated with a verb of action, for example:

Πυλαιμένα ἐλέτην ἀτάλαντον Ἄρηϊ (V, 576).⁴⁹

Some are a general designation of a hero's pre-eminence (e.g. II, 651), and others a conventional expression of praise occurring in the vocative in speeches (e.g. XI, 200). There are a number of recurring formulae: *θεόφιν μῆστωρ ἀτάλαντος* is used of Priam (VII, 366), of Peirithoos (XIV, 318) and of Patroclus (XVII, 477).⁵⁰ There is also a group of comparisons which may be labelled expressions of abuse; all of them are found in *oratio recta*. The most obvious examples are abusive comparisons in the taunts of warriors (VII, 235; VIII, 163; XI, 389); all these mention woman as a criterion of unwarlike behaviour. Expressions of the same sort are found in speeches of exhortation (V, 476; XIII, 292). In the Irus episode in *Odyssey* 18

⁴⁸ Cf. the occurrence of this simile as a statement of a view of life in the later poets: Mimn., 2, 1 ff. and Semonides, 29 D, 1 ff.

⁴⁹ On adjectival and adverbial comparisons see B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 194 ff.

⁵⁰ It is also used of Patroclus in *Odyssey*, 3 (110), and later in the same book of Neleus (409).

there are three abusive comparisons.⁵¹ At 4, 32 Menelaus reproaches Eteoneus for talking like a child, as he has hesitated to let the strangers in; this expression of abuse refers to a specific piece of conduct.

Simile illustrates the *μένος* of a hero or his temper in battle. Such comparisons describe a temporary state, a sudden accession of energy or fury that is sometimes given to a warrior by some divinity.⁵² Diomedes is wounded by Pandarus, but helped by Athene: he is seized by three times as much *μένος*, just as a lion wounded by a shepherd redoubles its fury (V, 136). The kernel of the simile is the description of the sudden increase in *μένος*. In the same way Athene puts into Menelaus the persistent *θάρος* of a gnat (XVII, 570).⁵³

Simile describes various physical reactions such as pain and the physical concomitants of emotion. The intensity of the pain felt by the wounded Agamemnon is compared to that of a woman in child-birth (XI, 269). The eyes of an angry man are compared to flashing fire (I, 104), and those of Odysseus unmoved by Penelope's lamentations to horn or iron in their fixed and unmoved state (19, 211). In the last example there is a contrast between Odysseus' external appearance and his inner feelings. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the physical concomitants and the emotion itself, as in the comparison of the weeping Patroclus to a weeping child that tugs at its mother's skirts to be picked up (XVI, 7). The child looks purposefully at its mother,⁵⁴ just as Patroclus intends to persuade Achilles. The simile measures Patroclus' misery, but also his dependence on Achilles. Other emotions illustrated by similes are: pleasure, as when Menelaus' heart warms at Antilochus' offer (XXIII, 598); eagerness, in Odysseus' impatience for departure from Phaeacia, compared to a ploughman's eagerness for food (13, 31); sense of relief, in the illustration of how welcome is the sight of land to Odysseus (5, 394). Odysseus is as dear to

⁵¹ 18, 27, 29, and 240 (cf. pp. 114-15 and n. 9 above).

⁵² In an expression like XVII, 565: "Ἐκτωρ πυρὸς αἰὼν ἔχει μένος Hector seems really to share the *μένος* of fire (cf. XVI, 752). On *μένος* as a sudden accession of power from outside see E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 8 ff.; Snell, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵³ On the identification of the insect see Körner, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

⁵⁴ For an analysis of the meaning of *δέρκεσθαι* see Snell, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 f.

Penelope as is land to shipwrecked sailors, who attain the land with joy, having escaped peril (23, 233). The simile describes Penelope's relief and her reaction to the ending of her anxieties. It also marks the climax of the whole story, the recognition of Odysseus by Penelope. In these passages obviously description of the emotion felt cannot be separated from that of the situation in which it occurs.

In a number of passages the simile illustrates a relationship between one individual and another, or between an individual and a group. A protective attitude is illustrated by the mother-child relationship: e. g.: Teucer protected by Ajax' shield (VIII, 271), or Athene's act of warding off an arrow from a vital part of Menelaus (IV, 130). This comparison is used in abuse of Odysseus by Ajax to the effect that Athene stands like a mother over him (XXIII, 783). The comparison drawn from the protective care of a father is found frequently in *oratio recta* in the *Odyssey*, both in descriptions of the kindly care of one individual for another, for example, Athene-Mentes advising Telemachus (1, 308), and also in descriptions of Odysseus in relation to his people (2, 47; 2, 234).

Several passages describing pondering and decision contain similes. Decision passages have been admirably discussed in detail by Arend,⁵⁵ who distinguished between "pondering" passages in which there is only one possible course of action and those in which a decision is to be made between two possibilities. X, 3 ff. belongs to the first class: Agamemnon's deliberation and the concomitant emotional disturbance are intensified by the simile of the flash of lightning that heralds bad weather or war. The description of Nestor's anxious ponderings (XIV, 16 ff.) belongs to the second class. He has to decide whether to go into the ranks of the Greeks or to seek out Agamemnon. The simile of the sea that does not roll in one particular direction until a steady wind sets in intensifies the urgency of his ponderings (cf. IX, 4). At the beginning of *Odyssey* 20 there is a decision scene that is in two parts with an example of both kinds of pondering. Firstly Odysseus has to decide whether or not to kill the unchaste servants. His angry heart is described metaphorically as barking (line 13). The metaphor is turned literal in the ensuing simile of the bitch that barks at a stranger and is

⁵⁵ W. Arend, *Die typische Scenen bei Homer* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 106 ff.

ready to attack him. Odysseus exhorts his heart to endure in spite of the provocation. Secondly he tosses like a haggis roasted on the fire (25), wondering what is his best way to kill the wooers, as he is one man against many. The similes illustrate the emotions that accompany his ponderings, that of the bitch his indignation at the maids for their conduct (and here there are two possible courses of action for him), and that of the haggis his anxious fears for the future contest, where no clear course of action is apparent. In the same way Penelope's ponderings and tearful indecisions are illustrated by the simile of the trapped lion (4, 791) and of the lament of the daughter of Pandareus (19, 518). Similes thus intensify passages of decision, which are sometimes important for the presentation of individual characters, especially those of Odysseus and Penelope.

The most important simile to describe the permanent traits of an individual is III, 60 ff.:

αἰεὶ τοι κραδίη πέλεκυς ὥς ἐστιν ἀτειρής . . .
ὥς σοὶ ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ἀτάρβητος νόος ἐστίν.

It is clear from the preceding line that Paris' reply to Hector's criticisms is not made in a tone of angry abuse, and so it may be taken as an objective comment on Hector's *κραδίη* and *νόος*. The presence of *αἰεὶ* together with the lack of heated rhetoric in Paris' reply shows that the description refers to a permanent characteristic and not to a passing state.⁵⁶ The simile here is part of the presentation of Hector as a steadfast, persistent, and tireless warrior; one may compare VI, 444, where Hector says of himself that it is not a sudden prompting that leads him to fight, but that he has learned to be brave always. Here the bravery is to be taken as a permanent characteristic. Less important for the representation of character is the comparison of the fame of Penelope to that of a great king (19, 109). The simile occurs in a speech of Odysseus, who is in disguise; the speech is a piece of immediate persuasive rhetoric rather than an objective statement of facts, and so is not to be taken as a significant addition to the portrait of Penelope. The compari-

⁵⁶ W. Marg, *Der Charakter in der Sprache der frühgriechischen Dichtung* (Würzburg, 1938), pp. 46, 52, and 54, denies a description of a permanent attribute in this passage; his arguments, though most ingenious like those of the rest of his book, fail to carry conviction here. See H. Fränkel, p. 35, and also his review of Marg's book in *A.J.P.*, LX (1939), pp. 475 ff.

son of Nausicaa among her companions to Artemis among her handmaidens (6, 102) is relevant to characterization in that it describes the beauty of the princess in terms of the highest excellence in a scene in which the difference between her companions and herself is made manifest as soon as Odysseus appears. In short similes such as 23, 103:

σοὶ δ' αἰὲ κραδίη στερεωτέρη ἐστὶ λίθοιο,

the judgment is only relevant to its immediate context, and has bearing on characterization only in so far as Penelope at this point seems to behave as if she were harder than stone.

Finally the simile is used to illustrate mass emotion. Comparison with deer to illustrate the cowardice of troops is found in formulaic form (XXII, 1; XXI, 29) and in simile form (IV, 243; XIII, 102). The lament of children and widows is used to measure the grief of the Achaeans at being far from home (II, 289). The joy of Odysseus' companions at his safe return is illustrated by the simile of calves that frisk when the cows return from pasture (10, 410); this is akin to the simile to illustrate the emotions of an individual as considered above.

Thus the primary function of the Homeric simile in its immediate context is to illustrate either a concrete action in the narrative or a series of actions that may be said to make up a situation, in which abstract qualities are important to a greater or lesser degree. The simile also illustrates temporary and permanent psychological traits. As has been pointed out frequently in the foregoing discussion, it is often impossible to state the whole of the function of the similes in terms of one single function; many of them fulfil a combination of some of the functions described above. Further some similes have, in addition to their grammatical relationship to the surrounding lines, an important place in the story-teller's art, because they vary the tension of the narrative; but this is a subject for a separate inquiry. In a sense almost every comparison and simile is individual. This is obviously true of those that do not belong to stock types of subject matter. But it is also true of those which seem to belong to a long bardic tradition. The place of comparison and simile in immediate and remoter contexts is so infinitely variable that each one must be examined as an individual poetic creation in its own right.

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AENEID III: A NEW APPROACH.*

Book III of the *Aeneid* is at once one of the most studied and neglected books of the epic. For nearly 100 years it has had the dubious distinction of occupying a central position in the controversy over the composition order among the various books of the *Aeneid*, a controversy so unsatisfactorily resolved that reputable scholars have placed the book in almost every conceivable position.¹ It is only natural that the rôle of book III should be a crucial factor here, for it has been universally designated as the least "finished" of the books. Several aspects of the book converge to support such a hypothesis:

- 1) the great number of inconsistencies² in narrative between III and the rest of the poem;
- 2) the relatively high number of incomplete lines;³
- 3) the general lack of "purple passages."⁴

The constant examination of these aspects, however, while perhaps pertinent to the controversy,⁵ has had a damning effect upon the book itself. As a result book III is often considered

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¹ Most significant are the diametrically opposed views of R. Heinze, *Vergils epische Technik*³ (Leipzig, 1915), pp. 86 ff., who places it late; and M. Crump, *The Growth of the Aeneid* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 30 ff. and 38, who places it first in the order of composition. For a fuller bibliography see both of these; M. B. Ogle, "On Some Theories Concerning the Composition of the Aeneid," *A. J. P.*, XLV (1924), pp. 260-75; A. Guillemin, "L'originalité de Vergile," *R. E. L.*, VIII (1930), pp. 153-211, 296-325, especially pp. 161 ff.; and A. S. Pease's edition of *Aeneid IV* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 56 ff.

² Some real and some exaggerated. For a complete discussion see Crump, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-28, and cf. C. Saunders, "The Relation of Aeneid III to the Rest of the Poem," *C. Q.*, XIX (1925), pp. 85-91 [= *Vergil's Primitive Italy* (Oxford, 1930), Ch. VIII].

³ Crump, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 29.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28 and note 1.

⁵ Ogle, *op. cit.*, p. 275, denies the value of such evidence for ascertaining the composition order, "... there is no such serious disagreement between these references as to justify any definite conclusion regarding the priority of this or that book in which they occur."

as a blot upon the perfection of the epic, grossly inferior to the other books and out-of-joint, so to speak, with the rest of the poem. The extreme view is expressed by Crump, who states that simple "want of revision will not account for the striking differences between III and the other books. Nothing short of rewriting the whole could bring it into harmony in style and matter with the rest of the poem."⁶

Book III has not been without its champions,⁷ however, who have rightly deplored the dissection of the book with little or no regard for artistic considerations.⁸ But the approach of these champions has often been more negative than positive in that their efforts have been concentrated in explaining away the discrepancies. This has been done with some success, but not all the difficulties can be explained in an equally satisfactory manner and the explanations offered on the same points differ most widely. For example, on the single question of why Aeneas at the beginning of III apparently has forgotten the words of Creusa at the end of II, that he should seek Hesperia, the following reasons have been advanced:

1) that "Hesperia," with its inherent meaning "land of the west," had no clear significance for Aeneas.⁹

2) that Aeneas heeds omens and prophecies of divine origin, but regularly disregards prophecies of mortals or their shades (except Anchises).¹⁰

3) that the discrepancy is intentional, foreknowledge being

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 29 f., and she is followed by Mackail, *The Aeneid* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 89 ff.; cf. F. Noack, "Die erste Aeneis Vergils," *Hermes*, XXVII (1892), pp. 407-45, who postulates an earlier and a later, revised plan for the *Aeneid*, but for him books III and V represent the revision!

⁷ Particularly Saunders, *op. cit.*; Ogle, *op. cit.*

⁸ Interesting enough Crump, *op. cit.*, p. 2, makes the same complaint, but in assailing book III devotes not all of two short paragraphs (pp. 28 f.) to the "artistic value" of the book. (Should unfinished lines be discussed here?)

⁹ E. Adelaide Hahn, "On an Alleged Inconsistency in the *Aeneid*," *C. W.*, XIII (1920), pp. 209-12; Ogle, *op. cit.*, p. 272; Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 85; cf. R. Mandra, *The Time Element in the Aeneid of Vergil* (Williamsport, Pa., 1934), p. 17, note 46.

¹⁰ E. Adelaide Hahn, "Aeneid 2.781 and Aeneid 3 Again," *C. W.*, XIV (1921), pp. 122-6.

deliberately forgotten to create suspense in a manner typical of ancient epic.¹¹

4) "that in life the goal is often forgotten, or rather—even when it is seen—is not fully understood."¹²

The effect of such explanations has often been rather to focus attention upon the minor difficulties and fail to reaffirm the artistic excellence of the book.

If, despite ingenious scholarship, minor discrepancies remain in the *Aeneid* (and even the most bitter critic of book III would not term them more than minor),¹³ then we must accept them cheerfully as a hazard of an incomplete work. If, on the other hand, book III as it stands reveals itself as part of an epic of different overall plan (as stated by Noack¹⁴ and implicit in the work of Crump),¹⁵ this is a more serious charge and strikes at the artistic unity of the epic as a whole. It is perhaps time to disregard the minutiae and examine the form, structure, and substance of book III.

The object of the present study will be to examine certain aspects of

- I. the overall plan of book III;
- II. the structural relationship among the various episodes within the book;
- III. the rôle played within the book by the two principals, Aeneas and Anchises;

and finally to relate each of these to the epic as a whole, or more particularly to the unit formed by books I-VI.

¹¹ George E. Duckworth, "Suspense in Ancient Epic—an Explanation of *Aeneid* III," *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), pp. 137 f.

¹² Stated by A. W. Allen in what I assume to be a defense of book III!, "The Dullest Book of the *Aeneid*," *C. J.*, XLVII (1951), pp. 119-23.

¹³ Crump, *op. cit.*, p. 2: "Though many imperfections and inconsistencies remain in the poem, yet the unity and artistic value of Vergil's conception are not affected by the want of final revision. Indeed, on a first reading of the *Aeneid* the inconsistencies pass unnoticed or are dismissed as unimportant."

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 443 ff.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*; she speaks throughout of different "versions," "conceptions," "plans," etc., represented by sections of the epic as it stands.

I.

The general function of book III is obviously to supply the second half of Aeneas' narrative to Dido. This of necessity must include, or at least summarize, the happenings of the Aeneadae in the interval between the fall of Troy and their arrival in Carthage, or more specifically their wanderings from Troy to Drepanum,¹⁶ completing the flash-back to the opening of book I. The great mass of legendary material concerning Aeneas' wanderings over the Mediterranean had in many centuries of accretion scarcely crystallized into the single, relatively coherent form which Vergil gives it here. The reduction of this body of often conflicting elements to a simple plot and the translation of this into an artistic unit is one of the most difficult problems which the author of the *Aeneid* had to face. Granting the necessity of a series of stops along the way, a degree of unity could be achieved by reducing the landings to a comparatively small number and by devising a plot line through which they could all be related. This Vergil did by limiting himself to nine major episodes en route, which he bound together around a plot of progressive revelations to Aeneas of his destiny. These episodes are:

- I. Thrace
- II. Delos
- III. Crete
- IV. Strophades (Harpies)
- V. Actium
- VI. Buthrotum
- VII. Passage from Epirus to Italy¹⁷
- VIII. Scylla and Charybdis¹⁸
- IX. Cyclops

¹⁶ Dido has already learned from Ilioneus (I, 520 ff.) what happened after the departure from Drepanum.

¹⁷ The yoking of the stops in Northern Epirus and Castrum Minervae in Italy is somewhat arbitrary. There is some indication, however, that they were conceived as a unit by Vergil, for the only purpose of the Aeroceraunia stop seems to have been that it offered the nearest crossing to Italy (cf. line 507).

¹⁸ The Scylla-Charybdis episode leads directly to the more extended narration of the adventure with the Cyclops and seems in many ways to serve as an introduction to it.

Now the plotting of *Aeneid* III upon a series of revelations has long been recognized, and the divine directives have been listed many times approximately as follows:¹⁹

1) [Episode I] the ghost of Polydorus: *fuge crudelis terras, fuge litus avarum*.

2) [II] the oracle at Delos: *antiquam exquirite matrem*.

3) [III] the Penates in a dream bid Aeneas seek Hesperia (= Italy).

4) [IV] the Harpy Celaeno: they will reach Italy but suffer war and famine.

5) [VI] the detailed prophecy of Helenus.

But does the pattern of omen and prophecy end here? If so, lines 505 to the end of the book, nearly one-third of the whole, stand apart from the revelation plot and would seriously threaten the unity of the book. Although episodes VII-IX contain no oracular responses as such, they do contain supernatural directives which are no less positively and often more dramatically stated than what has gone before. Thus we should continue the list through the book:

6) [VII] the omen of the four white horses, here a symbol of both war and peace, or rather of war and eventual victory.²⁰

7) [VIII] the emphasis of the actual encounter with Scylla and Charybdis is upon the fulfilment of the prophecy of Helenus, the implication being that the other details of the prophecy will prove equally true.

8) [IX] While the Cyclops episode assumes the proportions of an epyllion told for its own sake, the giant himself is a *monstrum horrendum* (658) and ominous is the whole vicinity of Aetna where the Aeneadae endure *immania monstra* (583).²¹ Achaemenides can perhaps lay no claim to divine powers, but the urgency of his plea: *fugite, o miseri, fugite* (639) is consciously parallel to the words of Polydorus' ghost in episode I.

¹⁹ Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 83 f.; G. Howe, "The Revelation of Aeneas' Mission," *Studies in Philology*, XIX (1922), pp. 31-41; H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Vergil's Art* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 343 ff.; H. L. Tracy, "The Gradual Unfolding of Aeneas' Destiny," *C.J.*, XLVIII (1953), pp. 281-4.

²⁰ Cf. Servius on *Aeneid*, III, 537-8.

²¹ Cf. C. Bailey, *Religion in Vergil* (Oxford, 1935), pp. 16-19.

It will be noted that each of the episodes except one, the stop at Actium, is centered upon this revelation pattern, and even episode V, containing the reference to the initiation of the Actian games, while ostensibly not prophetic for the Aeneadae, is nevertheless portentous in looking forward to the Augustan practice.²² This is of course Vergil's reason for including the stop and he has done so without destroying the unity of his theme.

When we examine further these nine episodes and the revelations they contain, they seem to fall into a natural tripartite grouping. The revelations in episodes I-III seem to have the business of making clear to the Aeneadae where they are to settle, culminating in the clear revelation of the Penates establishing the name at least of the region, i. e. Hesperia = Italy. IV-VI are concerned with the signs and perils of the approach and settlement of Italy, instructions of a most specific nature being given by Helenus. VII-IX begin the partial fulfilment of what has been forecast. The encounters with Scylla-Charybdis and the Cyclops propel the Aeneadae around Sicily for reasons other than purely divine direction. There is, moreover, a geographical grouping: I-III take place in the Aegean; IV-VI, in Western Greece; VII-IX in Magna Graecia. In addition the third episode of each unit has the emphasis of greater import and longer narration.²³

II.

Turning to an examination of the interrelationship of the various episodes listed above, we find that they have more in common than the series of revelations. They are all conceived on a similar pattern,²⁴ sharing many features in common. Each of the episodes contains all or most of the following elements:

²² See Servius on *Aeneid*, III, 274 and cf. R. B. Lloyd, "On *Aeneid*, III, 270-280," *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 292 ff.

²³ Less true of episode III which is just a few lines longer than I and II. It is interesting to note that the same grouping of adventures into units of three is apparent in *Odyssey* IX, X, and XII: see W. J. Woodhouse, *The Composition of the Odyssey* (Oxford, 1930), pp. 43 ff. Crump, *op. cit.*, p. 77, failing to note this deliberate arrangement, calls the Helenus and Achaemenides episodes "disproportionately long."

²⁴ H. L. Tracy, "The Pattern of Vergil's *Aeneid* I-VI," *Phoenix*, IV (1950), p. 2, notes in each visit "three thematic ideas, skillfully

A: the spotting of a new land, approach, and disembarkation.

B: a sacrificial ceremony.²⁵

C: an omen and/or divine revelation.

D: an interpretation of the above.

E: the departure, often under pressure or haste.

We should not infer from this, however, that Vergil's handling of the stops is in any way mechanical. If we examine the occurrence of these elements over the various episodes we can see not only how frequently they appear, but also how much subtle variation is possible within a rather set pattern:

I.	A	B	C	D	E
II.	A	C	D	B	E
III.	A	C	B	D	E
IV.	A	B	C	D ²⁶	E
V.	A	B			E
VI.	A	B	C		E
VII.	A	C	D	B	E
VIII.	A			D ²⁷	E
IX.	A		C		E

We must not suppose that the repetition of these elements, varied though they be, is anything but intentional and of calculated effect. This becomes more clear when we consider the various elements collectively.

varied—the motive for stopping, the portent enjoining departure, the new light shed on the future course." The similarity between the stops in Thrace and Delos had already been noted by Walter Jens, "Der Eingang des dritten Buches der Aeneis," *Philologus*, XCVII (1948), pp. 194-7.

²⁶ For the present study this element is confined to regular sacrifices to particular deities. There are in addition within the book two special services honoring the dead: one for Polydorus in episode I and one for Hector in episode VI. They are in essence miniatures of the detailed rites in honor of Anchises in book V; see C. Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-9.

²⁷ Not exactly an interpretation, but the recognition of the portent by a prayer to avert the indicated disaster.

An interpretation to the extent that it is recognized as a partial fulfillment of Helenus' prophecy. Actually in this sense episodes VI and VII should be taken closely together: the one being the prophecy of Helenus; the other, the partial realization of that prophecy in the appearance of Scylla and Charybdis. In essence, then, the element D, naturally absent in VI where we have the words of a divine interpreter himself, is logically reserved until VIII where the event itself proves his accuracy. Taken together episodes VI and VIII present the full sequence A-E.

A and E, the arrival and departure elements, are of course first and last in each episode; and are, as we might expect, somewhat formulaic in their expression as some samples of the phraseology in each case will show:

	A	E
I	<i>terra procul . . . colitur</i> (13) <i>feror huc</i> (16)	<i>provehimur portu</i> (72)
II	<i>colitur . . . tellus</i> (73) <i>huc feror</i> (78) <i>haec fessos . . . portu accipit</i> (78-9)	<i>linguimus . . . portus pelagoque volamus</i> (124)
III	<i>adlabimur oris</i> (131)	<i>deserimus sedem paucisque relictis</i> (190)
IV	<i>terra . . . se attollere . . . visa</i> (205-6) <i>aperire procul montis</i> (206) <i>caerulea verrunt</i> (208) <i>me litora . . . excipiunt</i> (209-10)	<i>fugimus . . . undis</i> (268)
V	<i>aperitur Apollo</i> (275) ²⁸ <i>hunc petimus fessi</i> (276)	<i>linquere portus iubeo</i> (289) <i>aequora verrunt</i> (290)
VI	<i>portuque subimus</i> (292)	<i>provehimur pelago</i> (506)
VII	a) ²⁹ <i>fessos sopor inrigat artus</i> (511) b) <i>procul . . . collis . . . videmus</i> (522) <i>portusque patescit</i> (530) <i>templum apparet</i> (531)	<i>castra movemus</i> (519) <i>linguimus arva</i> (550)
VIII	<i>procul e fluctu . . . cernitur Aetna</i> (554) ³⁰	<i>fessos ventus reliquit</i> (568)
IX	<i>adlabimur oris</i> (569)	<i>nos procul . . . fugam . . . celerare</i> (666) <i>verrimus . . . aequora</i> (668)

Certainly not all of the repetitious phraseology here is necessitated by metrical or vocabulary restrictions. Rather, the expression at these important junctures is calculated to sustain a mood which was announced in the introduction (first twelve lines) of the book. The despair of *diversa exilia et desertas quaerere terras* (4) and *litora cum patriae lacrimans portusque relinquo* (10) is reiterated, both modally and verbally, in every episode of book III such that it constitutes a major theme. Likewise the passive resignation of *auguriis agimur divum* (5) and *feror exul in altum* (11) finds its counterpart in the repetition of *feror* and other middle/passives: *provehimur*, etc.,³¹ as well

²⁸ Cf. lines 270: *iam medio apparet fluctu nemorosa Zacynthos*, and 701: *apparet Camerina procul*.

²⁹ a) = the stop at Acroceraunia; b) = Castrum Minervae; see note 17 above.

³⁰ Cf. lines 551 f.: *sinus . . . Tarenti cernitur*.

³¹ Cf. *practervehor*, line 688.

as the passivity of such expressions as *haec fessos*³² . . . *portu recipit* and *me litora . . . excipiunt*. The words *terra procul* announce the first episode and the repetition of *procul* . . . *apparet* and the like through the book seems to symbolize the one ray of hope which the Aeneadae have of eventually sighting the promised land. That *procul* characterizes their ultimate goal is clear from Helenus' words: *Ausoniae pars illa procul quam pandit Apollo* (479).

B, C and D appear in almost any order, although D of necessity occurs after C. B, or the formal sacrifice, occupies a particularly important rôle here not only in further demonstrating the religious piety of Aeneas and his followers, but in the opportunity afforded the author to retrace current Roman practices back into the legendary period. This object is especially clear in Helenus' instructions for the veiling of the head in sacrifice and his admonition that the practice be perpetuated (408-9):

hunc socii morem sacrorum, hunc ipse teneto;
hac casti maneant in religione nepotes.

And this procedure is duly followed by the Aeneadae when they touch Italy and perform the required sacrifice to Juno (543 ff.).

Sacrifices are offered to a variety of deities along the way and this is a point of some significance. Many scholars, and particularly the critics of book III,³³ have been disturbed by the fact that Apollo appears to dominate this book where one might have expected Venus. Although Apollo might well be expected to be a dominant factor in a book so concerned with divine revelation, there is no such imbalance in the objects of strictly formal sacrifice.³⁴ Here are the formal sacrifices as they appear in the episodes of the book:

I. Aeneas sacrifices to the *divi auspices*, specifically Venus and Jupiter (19 ff.).

³² On the significance of the repetition of *fessi* see Mandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 ff. and Allen, *op. cit.*

³³ Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 ff., and cf. pp. 84 ff.; Crump, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-5; cf. Ogle, *op. cit.*, pp. 266 ff., and Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 f. For more on the rôle of Apollo here see A. Gercke, *Die Entstehung der Aeneis* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 143 ff.; Prescott, *op. cit.*, pp. 345 ff.; Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 ff.

³⁴ Except perhaps for a natural favoring of Jupiter. On the significance of Jupiter here see Lloyd, *op. cit.*, pp. 296 ff.

- II. Anchises, a bull each to Neptune and Apollo; a black sheep to Hiems and a white one to Zephyrus (118 ff.).³⁵
- III. Aeneas, to the Penates (176 ff.).
- IV. Jupiter is called upon to share the human meal (222 ff.).
- V. Lustration to Jove (279 ff.).
- VI. Helenus sacrifices steers to Apollo and others (369 ff.).³⁶
- VII. The required sacrifice to Juno (543 ff.).

We have already seen the importance of C, a divine revelation or directive, for the structure of the book as a whole and in this respect it is the most important of the recurring elements within the book. We can add here that these revelations vary most widely in subject matter and significance. In such variation the author has shown great wisdom in avoiding the tedium of over-repetition. The directives in episodes I and IX are of only momentary importance, ushering the Aeneadae out of the district as quickly as possible. Episodes II and III provide the important clues to the region they are ultimately to settle. In episodes IV and VII specific incidents of their future in Italy are announced. The prophecy of Helenus in episode VI and its partial fulfilment in VIII give the most practical directives as to how the goal of Italy is to be reached. The prophecy of episode VI is the longest and most important which Aeneas receives in this book. It is no coincidence that it occurs at the precise center of the book.

The sources of divine utterance are also the most varied, coming from a ghost (Polydorus), an oracle (Delos), a dream vision (Penates), a prophet (Helenus), an omen (the four white horses), various *monstra* (Celaeno, Scylla-Charybdis, Cyclops), and we should perhaps add an experienced mortal (Achae-menides). Variation and suspense are derived from the fact that the divine directives, true to their nature, are of varying degrees of clarity, involving at least one instance of fatal error in the landing at Crete.

The recurring element D, interpretation of omen and prophecy, thus assumes a considerable significance in the episodes, for the

³⁵ Cf. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

³⁶ N. B. *exorat pacem divum* (370).

effectiveness of the often oblique revelations is directly limited by the meaning attached to them. It is here in the rôle of interpreter that the character Anchises especially comes to the fore.³⁷ We must now look briefly at the part played in book III by this and the other principal character Aeneas, as the relationship of these two characters has figured rather prominently in the criticism of the book.

III.

In the course of book III we find Anchises developing from a senior counsellor into somewhat of a seer himself.³⁸ In each instance it is Anchises who determines the meaning of the revelations which Aeneas receives along the way:

- I. The omen is referred to a council headed by Anchises and it is determined to leave the land (58 ff.).
- II. Anchises interprets the *antiquam matrem* as being Crete (103 ff.).
- III. After Aeneas reports his dream, Anchises recognizes the true meaning of the prophecy, recalling similar words of Cassandra (180 ff.).
- IV. Anchises prays to the gods to avert the ill-omened prophecy of Celaeno (265 ff.).
- VI. Although Helenus' words need no interpreting, Anchises plays a dominant rôle in the following scene and Helenus' direct plea (478-9):

et tamen hanc pelago praeterlabere necesse est;
 Ausoniae pars illa procul quam pandit Apollo
 is addressed to him.
- VII. Anchises interprets the horses seen by Aeneas as a symbol of war and peace (539 ff.).
- VIII. Anchises recognizes the Charybdis foretold by Helenus (558 ff.).
- IX. Anchises is foremost in honoring the words of Achaemenides (610 f.).

³⁷ On the rôle of Anchises as interpreter see Hahn in *C. W.*, XIV (1921), pp. 123 ff.

³⁸ H. T. Rowell, "The Scholium on Naevius in *Parisinus Latinus* 7930," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 1-22, minimizes any prophetic gifts of the living Anchises. I am in entire agreement with Rowell in his point that Anchises does not assume the proportions of a true "divinus" in life.

As an interpreter of the supernatural, then, Anchises dominates much of the action of book III. The pattern for this characterization is set very early in the book; in fact at the very outset it is Anchises who orders the departure from Troy (9). Largely in his rôle as interpreter he subsequently directs the departures from Thrace, Delos, Crete, the Strophades, Buthrotum, and Charybdis. The importance of this character is sustained to the very end of the book when his death at Drepanum brings Aeneas' narrative to Dido to a quiet close.

Although Anchises plays a most forceful part here, we must not for a moment suppose, as many have done,³⁹ that he usurps the place of Aeneas as hero of the epic. The clue to this fact is that the divine revelations are always made directly to Aeneas and there is no question that they concern his own personal destiny and that of his descendants. This aspect is thrown into high relief by Aeneas' complaint as he reports the death of his father (712-13):

nec vates Helenus, cum multa horrenda moneret,
hos mihi praedixit luctus, non dira Celaeno.

We must likewise be wary of attributing Aeneas' willingness to submit every question to his father and abide by his decision to weakness on the part of this character, for this is a most important aspect of his filial *pietas*. In connection with his religious devotion, which is here related, we should observe not only Aeneas' complete obedience to divine will as interpreted by his father, but also the dominant part he plays in the conduct of the series of formal sacrifices listed above.

Let us briefly summarize and draw together certain aspects of book III which we have examined. The book, taken by itself, is plotted on a series of significant stops of the Aeneadae in their wanderings from Troy to Drepanum. The most important aspect of these stops for the structure of the book is the gradual revelation to Aeneas of his ultimate goal, how it is to be reached and

³⁹ The relative importance of Anchises in this book has, needlessly I think, disturbed many; see Crump, *op. cit.*, p. 36, and Mackail, *op. cit.*, p. 91. On the significance of the relatively passive rôle of Aeneas in this book for the structure of the epic as a whole see R. S. Conway, *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, 1928), p. 140, and cf. George E. Duckworth, "The Architecture of the *Aeneid*," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15.

certain facts about his future there. These revelations are of varying degrees of import, of greater and lesser clarity, and come through agents of greater and lesser divinity, the whole being skilfully arranged so as to maintain suspense and interest. Although the external events of the several episodes are the most varied, their patterns are essentially very similar. The repetition of these patterns and their elements serves to emphasize what might be termed the dominant themes of the book:

1) The resigned despair and weariness of the Trojans, defeated in a long war and now compelled to wander for many years. This is emphasized by the repeated comings and goings, recorded in intentionally passive and repetitious phraseology [A and E above].

2) This is balanced by an eagerness on the part of Aeneas and his followers to ascertain and fulfil their destiny, the more so as they gradually become aware of it as the will of a higher authority. This is emphasized by extreme religious piety, exemplified in their religious performances to a variety of deities [B above] as well as their eagerness to take advantage of oracular seats and to interpret all omens and supernatural phenomena as keys to divine will [D above].

3) The omnipresence of divine directives is reassuring, perhaps more to the reader than to the suffering Aeneadae, that these are indeed a favored people who have the promise of a more glorious future [C above].

In the midst of these we find what are perhaps the most important stages in the development of two principal characters of the epic—Aeneas and Anchises. Not only is Aeneas' piety towards his gods, his father, and his fellow citizens here amply illustrated but, as Howe has pointed out,⁴⁰ Aeneas in the course of book III turns from hopeless exile to man with a mission, although the precise nature of that mission is still unclear. Anchises, on the other hand, occupies a considerable rôle as

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, and "The Development of the Character of Aeneas," *C. J.*, XXVI (1930), pp. 182-93. The observation that Vergil's characters develop is a contribution of the present century; cf. Howe's note 1 and see Gunnar Carlsson's study, "The Hero and Fate in Vergil's Aeneid," *Eranos*, XLIII (1945), pp. 111-35.

advisor,⁴¹ and in the process displays an ever-increasing talent as interpreter of divine will, and even prophet.

It remains for us to consider whether the aspects of book III revealed by the above analysis are consonant with the epic as a whole, or whether they reveal a radically different scheme such as would betray an alternate structural plan for the *Aeneid*. It hardly need be pointed out that a theme of Aeneas' wanderings from Troy to Latium is at the base of the structure of books I-VI as a unit,⁴² book II providing by way of background a full description of the disaster which precipitated such an odyssey. But, moreover, just as book III is plotted on a series of significant stops from Troy to Drepanum, the expanded structure of I-VI as a whole is a series of significant stops from Troy to Latium. The relationship, however, goes much deeper than this. Chronologically, after the events of III, there are three episodes before the arrival in Latium: Carthage (books I and IV, framing Aeneas' narrative); Sicily (book V); and Cumae (book VI). These, while painted on a much wider canvas than any single episode of book III, follow in rather precise detail the pattern laid down there.

Although much of the desperate weariness of the Aeneadae has given way to a greater awareness of purpose (gained by the end of III) the mood of essential weariness which was the keynote of successive arrivals and departures in III (A and E above) is here sustained. Note the tenor of the passage describing the landing in North Africa (I, 157 ff.):

defessi⁴³ Aeneadae quae proxima litora cursu
contendunt petere, et Libyae vertuntur ad oras, etc.

⁴¹ I do not believe with Howe that as Aeneas grows stronger the character of Anchises becomes less significant. It may be true that Aeneas grows less dependent upon Anchises' wisdom as the book progresses, but the view that Anchises' rôle diminishes in the final episodes of book III is not accurate; see above pp. 143 f.; cf. Carlsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 125 f.

⁴² That books I-VI form a unit from which VI is not to be excluded has recently been reaffirmed by G. E. Duckworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 f.; cf. W. A. Camps, "A Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *C. Q.*, N. S. IV (1954), pp. 214 f.

⁴³ The adjective *fessus* occurs twice more in the passage (168, 178); cf. pp. 140-1 and note 32 above. *Defessi* has been a constant characterization of the Aeneadae from the beginning of the epic; see H. L. Tracy in *Phoenix*, IV (1950), p. 1.

and Sicily (V, 26 ff.):

tum pius Aeneas: 'equidem sic poscere ventos
iamdudum et frustra cerno te tendere contra.
flecte viam velis. an sit mihi gratior ulla,
quove magis fessas optem demittere navis,
quam quae Dardanium tellus mihi servat Acesten
et patris Anchisae gremio complectitur ossa?'

and Cumae (VI, 1, 2):

Sic fatur lacrimans, classique immitit habenas
et tandem Euboicis Cumarum adlabitur oris.

A comparison of these passages with the similar junctures of book III (see pp. 140 and 141 above) will reveal how largely through repetitious vocabulary this mood is sustained.

The formal sacrifice (B above) continues to occupy an important position in each of the stops. In Carthage, significantly enough, the theme is inverted—the sacrifices are Dido's and ill-omened they are indeed; first to many deities in passionate desperation (IV, 56 ff.), and then rites for the gods of the underworld (IV, 509 ff.),⁴⁴ and finally Stygian Jove (IV, 638 ff.), which conceal her suicide. The return to the theme of formal sacrifice as illustrative of the piety of Aeneas and his followers is by means of the funeral rites in honor of Anchises, to which book V is almost entirely devoted and through which Anchises attains almost divine status.⁴⁵ The theme is emphatically restated in the elaborate preparations for the descent in book VI which begin with a sacrifice to Apollo (37 ff.) and culminate appropriately in one to the gods of the underworld (243 ff.).

Most significant of all for the relationship of the structure of book III and that of books I-VI as a whole is the importance of divine directive (C above). We have already seen how a unity was given to the various stops in the securing of successive revelations. An examination of the episodes outside III will show that this pattern of successive revelation begins actually before the departure from Troy and has not run its course until the end of VI. Though not in continuous climactic order, the progression of these manifestations as a whole is from a simple direction to depart from Troy in book II to complete revelation

⁴⁴ Note also her earlier ill-omened offerings in lines 453-5.

⁴⁵ See C. Bailey, *op. cit.*, pp. 293 ff., and note 25 above.

of the glorious future of the Aeneadae in book VI.⁴⁶ Thus to our list of revelations in book III (see p. 137 above) we can not only add, as a prelude from the preceding book,⁴⁷

Book II:

a) the vision of Hector (270 ff.)⁴⁸ who bids Aeneas flee from Troy with the holy things and the Penates, eventually to found a city for them

b) Venus (590 ff.)⁴⁹ who, revealing the futility of the fight, directs him to his home and escape

[c) the omen of fire around the head of Iulus, followed by thunder on the left and a shooting star (680 ff.), a personal revelation for Anchises]

d) the ghost of Creusa (772 ff.) who predicts long exile but eventual happiness, kingship, and a royal bride in "Hesperia"

but continue the list generally as follows:⁵⁰

Book IV: Jupiter's rebuke of Aeneas (via Mercury) stated in terms of neglect of posterity (222 ff.). A second urging is necessary (556 ff.).⁵¹

Book V: the vision of Anchises (722 ff.) hinting at future wars in Latium and directing the visit to Cumae and the underworld.

Book VI: the interview with the shade of Anchises, revealing the future greatness of Rome (679 ff.).

The stops at Carthage, Sicily, and Cumae, moreover, form the same sort of triad characteristic of the grouping of episodes in book III. As a unit the revelations here received deal with the same aspect of Aeneas' destiny = the future of his race in Italy; the episodes mark another geographical unit: the western Mediterranean; and are so constructed as to lead to a climax in

⁴⁶ F. J. Miller, "Vergil's Motivation of the *Aeneid*," *C.J.*, XXIV (1928), pp. 28-44, and C. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁴⁷ Cf. Traey in *C.J.*, XLVIII (1953), p. 282.

⁴⁸ Note especially the *fuge, nate dea* and compare the words of the ghost of Polydorus and those of Achaemenides in book III (see p. 137 above).

⁴⁹ Again note the language: *eripe, nate, fugam*.

⁵⁰ The list from this point does not pretend to be complete. There are many manifestations of divine will in books IV-VI; only the major directive or revelation from each book is cited.

⁵¹ N. B. *non fugis hinc praeceps?* and cf. notes 47 f. above.

the third episode, which is related in greater detail. Certainly *Aeneid* VI is designed as a "keystone" in the series of stops and successive revelations basic to the structure of the first half of the epic. At the end stands the fullest revelation of the destiny of the wandering people which incidentally neatly balances, although of much wider scope, the prophecy of Jupiter in book I (254 ff.). The latter, of course, was not intended for Aeneas' ears, but functions rather in an expository way for the reader.

Finally, we observed in book III the necessity of an interpretation of divinely inspired omen and prophecy (D above) and how Anchises there functioned almost exclusively in this capacity. To be sure Anchises is not present in the flesh to render such services in books IV-VI, but fortunately in his absence divine directives become less obscure. The absence of such an advisor is immediately felt, however, and as E. Adelaide Hahn has pointed out, "practically the first thing Aeneas does after losing his father is to get into mischief."⁵² But conversely, granted the desirability of including the Dido episode, one could hardly imagine Anchises present for it! At any rate, Anchises' death at the end of III seems timely for more reason than bringing the book to a quiet close. The metamorphosis of Anchises into a guiding spirit in the other world is clearly essential for the desired conclusion of the first six books. After the intermediary of the extensive devotions to him in book V we are prepared for the appearance of his ghost directing the course of the Aeneadae at the end of the book and for his appearance in Hades as well.⁵³ But the extraordinary gifts which he displays do not accrue to Anchises simply because he is dead! This fact

⁵² See above, note 10; cf. W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London, 1911), p. 414.

⁵³ Many have concluded that the position of book V is so awkward as to suggest an alternate arrangement of the books, observing that V more logically follows III and that IV and VI form a sequence (see Crump, *op. cit.*, pp. 65 ff.). These fail to observe the artistic desirability of delaying the apotheosis of Anchises to a position immediately in front of the visit to Hades. The present writer finds no awkwardness, structurally or geographically, in two visits to Sicily. The fact that the first visit is not described is all the more indicative of the fact that Vergil had a second, more fully developed episode in mind and that book V is not an afterthought.

is essential for an understanding of the relationship of III to the rest of the poem. We have been prepared for this most carefully. Granted the overall plan of I-VI building toward the *nekuia* and final grand revelation, what better choice for the delivery in Hades (in the absence of a Tiresias) than Anchises? This is not the happy inspiration of the moment, however, for the groundwork for such a climax has been carefully laid, principally in book III, but overall by consistent characterization from the very first appearance of the character in book II. His death, necessary somewhere along the line, is placed at the end of III, not as an afterthought, but only after he has been clearly established in the rôle of divine interpreter. At the same time an embarrassing presence in book IV is avoided and the interval of book V is allowed for a sort of apotheosis.

The extreme devotion of Aeneas for his father, moreover, and the dominant influence of Anchises over his son's life is not a relationship confined to book III. In book II Aeneas is unwilling (657 ff.), in spite of the previous injunction of his mother (590 ff.), to depart from Troy until Anchises has decided that it is the best course. This influence does not wane even after his death. Book V is almost entirely devoted to funeral games in his honor and after the firing of the ships Anchises' ghost appears (722 ff.)⁵⁴ to urge the counsel of Nautes (who seems to be momentarily filling the void of a living Anchises) and directs, as he so often did in book III, the sailing to the next port. This relationship between the two characters reaches its golden climax in their encounter in Hades.

From these factors it should be abundantly clear that book III cannot be considered as standing apart from the rest of the epic. When we examine the structure of its episodes and the delineation of its characters, we find them so integrally related to the plan of the unit formed by books I-VI that we might rather point to book III as basic to our understanding of the structure of the first half of the epic: a pattern of the wanderings of Aeneas, plotted on a series of stops at each one of which the hero receives some supernatural guidance as to the ultimate attainment of his goal.

If book III was the earliest of the books to be written, and

⁵⁴ Cf. IV, 351 ff. and VI, 695 ff.

the likelihood seems to the present writer exceedingly great, what we have here is not the stumbling effort of a poet who was not yet certain of what course this work would eventually take. As a matter of fact the quite external evidence of the *Life* by Suetonius⁵⁵—that he sketched the whole out in prose first—would be against this. Rather the poet had in mind not only a general outline, but a detailed conception of a pattern for the structure of his episodes and a clear notion of how the major characters, Aeneas and Anchises, would be developed at least through the first half of the poem. The minor discrepancies, numerous half-lines and relatively incomplete state of the book should not obscure this fact.

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⁵⁵ J. Brummer, *Vitae Vergilianae* (Leipzig, 1912), p. 6; cf. Guillemin, *loc. cit.*

THE EPITAPH OF AERARIUS APER AT TARRACO.

The first two inscriptions which are here examined were discovered in the foundations of a Gothic chapel at Tarragona on a reused block and were published by Samuel Ventura Solsona, "Inscripciones halladas en el Anfiteatro," *Boletín arqueológico de la Real Sociedad Arqueológica Tarraconense*, LV (1955), pp. 12-15 as nos. 10 and 11 (hereafter Ventura), and were republished in the next issue with the same photographs by Sebastián Mariner Bigorra, "El epitafio de Aper," *ibidem*, pp. 107-16 (hereafter Mariner).

Ventura considers the lettering identical in the two inscriptions. Whether they are by the same hand I do not know, but I think the block was originally used for no. 11 alone, which accordingly provides a *terminus post quem*. No. 11 reads:

L. Fuficio Mevan(ia) Prisco
vet(erano) leg(ionis) VII g(eminae) f(elicis) et Flaminiae
Melete

3 uxori et Domitiae Saturninae adfini
Fuficia Germana lib(erta) h(eres) f(ecit).

The resolutions are by Ventura except *Mevan(ia)* in line 1 by Oliver and *h(eres)* in line 4 by Mariner.

The letters MEVAN in line 1 give the document interest. They seem to me correctly interpreted by Ventura as a reference to the town of Mevania in Italy, though I cannot accept the adjectival form *Mevan(iensi)* which both Ventura and Mariner adopt. Undoubtedly they have in mind the adjectival forms of both genuine tribes and pseudo-tribes. For instance, in *C. I. L.*, XVI, 189 a man from Philippopolis is called *M. Aurelio M. f. Ulp(ia) Potenti Philippopoli*, and in the index on p. 247 Nesselhauf comments "Loco tribus positum cognomen patriae ab imperatoris nomine derivatum." In our inscription, however, MEVAN is not the *cognomen patriae* but the *patriae nomen*, and so must be resolved as a noun, *Mevan(ia)*, in conformity with unabbreviated parallels.¹ The recording of the

¹ Giovanni Forni, "Il tramonto di un'istituzione: Pseudo-tribù romane derivate da soprannomi imperiali," *Studi giuridici in memoria*

veteran's town in his name at the place where one would expect the tribe, between filiation and cognomen, reflects a trend which begins in the second half of the first century and does not help us much with a dating. Nor does the veteran's Italian origin. Vespasian did not exclude the enlistment of Italians on a voluntary basis.² An Italian can have been no rarity in a Spanish port, and if an Italian in fit condition wished to join a legion being recruited in Spain, there was nothing to stop him.

On the other hand, since the *legio VII gemina* is thought to have obtained the epithets *felix* in A. D. 73/4 and *pia* around A. D. 200,³ the veteran's release from the army seems to have occurred between those two dates, while the inscription no. 11, which postdates his death, must be placed between A. D. 80 and 220. And since the lettering of no. 10 is not dissimilar, it follows that no. 10 falls only a few years later.

di Alfredo Passerini (*Studia Ghisleriana*, Serie I, vol. II [Milan, 1955]), pp. 89-124, especially p. 122, where precisely this type of nomenclature is treated as one indication of the decline of the tribe. Apart from cases of a *soprannome* (pseudo-tribe) replacing the tribe, twelve cases are known to Forni where the name of the town stands between filiation and cognomen without accompanying mention of the tribe. Of course, other cases exist where both elements (tribe and town) are present and have been attracted so that both stand between filiation and cognomen or both, where mention of the town belongs, after the cognomen; but whether or not such cases formed a bridge to ours, they are different.

² Eric Birley, *Festschrift für Rudolf Egger (Beiträge zur älteren europäischen Kulturgeschichte*, I [1952]), p. 178; Giovanni Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano* (Milan, 1953), ch. V, "La provincializzazione delle legioni e la questione della 'esclusione' degli Italiani," and Appendix B, "*Origines* dei legionari (ordinate geograficamente)." A document published by Abdullatif Ahmed Aly, "A Latin Inscription from Nicopolis," *Annals of the Faculty of Arts, Ain Shams University*, III (1955), pp. 113-46, and further studied by J. F. Gilliam, "The Veterans and Praefectus Castrorum of the II Traiana in A. D. 157," *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), pp. 359-75, shows that of 133 discharged in A. D. 157 from a legion in Egypt 15 were Italians.

³ So Ritterling, *R.-E.*, XII (1925), coll. 1632 and 1637, s. v. "legio." Ritterling's argument is accepted by Antonio García Bellido, *La "legio VII Gemina Pia Felix" y los orígenes de la ciudad de León* (Madrid, Editorial Maestre, 1950), p. 13. On the other hand it is rejected without reference or evidence by Mariner, p. 116, who seems to have confused the epithets *felix* and *pia*. The inscription *I. L. S.* 254 (under Vespasian) suffices to disprove Mariner's assertion that the epithet *felix* began under Caracalla.

No. 10, for which the veteran's inscription would permit a date anywhere between A. D. 80 and 230, is engraved in a *tabula ansata* or cartouche such as are particularly common in the second century but occur in Attica from the late first to the third century and in Tripolitania from the early first to the late fourth century. The first century may really be excluded; perhaps the end of the second century would be the most likely date for no. 10, which is clearly an epitaph. The deceased was an otherwise unknown young man called Aper *aerarius* (so Venura and Mariner) or, as I believe, Aper Aerarius, i. e. Aerarius Aper. The nomen is not indispensable in an epigram, but, to be sure, rare nomen Aerarius is actually attested at Mutina in Italy,⁴ and it seems better to read a name, since names were frequently allowed to violate the metre.

Though, on the stone, verse 1 of the epitaph of Aerarius Aper was broken after *iacet* and inscribed on two lines, each of the following verses was inscribed on a line of its own; but since we wish to show the scansion, we shall print the first verse as a single line and ignore in our numbering and alignment the actual arrangement of the inscription. The scansion is one of the things which give this poem its interest, because the poem is a dated document of the transition from quantitative verse to rhythmic verse, a subject recently advanced by Mariné's valuable book on the metrical inscriptions of Spain (hereafter Mariné).⁵ The epitaph reads:

Conditus his tumulis iuvenis iacet hic Aper Aerarius ille
 cuius viventis fuit probata i<u>ventus.
 pauper vixisti. fuisti pronus amicis.
 annis vixisisti (triginta), duo menses et d(ies) octo.

⁴ See W. Schulze, *Zur Geschichte der lateinischen Eigennamen* (Gött. Abh., Phil.-hist. Kl., V [1904]), p. 344.

⁵ Sebastián Mariné Bigorra, *Inscripciones hispanas en verso* (Publicaciones de la Escuela de Filología de Barcelona, XI [1952]), of which the usefulness is greatly reduced by the absence of an index and, on p. 215, even of cross references. Mariné and Mariner are of course identical, but the difference in spelling is here preserved to distinguish the book from the article.

- 5 ó dolor, ó lacrim<a>e! ubi te dum qu<a>era<m> ego, nate?
 has tibi fundo miser lacrimas pater orfanus, ecce.
 effugit et lumen, labuntur membra dolore.
 hoc melius fuerat, ut funus hoc mihi parares.
 infernus si qua sapent, miserum me abducite patrem.
- 10 iam carui lucem, qui te amisi ego, nate.
 si, qui pergis iter viator, transis aut p[au]llo resistes
 et relegis titulum sulcato marmore ferro,
 quod ego feci pater pio mi dulcissimo nato,
 hoc bene habet, titulus. tumulo manent ossa s[epulta].
- 15 se[mper in] perpetuo vale, mi ka[ri]ssim[e nate].

2 IVENTVS *marmor*, i<u>ventus *Ventura*. 4. vix{is}isti *Ventura*.
 5. LACRIME et QVERA *marmor*, lacrim<a>e et qu<a>era<m> *Ventura*.
 11 pollore sistes *Ventura*, p<au>llo resistes *Mariner*, p[au]llo resistes
Oliver. 14 c[ontecta] *Mariner*, s[epulta] *Oliver*. 15 semper i[n] p[er]per-
 petuo vale mi ka[ri]ssime na[te] *Mariner*.

TRANSLATION

Here in this grave lies hidden a young man, that Aerarius Aper whose conduct during his youth was irreproachable. You had no riches, while you lived; of yourself you were ready to give to friends. Thirty years you lived, two months and eight days. Oh grief, oh tears! Where then shall I look for you, son? See, a bereaved and unhappy father sheds these tears for you. Even the light has departed for him, and his limbs collapse in grief. It would have been better if you had had to perform this office for me. If the shades have any feeling, I bid them take me away, the unhappy father. I have already lost the light, who have lost you, son. Oh, traveler on your way, whether you pass or stop a moment and read the inscription on the engraved marble, my duty has been performed: what I, the father, have been able to do for a devoted son very dear to me is this, an inscription. The bones lie buried in the tomb. Forever in eternity farewell, son very dear to me.

In the following notes the abbreviation CE refers to the Teubner edition of the *Carmina latina epigraphica*, vols. I (1895) and II (1897) edited by F. Buecheler and vol. III (1926) edited by E. Lommatzsch.

Line 1 like lines 4 and 11 contains at least seven feet. For examples of hexameters with seven or eight feet see F. D. Allen, "On Greek Versification in Inscriptions," *Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, IV (1886-1887, published in 1888), p. 45. Such irregularities are probably due, as Allen says on p. 38, to tinkering with lines that are copied from other epigrams. The poetaster could not settle either for *Conditus his tumulis iuvenis iacet hic Aper ille* or for *Conditus his tumulis iacet hic Aerarius ille*, because (cf. Édouard Galletier, *Études sur la poésie funéraire romaine dans les inscriptions* [Paris, 1922], pp. 293-5) the satisfaction to the corpse of hearing his name pronounced with both nomen and cognomen took precedence over any aesthetic considerations.

Line 2: IVENTVS, a common error of haplography, or rather perhaps a common spelling (see Mariné, p. 28).

Line 4 begins with the dative *annis* and then changes for metrical reasons to the accusative construction. This is why *menses* has to be spelled out, whereas *d(ies)* can be abbreviated. CE 1829 contains a similar line, *vixisti triginta annos duo mensibus et sex*. VIXISISTI looks like a mere error of dittography for VIXISTI, but if so, the poetaster in combining formulas saddled himself with one and a half feet too many. The line that gives the age of the deceased, as Galletier, *Études sur la poésie funéraire*, p. 295 notes, is often hypermetric or can be scanned only at the beginning and at the end: for instance, in *Année épigraphique*, 1920, no. 23, *annos vixi XVI et mensibus VIII totidemque diebus et horis*. Our poetaster may have deliberately written VIXISISTI in order to scan the line with two extra but complete feet.

Lines 5-7: The spelling LACRIME should be noted. The word QVERA was recognized by Ventura as *quaeram*, though he suggested that *quaero* might fit the sense too. Since I interpret *dum* as a particle and not as a conjunction, I place a question mark after *nate* and eliminate the form *qu<a>er<o>* from consideration. So also Mariner. On *lumen* as life itself see Angelo Brelich, *Aspetti della morte nelle iscrizioni sepolcrali dell'Impero Romano* (*Dissertationes Pannonicae*, Ser. I, Fasc. 7 [1937]), p. 6; Richmond Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XXVIII [1942], 1-2), p. 163.

Lines 8-9: In *fuera*t the last syllable has been lengthened before the caesura (for parallels see Mariné, pp. 128 f.). Note the importance of the stress accent on emphatic words in the second half of line 8. On the lamentation that the death was untimely and that it would have been better for the child to have buried the parent see Bruno Lier, "Topica carminum sepulcralium latinorum," *Philologus*, LXII (1903), pp. 456-60. This might be called the *aequius* formula from CE 456, 822, and 1156. For the word *parare* an epigram from Brundisium, CE 2130, offers a parallel, *quot decuit natam matri patrique parare, hunc titulum*

miseræ fecit uterque parens. The phrase *inferi si qua sapent* (with the vulgar ending from the second conjugation, as Mariner notes) is a variation of the formula *si quid sapiunt inferi* (CE 179 and 647, Rome) or *siquid Manes sapiunt* (CE 1147, Salona). Line 9, crudely telescoped, means, "If the Manes have any feeling, they will take me away, the miserable father. Ah, take me!" It is a cross between the formula of the second person and the formula of the third person. The imperative *abducite* supports Brelich's interpretation, *Aspetti della morte*, p. 78, against Cumont and Galletier, that these hypothetical statements do not express doubt or hesitation but reinforce the thought. This is perhaps one of the epigram's main contributions.

Line 10: On the theme of death as the removal of light see Brelich, *Aspetti della morte*, pp. 5-7 and Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, pp. 161-4, and the two epigrams added by Louis Robert, *Hellenica*, X (1955), pp. 278-9. *Caruit lucem* (CE 503, Rome), *vitam caruisti* (CE 1328, Africa) and *amisi lucem* (CE 496 Rome) serve as parallels.

Lines 11-12: The *i* of *viator* is a semi-consonant (cf. Mariné, p. 147). In combining formulas the poetaster saddled himself here with an extra foot. In line 11, Ventura had read *pollore sistes*, but Mariner rightly divided *p<au>llo resistes*. He explains the alleged *o* as phonetic. Thinking, as I still do, that the alleged *o* appeared in the photograph as merely a round hole, I had assumed a ligature of AV lost in the hole. The form *resistes* has, as Mariner notes, a vulgar termination from the second conjugation. Compare CE 54, 63, 73, 74, 76, 82, 83, 117, and 118 for the verb *resistere* in this sense. For *paullo* compare *Aspecto paulum tumulto subsiste, viator* (CE 1305, cited by Mariner), Βαῖον ἐπιστήσας ἰχθυσ (Kaibel, *Epigrammata graeca ex lapidibus conlecta*, 690), Βαῖον στῆσον ἰχθυσ (Kaibel 616), Βαῖον μείνον, ξεῖρε (Kaibel 338), and others cited by Malcolm MacLaren, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 475. [W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, is not yet available to me.] On the address to the wayfarer see also Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, pp. 230-4. Here it is the survivor and not the deceased who addresses the wayfarer. For the image *sulcato marmore ferro* compare uses of the verb *exarare*.

Lines 13-14: Mariner and I had prepared a more complete republication of the inscription independently with the natural result that we tended to emphasize different aspects within a wider field of general agreement, but there was also some disagreement, especially in the punctuation of lines 11-14, which Mariner edited as follows:

Si qui pergis iter, viator, transis aut p<au>llo resistes
et relegis titulum sulcato marmore ferro
quod ego feci pater pio mi dulcissimo nato:
hoc bene habet titulus: tumulo manent ossa e[ontecta].

For Mariner the antecedent of *quod* (line 13) is to be found in line 12, for me no. Even though he of course recognizes the gender of *titulum*, he makes *titulum* rather than *marmore* the antecedent of *quod*. Furthermore, he seems to ignore the *si* of line 11 entirely in his transla-

tion: "Viandante, ya prosigas tu marcha, pases o te detengas un poco y leas el epitafio en mármol a cincel surcado, que yo, su padre, hice a un hijo dulcísimo, lleno de amor para mí, bien lo dice la inscripción: en el túmulo quedan enterrados sus restos." For the phrase *bene habet* Mariner cites CE 500 from Tarraco itself: *Fuscus habet titulos mortis, habet tumulum. | contegit ossa lapis. bene habet.* He assumes that in CE 500 this means *καλῶς ἔχει*, "está bien," and asks whether in Aper's epitaph *hoc* (neuter) does not agree irregularly with *titulus*. But surely *titulum* cannot be the antecedent of *quod*, and *hoc* cannot agree with *titulus*, while in finally adopting the translation "bien lo dice la inscripción" he sacrifices the advantage of his parallel. I too had noted the parallel in CE 500, which incidentally Bulhart cites with other parallels in *T. L. L.*, VI, s. v. "habeo," col. 2451, but I assumed that the phrase *bene habet* in both epigrams meant "The requirement has been fulfilled." Its use, not in colloquial prose, but in poetry may be cited. Seneca, *Oedipus*, 998: *Bene habet, peractum est: iusta persolvi patri.* Seneca, *Hercules furens*, 1035: *Bene habet, . . . vota persolvi libens.* Statius, *Thebaid*, XI, 557: *Bene habet. non inrita vovi.* See also *Thebaid*, XII, 338 and even Propertius IV, 11, 97. The antecedent of *quod*, or rather its postcedent, would be *hoc*, with which *titulus* would stand in apposition. Furthermore, in line 13, where *mi* is probably a dative rather than a proclitic possessive, the dative depends, I think, not from *pio* (so Mariner), but from *dulcissimo*. What, then, would be the point of the statement *quod ego feci pater pio mi dulcissimo nato | hoc bene habet, titulus?* Since, after all, a *titulus* is very little, I interpret the statement against the background of a *topos* which occurs frequently near the end of an epigram, namely the apology that the monument is unworthy of the deceased (cf. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, pp. 227-30). I believe that the address to the wayfarer is enclosed in the protasis of a conditional sentence for which a separate theme in lines 13-14 constitutes the apodosis, so that the *topos* of the address to the wayfarer is subordinated instead of being juxtaposed to the *topos* of the inadequacy of the monument: "Oh traveller on your way, whether you pass or stop a moment and read the inscription on the engraved marble, my duty has been performed (*bene habet*): what I, the father, have been able to do for a devoted son very dear to me is this, an inscription."—The unaccented final syllables of *feci*, *pio* and *dulcissimo* have been shortened, while *quod* is treated as a long syllable.—The curved top of either C or G or S represents the last visible letter. For Oliver's restoration *tumulo manent ossa s[epulta]* compare CE 501 (Mauretania), *Hisce locis Flori requiescunt ossa sepulta.* For expressions of place without the preposition *in* see Mariné, pp. 104 f.

Line 15, read from the photograph by Mariner with the help of the parallel in CE 542, left him with a still unsolved problem of interpretation, namely whether to place the comma before or after *mi*. We shall return to this problem.

F, as I shall henceforth call this epigram erected by a father for his deceased son, Aerarius Aper, comes from Tarraco, and that is where another epigram which I shall call W, ordered by a wife for her deceased husband, was discovered centuries ago. I refer to *C. I. L.*, II, 4427 = CE 542. A close similarity of themes, words, structure, and prosody connects the two epitaphs, which⁶ might even have been composed by the same poetaster, because the woman who ordered the monument need not have composed the epitaph herself. The stone is now lost, but I offer the following text of W based on disagreeing copies of the sixteenth century as reported by Huebner in the *C. I. L.*

[----- name -----]

[----- virtues -----]

[----- biographical details -----]

[-----] mens() (quattuor).

5 Manes si saperent, miseram me abducerent coniugem.

vivere iam quo me? lucem iam nolo videre.

dulcem carui lucem, cum te amisi ego, coniunx.

lacrimae si prosunt visis, te ostende videri.

haec tibi sola domus, [qualem pia paupera feci].

10 semper in perpetuo vale, mihi carissime coniunx.

This is an important document for Mariné, who treats it on pp. 16, 17, 20, 94, 97, 102, 103, 123, 124, 129, 130, 132, and 164. On pp. 16-17 he argues for a date in the third or even second century after Christ.

Lines 4 and 5 may balance each other metrically, *méns(ibus)* (*quattuor*) in 4 and *abducerent coniugem* in 5, just as F 1 and 4 (even F 2 and 3) balance each other. Hence the discovery of F discredits Victorius' emendation of *IIII* into *VIII* and answers with a negative the question raised by Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*,

⁶ Of course Mariner too recognized the similarity of CE 542, which he reprinted without using the epitaph of Aper to reconstruct the text. Mariner also reprinted CE 500, which is by no means as close as CE 542 but stands in quite a different relation.

who on p. 81, note 449, complained that W 5 did "not make sense" and suggested, "Something like the following may conceivably have been intended: *Manes si saperent, misera me non abducerent coniugem.*" On the contrary, the sentence clearly means, "If the Manes had any feeling, they would take me away, the miserable spouse."

Line 6: *vivere iam quo me* (sc. *iuvat*)? There is nothing wrong with this: it merely needs to be punctuated as a question and compared with line 4 of CE 1190 (Florence), *vivere quo prodest, nisi si post morte cavemus?* or line 6 of *I. G.*, II², 13134 (Athens), *εἰ θάνατος, ὥς ἐνέπονσι, τί μοι βίωτοιο τὸ κέρδος*; and especially Euripides, *Medea*, 145: *τί δέ μοι ζῆν ἔτι κέρδος*; (cf. 798).

Line 7: It would be wrong to make, under the influence of F 10, the emendation *iam* for the independently attested *dulcem*. Mariné, pp. 129-30, correctly accents *cáruī* but explains the scansion by arguing that the *u* of *carui* is a semi-consonant. The final *i* is, I think, treated as short like the final vowels of F 13, and the *u* is a short vowel also; but the first syllable seems to me lengthened merely by the stress accent (cf. Mariné, p. 132). In the phrase *cúm te amisi ego* the vowel of *te* and the *a* of *amisi* are perhaps shortened rather than elided.

Line 9: Oliver's restoration, *qualem pia paupera feci*, assumes here as in F an apology for the insufficiency of the grave. Compare CE 203 (Narbonnensis, *qualem paupertas potuit, memoriam dedi*, and CE 1172 (Misenum), *hoc natum tumulo pietas pauperrima texit*.

Line 10: P. Burman, *Anthologia veterum latinorum epigrammatum et poematum*, II (Amsterdam, 1773), pp. 153-4 placed a comma after *vale* and wrote *mi carissime conjux*. The spelling *mihi* was accepted by Buecheler, and also the comma after *mihi* enjoys the recommendation of Buecheler's authority. The spelling *mihi* of the copyists is not overthrown by the evidence of F 15, but the question whether *mihi* goes with *carissime* in W 10 and *mi* goes with *karissime* in F 15, or whether they go as ethical datives with *vale*, has not yet been settled. Is the phrase *mi dulcissimo nato* in F 13 exactly parallel? For me, however, a decisive passage is cited by Probst, *T. L. L.*, III, coll. 504-5, s. v. "*carus*" *speciatim in allocutione*: Act. lud. saec. Sept. Sev., 2, 4, *valet c[oll]egae carissimi nobis*. Also Petronius, 48, *Agamemnon mihi carissime*, and Cicero, *Epist.*, XI, 21, 3, *vir optime mihique carissime Brute*, and the emperor Constantine, *M. A. M. A.*, VII, 305, col. I, line 8, *Have, Ablabi carissime nobis*, are parallels. For the ethical dative with *vale* no parallels have been cited.

The verses which we have just examined are more banal than those of Commodian and exhibit an awkwardness resulting in hypermetric lines and perhaps in a monstrous pseudo-literary form *vixisisti*. Nevertheless, the rules of scansion which guide the poetaster are much the same as those which guide Commodian, whom some would date in the third century and some in the fifth. For instance, Commodian, *Instruct.*, II, 16, 1-3:

Si quidam doctores, dum exspectant munera vestra
aut timent personas, laxantes singula vobis,
et ego non doceo, sed cogor dicere verum.

"Commodian's hexameters may all be called quantitatively correct if we make just two concessions: that longs may, on occa-

Wife for husband	Father for son
mens. IIII	d. VIII
Manes si saperent	infernū si quā sapent
miseram me abducerent coniugem	miserum me abducite patrem
vivere iam quo me?	ubi te dum quaeram ego, nate?
lucem iam nolo videre	effugit et lumen
dulcem carui lucem	iam carui lucem
cum te amisi ego, coniunx	qui te amisi ego, nate
has tibi fundo miser lacrimas	has tibi fundo dolens lacrimas
dulcissime coniunx	pater orfanus, ecce
lacrimae si prosunt	si, qui pergis iter viator, transis
(lacrimis) visis te ostende videri	aut p[au]llo resistes
haec tibi sola domus	et relegis titulum sulcato marmore
[qualem pia paupera feci]	ferro
semper in perpetuo vale	hoc bene habet titulus
mihi carissime coniunx	quod ego feci pater pio mi dulcis-
	simo nato
	se[mp]er in] perpetuo vale
	mi ka[ri]ssim[e] nate]

FIGURE 1. Comparison of Epitaphs W and F.

sion, be regarded as short, and that shorts may, on occasion, be regarded as long." ⁷ An accented short syllable can certainly be treated as long when the composer wishes to emphasize the word in which it occurs. A few long syllables may fade, especially in unemphatic words or at the end of a word.

In conclusion, the recent discovery of the epitaph of Aerarius Aper at Tarragona in excavations of the William L. Bryant Foundation provides evidence which deepens our knowledge of the background of Commodian's hexameters and perhaps even

⁷ W. Beare, "The Origin of Rhythmic Latin Verse," *Hermathena*, LXXXVII (1956), p. 13.

supports the earlier date for Commodian. It also facilitates the interpretation and partial reconstruction of another epigram from Tarraco, CE 542, which has long been a puzzle. Furthermore, it throws some light on the spirit of hypothetical references to the Manes, and it contributes an interesting example of one use of the phrase *bene habet*.

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THE LATIN LAW OF BANTIA.¹

The Latin Law of Bantia has not yet been satisfactorily identified. This is scarcely surprising, as the main provisions of the law are missing. In fact, all that is preserved is the prescription of penalties for failure to observe the law, and the imposition on magistrates of an oath to obey it. In this article I shall argue that the law should be dated to Gaius Gracchus' first tribunate in 123; I shall seek to identify it with one of his known laws; and I shall very briefly sketch the importance of this dating for interpreting Gracchus' policy and establishing a chronology of his legislation.

Mommsen (*C. I. L.*, I [2]², p. 441) dated the Bantia Law to the period 133-119 or 118 B. C., by reason of the inclusion of the *IIIvir a. d. a.* in a list of magistrates and holders of *imperium* (lines 15-16). The *terminus a quo* of 133 is fixed by the tribunate of Ti. Gracchus, when the office of *IIIvir a. d. a.* was founded;² the *terminus ad quem* of 119-118 is given by Appian's muddled account (*Bell. Civ.*, I, 27) of the agrarian laws passed after C. Gracchus' death. The second of the three laws mentioned in this passage put a stop to the distribution of public land and presumably dissolved the land commission. Appian seems to attach the date 118 to the third of these laws;³ but if this third law is to be identified with the extant Agrarian

¹ This article owes much to Mr. A. N. Sherwin-White, Mr. C. E. Stevens, and the Rev. R. Butterworth, S. J. To the first named I am especially grateful for reading the first draft of this article and most generously allowing me to avail myself of his conclusions before he was himself prepared to publish them.

² The inclusion of the office in the list of magistrates and holders of *imperium* in the Bantia Law shows that the triumvirs are not merely the customary commissioners in charge of founding a colony.

³ πεντεκαίδεκα μάλιστα ἔτεσιν ἀπὸ τῆς Γράκχου νομοθεσίας. A. E. Douglas (*A. J. P.*, LXXVII [1956], pp. 389-91) believes there is no justification for referring this phrase to the second law, though he concludes that "there is evidence . . . which suggests the year 118 as a suitable context for the law. . . . But we know too little to assert that the year 118 is more suitable than others in this decade for the passing of Appian's second law."

Law of 111,⁴ the date 118 must belong, if to any law, to the second, which put a stop to the land distribution.

Mommsen's dating of the law is certainly the most natural, although perhaps the exact *terminus ad quem* of 119-18 is more precise than the evidence warrants, and the limit should be extended down to about 112; but historians have sought a way round his argument in order to assign to the law a later date. For in view of the fact that Saturninus' forcing of the oath on the Senate in 100 seems by reason of the perplexity it caused to have been an innovation, a tidy solution would be provided if the Bantia Law, which contains a similar oath, could be ascribed to the same date. The Greek inscription found at Delphi prescribing measures against the pirates, which has a similar *sanctio* appended to it, is almost certainly to be dated to 101-100 B. C., as G. Colin and H. Stuart Jones have shown.⁵ Stuart Jones believes it is possible to date the Bantia Law too to this year 100, the year of Saturninus' second tribunate, and argues as follows (*op. cit.*, pp. 170 ff.). Whenever an agrarian law was passed, land commissioners were appointed (Cic., *Leg. Agr.*, II, 17); therefore the triumvirs referred to in the Bantia Law may be men appointed to administer Saturninus' agrarian law. Stuart Jones anticipates the objection that these commissioners would not normally be regarded as magistrates, as they are in the Bantia Law (lines 15-16);⁶ he rebuts this argument by the consideration that "there is good reason to think that Saturninus, posing as the successor of the Gracchi, would revive this Land Commission in its magisterial form." And there is no point in objecting that there is no record of any such appointment by Saturninus, for, as Stuart Jones points out, such a record is hardly to be expected, as Saturninus' commission "had only an ephemeral existence" (p. 171).

E. H. Warmington in his edition in the Loeb series of *Remains of Old Latin* (IV, pp. 294 ff.) tries to avoid Mommsen's dating of the Bantia Law in another way. It is possible, he argues,

⁴ Bruns, *Font.*⁷, p. 73. Cf. E. G. Hardy, *Six Roman Laws*, p. 46, n. 6.

⁵ Stuart Jones writes in *J. R. S.*, XVI (1926), pp. 155 ff., G. Colin in *Bull. Corr. Hell.*, 1924, pp. 58 ff. The law is to be found in *S. E. G.*, I, 161, identified there incorrectly with the *Lex Gabinia* of 67.

⁶ Cicero in the passage in *Leg. Agr.* calls them *curatores*.

that the law may for the sake of completeness make provision not only for magistracies at present in force, but also for those that are temporarily in abeyance. Indeed, one may add, the list of magistracies is preserved only once on the tablet, and in this list mention is made of other offices not at the time in force, such as the dictatorship (line 15). The list refers explicitly not to the magistrates of the year, but to future holders of the offices ([*p*]ost haec factus erit): where the tablet refers to present holders of the offices (line 14: *qu[ei] nunc est*), the list of offices is missing. The inclusion of the *IIIvir a. d. a.* in a list of possible future office-holders does not prove that the office was in use at the time of the law.

The arguments put forward by Stuart Jones and Warmington, and summarised (and, in the second case, developed) above show that Mommsen's reasons for dating the Bantia Law to the years 133-118 are, though strong, not conclusive. We can, however, though again far from conclusively, object to Stuart Jones' dating of the law, because it cannot well be identified with any known law of 100. Stuart Jones himself demonstrates (p. 171) that it is not Saturninus' Agrarian Law, which had attached to it the *sanctio* by virtue of which Saturninus obtained the exile of Metellus Numidicus; for the phrase in the law *iudex ex h(ac) l(ege) plebive scito [factus]* (line 15) seems to refer to the presiding magistrate of a court established or modified by this law.⁷ He therefore identifies the law with the

⁷ This is clearly the meaning of the phrase in the *Lex Acilia* (Bruns, *Font.*, p. 53, lines 19 and 62). The *iudex* can hardly be a mere jurymen of the court in the Bantia Law, because he is referred to there as a magistrate (lines 15-16). It seems that the presiding officer over a *quaestio* need not be a praetor or quaestor, at least in post-Sullan times; thus Caesar was apparently president of the *quaestio de sicariis* in 64, between his quaestorship and praetorship (Suet., *Div. Iul.*, 11; Dio, XXXVII, 10). If the same arrangement held before Sulla, it would be natural to make mention of these *iudices* in the list of important officers (loosely called magistrates) that have to take the oath. If only a praetor or quaestor could be a *iudex*, special mention of the office in the list would be unnecessary.

For the identification of the Bantia Law with Saturninus' Agrarian Law cf. R. Maschke, *Zur Theorie und Geschichte der römischen Agrargesetze*, pp. 78 ff., and F. W. Robinson, *Marius, Saturninus und Glaucia*, pp. 80 ff. Maschke argues that Mommsen's supplements of lines 7 and

Lex Appuleia de Maiestate. Now this law is usually dated to Saturninus' first tribunate in 103. It is, however, most unlikely that the oath attached to the Agrarian Law of 100 would have created such perplexity in that year, if a similar oath had been attached to a law only three years before. Therefore we must either date the *Maiestas* Law to 100 after the Agrarian Law (for the latter can hardly be transferred to 103 without gross violence to the sources), or else reject Stuart Jones' identification of the Bantia Law with the *Lex de Maiestate*. However, the former alternative is unacceptable, for Saturninus' *Maiestas* Law seems to have been aimed particularly at Caepio and Mallius, the defeated generals of Arausio;⁸ hence the year closer to 105, the date of the battle, is the more likely date for the *Maiestas* Law. Stuart Jones' identification, therefore, should not be accepted.

The Bantia Law, then, cannot plausibly be identified with either of these two laws of the year 100, and I know of no attempt to identify it with any other law of that year. Of course, this is not by itself a cogent reason for refusing to ascribe this date to the law; but there is, I believe, a much more serious objection to doing so. In the first lines of the law a list is given

14 of the Bantia Law give lines that are too long. He therefore proposes to omit [ioudex] from line 7 and [IIIvir a. d. a.] from line 14. These supplements make the law now speak of the [IIIvir a. d. a.] *qui ex hac lege plebeive scito factus erit* (line 7), and list each magistrate *qui nunc est* omitting the *IIIvir a. d. a.* (line 14). Therefore if these supplements are accepted, the Bantia Law becomes an Agrarian Law establishing a land commission. But, first, Maschke's calculations are of dubious validity, because the spacing of words and letters on the tablet is so irregular. (Cf., for example, line 15). Secondly, the omission of *ioudex* in line 7 is most unlikely, because, as line 15 refers to the *ioudex ex h. l. plebeive scito* [factus], in line 7, too, the word before *qui ex hac lege plebeive scito factus erit* will in all probability be *ioudex*. Thirdly, if line 14 has to be pruned (and there seems more justification for pruning here than in line 7), there is more reason for omitting [tr. pl.] rather than [IIIvir a. d. a.]. We should then have in the list of *present* office-holders the tribune omitted (line 14), but included in the list of *future* office-holders (line 15). This would put the Bantia Law on the same footing as the Delphic Pirate Law, where the tribunes of the current year are explicitly exempted from swearing, but future tribunes have to swear (lines 43 and 44 in *S. E. G.*).

⁸ Cf. Licinianus, p. 21.

of the privileges from which the offender will be debarred. They seem to include (line 2):

a) the performance of certain acts in the Senate;

b) the performance of certain acts in a *publicum iudicium*: in *sena[tu seiv]e in poplico iudicio ne sen[tentiam]---*. The natural interpretation of these words is that it was possible for one and the same person to be both a senator and a juror in a *publicum iudicium*. Now scholars⁹ commonly identify in practice a *publicum iudicium* with a *quaestio perpetua*, and this certainly seems to have been the meaning of the term in the *Digest* and in Gracchan times in the *Lex Acilia*. The *Digest* (48, 1, 1) defines a *publicum iudicium* as follows: *Non omnia iudicia, in quibus crimen vertitur, et publica sunt, sed ea tantum quae ex legibus iudiciorum veniunt, ut Iulia maiestatis, Iulia de adulteriis, Cornelia de sicariis et veneficiis. . .* The *Lex Acilia* (line 11) lays it down that one cannot have as a *patronus* anyone who *quaestione<m> iudicioque poplico condemnatu[s] siet*. If, as Warmington (*loc. cit.*) believes, a *quaestio perpetua* is just one form of *iudicium publicum* (another form being a trial before the assembled people), the use of the particle *que* in the last quotation is hard to explain. It can scarcely mean "and" literally here, so as to imply that the guilty party must be condemned at two trials; nor can it have its explanatory meaning (in the sense of "i.e.") for on Warmington's supposition a *quaestio* is not the equivalent of a *iudicium publicum*, and in a legal document one does not define a term by substituting a wider one. If, however, the two terms have, as I believe, by Gracchan times become synonymous, *que* can bear the sense of "i.e." in the quotation.

I take it then that the Bantia Law implies that an individual can be both a Senator and a member of the jury of a *quaestio*

⁹ Cf. Last, *C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 76-7 and 893, and Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 207. Mrs. M. I. Henderson (*J. R. S.*, XLI [1951], p. 81) points out the difference in meaning of the words *quaestio* and *iudicium*: the former is a process of inquiry, the latter a single trial, and cannot, therefore, be perpetual. But Mommsen (*Strafrecht*, pp. 186-8) held that in the late Republic the terms *quaestio* and *iudicium publicum* were practically synonyms, but the latter term was not used as a synonym for the *iudicium populi* or trial before the people. Cf. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 161, n. 3.

perpetua. It follows that that law must be dated either before the *Lex Acilia* of 123 (by which C. Gracchus put the juries in the hands of the Equites), or else to the brief period between the *Lex Servilia* of Caepio (106), which gave back to the Senate a share in the juries of the permanent courts,¹⁰ and the *Lex Servilia* of Glaucia (104?), which seems to have restored them wholly to the control of the Equites.¹¹ The latter date can be rejected, as it is too close to the Agrarian Law of 100 to account for the surprise caused by Saturninus' bill. Therefore we are left with 123 as the latest possible date of the Bantia Law.

It is, of course, arguable that what the law means is that, if the offender is a Senator, he is not to be allowed to speak in the Senate, and, if he is not a Senator, he is not to be allowed to be a juror at a public trial. That is to say, the alternatives are disjunctive, as if an English law were to state that "anyone convicted of this offence is hereby debarred from speaking in the House of Lords or the House of Commons." We may, however, question whether it is likely that the Bantia Law, which is most carefully drafted in typical Roman fashion, would refer to different penalties, applicable to different classes of citizen, by so loose and casual a collocation as *in senatu sive in publico iudicio*. It is my own feeling that, if this were the sense of the law, it would have been expressed rather by a formula to the effect that "if the guilty party be a senator, he is not to be allowed to vote in the Senate: if he be on the panel of jurors, he is not to be allowed to sit on a jury in a public trial." Granted this, and granted the identification of a *publicum iudicium* with a *quaestio perpetua*, 123, the date of the *Lex Acilia*, is established as the latest possible date for the Bantia Law.

There is another consideration which provides a clue to the dating of the law. Those who take the oath are to stand facing the Forum (line 17: *in forum vorsus*). Now this point of ceremonial is reminiscent of Plutarch's statement that as a democratic gesture C. Gracchus introduced the practice of facing the Forum when addressing the *plebs*.¹² The correspondence

¹⁰ Cf., e. g., Cic., *De Invent.*, I, 49, 92; Tac., *Ann.*, XII, 60; Obsequens, 101 (39).

¹¹ For this explanation and dating of Glaucia's law cf. Last, *C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 162 ff.

¹² Plut., *C. Gracchus*, 5, 3.

between the clause in the Bantia Law and Gracchus' practice seems too great to be coincidental. This, of course, does not by itself prove that the law is to be dated to the times of C. Gracchus; the law might still be an enactment of, say, Saturninus in conscious imitation of the spirit of Gracchus. But we must consider this point in conjunction with the previous stages of the argument. The law cannot be later than 123. Moreover, since Plutarch says the practice of speaking facing the forum was introduced by Gracchus *τότε* (in his first tribunate), it seems likely that the practice of facing the Forum to swear, and therefore the Bantia Law itself, is not earlier than 123. We are accordingly left with 123 as the probable date of the Bantia Law.

The *Lex Acilia* also prescribes an oath to be taken *in forum* [*vorsus*] (line 36). Now this oath is probably not a democratic gesture, but the routine oath of jurors to do their duty. Therefore I suggest that the facing of the Forum in this law is an automatic following of the precedent set by the Bantia Law. Indeed it is tempting to construct from this another, admittedly tenuous, argument for the dating of the Bantia Law. If the *Lex Acilia* was not the first law to introduce the oath facing the Forum (for it seems to be a moderate and not an anti-Senatorial law),¹³ it must have been following a precedent; and if we place the Bantia Law in the early part of 123, we have that precedent to hand.¹⁴

Now if we accept this dating, can we identify the Bantia Law with any known law of 123? Mommsen (*loc. cit.*) believed that the Oscan Bantia Law on the other side of the tablet was a

¹³ This is a point made by Mr. Sherwin-White. For the opposite view cf. Last, *C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 53 ff. and 891. On the latter page Last gives his arguments for dating the *Lex Acilia* to 122.

¹⁴ It is, however, possible that the oath in the *Lex Acilia* was taken with the face to the Forum merely in order to make it more public.

But there is another complication. Cicero (*De Amic.*, 96) asserts that C. Licinius Crassus *primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo*. (Like Plutarch, Cicero apparently regards this as a democratic gesture.) Cicero appears to date this innovation to 145, when Crassus tried to pass his bill making the appointment of priests a matter of popular election. Must we, therefore, reject Plutarch's account of the origin of the practice of facing the Forum? Not necessarily, for the practice may have dropped out with the defeat of Crassus' bill, so that Gracchus' action was not an innovation but a revival.

translation of the Latin law, which, he thought, defined the terms of the *foedus* between Rome and Bantia, which had the status of an Italian ally. His belief was based on the theory that "quaecumque leges Romanae senatusve consulta liberae reipublicae aetate facta in civitate aliqua libera reperiuntur, aut foedera ipsa esse aut certe ad foedus adiecta probabiliter concluduntur." There seems to be good reason for this theory; for why should an Italian municipality keep a public record of a Roman law, unless the law dealt with the municipality's *foedus*? However, there are serious objections to Mommsen's view of the Latin Bantia Law. The magistrates mentioned in it are Roman, not municipal, and it seems unlikely that Rome would impose on all the magistrates an annual oath to observe the treaty with this unimportant municipality. Moreover, Mommsen has difficulty in explaining the reference in the law to the *iudex*: he hints that he can find no other example of the creation of such an official in a *foedus*, and can only argue that in such troubled times—Fragellae rebelled in 125—the appointment of a "iudicem agri publici fortasse similiumque rerum" was not improbable.

If for these reasons Mommsen's interpretation of the law is rejected, can we identify the law? A Roman law passed in such a democratic spirit in 123 must be the work of C. Gracchus or one of his party. As it precedes the *Lex Acilia*, an early date in that year is preferable to a late one. Mr. C. E. Stevens has proposed to me an identification which meets all these requirements. He suggests that the Bantia Law is none other than Gracchus' early law forbidding the passing of a capital sentence on a citizen *iniussu populi*.¹⁵ If this is so, the missing part of the law included a definition of the composition of the court which had power to pass such a sentence, and it is to the president of such a court that the phrase *iudex ex h(ac) l(ege) plebive scito [factus]* refers.

But here we are faced with a difficulty. Mommsen's point is valid. If Mr. Stevens' identification of the Bantia Law is accepted, why should a copy of the law be preserved in the allied town of Bantia, which was not subject to Rome's laws? Should we then, after all, in spite of the difficulties it involves, accept Mommsen's theory in despair of a better? We need not

¹⁵ Plutarch, *C. Gracchus*, 4, 1; Cic., *Pro Rab.*, 4, 12.

do so. One can construct a plausible explanation of the preservation in an allied community of a Roman law limiting the magistrates' powers of imposing a capital sentence on a Roman citizen. For it is not inconceivable that Gracchus' law contained a clause promising citizenship to Italians who prosecuted or gave evidence successfully against anyone who put a citizen to death without a trial,¹⁶ and that this is the reason why a copy of the law was preserved at Bantia. It seems to me, therefore, that Mr. Stevens' identification of the law is possible, though far from certain, and that this is more than can be said for any other attempt at identifying the law. However, we can, I think, accept with much less reserve the less precise conclusion that the Latin of the Bantia tablet records a Roman law of the year 123, and that this law was probably due to C. Gracchus or his followers.

Gracchus seems to have been fond of making symbolic democratic gestures. His practice of speaking facing the Forum is one. Other examples are his moving house to the district of the Forum, and his demolition of the booked seats for the gladiatorial show.¹⁷ It is, therefore, very much in accordance with his character that he should have introduced the expedient of attaching to laws passed in the *Concilium Plebis* an oath by which magistrates made a symbolic submission to the sovereign people. I suppose the second part of the law, i. e., the extant part imposing the oath, was not enforced after Gracchus' downfall, or even after his phase of co-operation with the Senate. At any rate, Saturninus' revival of this political weapon in 100 came as a complete surprise to the Senate—naturally enough, as the procedure had been in abeyance over twenty years. But it should be noted that it is not the legality of the imposition of such an oath that is questioned in 100, but rather the validity of legislation which has been forced through the *Concilium Plebis* by violence.¹⁸

¹⁶ The *Lex Servilia* of Glaucia (a demagogue in the Gracchan tradition) contained a similar clause awarding accusers. Cf. Cic., *Pro Balbo*, 24, 54.

¹⁷ Plutarch, *C. Gracchus*, 12, 1-3.

¹⁸ This certainly seems to be Cicero's view of the matter; cf. *Pro Sest.*, 16, 37: (Metellus) *unus in legem per vim latam iurare noluerat*. The same idea seems to be behind Marius' declaration that he would

In conclusion I wish to hint at the importance of this dating of the Bantia Law for the understanding of C. Gracchus. Hugh Last (*C. A. H.*, IX, pp. 49 ff.) believed that Gracchus' early legislation, including the projected law enrolling Equites in the Senate, was moderate and acceptable to the Senate, while his later legislation (in 122), including the *Lex Acilia* which Last dates to this year (erroneously in my opinion), was radical and anti-senatorial. This interpretation is open to objection for many reasons which cannot be gone into here. But if my dating of the Bantia Law and its attribution to Gracchus are accepted, we have a clear example of a democratic and anti-Senatorial law well before the end of 123. This suggests that Gracchus began his tribunician career as an enemy of the Senate, and that he underwent two conversions, first to a policy of co-operation with the Senate, and finally, after the rise of Livius Drusus, back to opposition of the Senate. This view has been worked out on other evidence by A. N. Sherwin-White in his lectures delivered at St. John's College, Oxford.

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Addendum.

Mention should be made of two very relevant articles. G. Tibiletti (*Athenaeum*, N. S. XXXI [1953], pp. 5 ff.) rejects the traditional synchronization of the tribunates of Acilius and Rubrius, and therefore also the identification of the extant *De repetundis* law with the *Lex Acilia*; and he suggests that the Latin Bantia Law is the *Lex Servilia* of Glaucia. E. Badian (*A. J. P.*, LXXV [1954] pp. 374 ff.) accepts Tibiletti's separation of the tribunes Acilius and Rubrius, but identifies the *Lex Acilia* with the extant law, and puts it in 122. My thanks are due to Mr. J. Pinsent for drawing my attention to this and other points.

obey the law "insofar as it was a law" (App., I, 30; Plutarch, *Marius*, 29, 4).

THE IMAGERY OF THE *PROMETHEUS BOUND*.¹

Prometheus Bound is a drama of disproportions: in the cosmos, in the souls of its inhabitants. Zeus, the tyrant newly established in heaven, has assumed more power than is just; he has not yet learned that his will is subordinate to Moira's. Prometheus, in the beginning the ally of Zeus, has given fire to mankind; he has been beyond justice—that is, beyond measure—their benefactor. For this Zeus is more than equitably angry; his punishment of Prometheus is harsh beyond measure. And Prometheus is, in the final scheme of things, more than rightfully rebellious.

The action of the *Prometheus Bound* does little more than provide a symbol of the conflict between Prometheus and Zeus: the actual binding of the Titan. But that binding is a symbol of several conflicts: between god and god, between god and man, and (indirectly) between god and fate; between tyrant and aristocrat, between force and intelligence, between one distorted passion and another. And this, the manifold significance of the symbol provided in action, finds expression only in that drama which transcends action.

Drama in the *Prometheus Bound* exists first of all in the character of Prometheus. In memory and in prophecy he carries drama far beyond action and its particular limits in space and time. More than this, in the moral import of his memories and prophecies he creates that drama itself. For he predicts not only the events to come (Io's release from her present suffering, his own freedom from bondage at the hands of Heracles) but the entire moral order and harmony that is to result from these events: his own reconciliation with Zeus, Zeus' eventual identification with Moira. And this, the vision of a justice that is complete, that consists of a perfect proportion in all things, is the drama of the *Prometheus Bound*.

¹ This essay was originally one chapter of a dissertation accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr College (*The Dramatic Use of Imagery in Aeschylus*, 1954). I am therefore very much indebted to Professor Lattimore, who directed the dissertation.

This larger drama exists then in the character of Prometheus, in the prophet's vision. It exists too—and this is not entirely a separate thing—in language, in the play's imagery. For imagery too is a vision—it is the magic that communicates the vision—and creates a drama that far transcends action.

Prometheus brought *techne* to mankind; he taught them every skill they know (506). The greatest of these was the art of healing (478-83). Now as a punishment for his gifts to men he is bound fast to the rock; and, although he has invented devices for the benefit of mankind, he has no skill to rid himself of his present suffering (469-71). The Oceanids agree. He has lost his wits and gone astray; he is like a poor physician who falls sick and cannot find the drugs (*φαρμάκοις*) to cure himself (472-5).

The Oceanids may think primarily of Prometheus' physical torment, but Prometheus when he speaks of his suffering means more than the pain of his body; he also means his state of mind. It is Hermes who defines that state of mind. When Prometheus tells him that he hates all the gods who, having prospered at his hands, now do him wrong, he replies:

κλύω σ' ἐγὼ μεμνηνότε' οὐδ' σμικρὰν νόσον (977).²

And Prometheus answers him:

νοσοῖμ' ἄν εἰ νόσημα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς στυγεῖν (978).

Prometheus' torment is twofold. He suffers drastic physical punishment; his pains are first of all pains of the body. But the hatred he feels for the gods who punish him is a torment of mind. And this, the greater torment by far, is his *nosos*, a *nosos* which is not entirely metaphorical.

In Homer *nosos* is the plague that Apollo sends upon the Achæan host (*Il.*, I, 10). It is the sickness from which Euchenor would have died had he stayed at home instead of going to war with the Greeks (*Il.*, XIII, 667, 670). In the beginning then the word seems to have meant a physical ailment, a disease or an illness. In Sophocles *nosos* can be an ailment of the mind as well as of the body. In the *Ajax* the

² All lines quoted from the *Prometheus Bound* are from the text of Herbert Weir Smyth, *Aeschylus* (Cambridge and London, 1952).

chorus speaks of the *theia nosos* that has afflicted their hero (185), and they themselves define that *nosos* (635-9). It is his madness, his sickness of soul.

Because the Greeks thought of the mind or soul as though it were a physical thing, as though it were the center of life itself as well as of thought or emotion (a concept nearly equivalent to our "brain"), they never made a complete distinction between disorders of mind and of body. The *Ajax* chorus is not speaking metaphorically when it says that Ajax is sick; he really is. Nor does the *Hippolytus* chorus speak in metaphor when it inquires about the *nosos* of Phaedra, who is literally love sick; they don't even know that she is in love, but they can see with their own eyes that she is languishing (*Hipp.*, 267-70).

Prometheus is not mad in the sense that Ajax is mad; he does not suffer from so obvious a *nosos*. Nor does his *nosos* take so apparent a physical form as Phaedra's. But still his soul is in its hatred sick in much the way that hers is in its love. Both suffer from a distortion of the passions; in this sense both are ailing.

In the *Prometheus Bound* *nosos* as it is used to describe a state of soul may be partly metaphorical; it may carry a meaning half way between its Homeric sense of "disease" and its Sophoclean sense of "madness." But whether or not it is in itself a metaphor, it is in its dramatic development a part of or, at any rate, a starting point for an entire image pattern. The prophet who taught men the art of healing is as a result of his own generosity sick and unable to find a cure.

Prometheus taught men to heal their bodies. He also cured their minds. For he prevented mortals from foreseeing their own deaths; he gave them blind hopes instead. The chorus now speaks of that particular foresight as a disease (*νόσον*), of those blind hopes as its drug or remedy (*φάρμακον*, 251).

But still Prometheus, although he relieved the mortal mind of its peculiar disease, is himself ailing and without a remedy. Kratos, when Hephaestus accuses him of being without pity for Prometheus, replies that this is so, for there is no remedy (*ἄκος*) in weeping for him (43). *ἄκος*, although it seems in Homer to have a generalized meaning (*Od.*, XXII, 481), is also a medical term (*Hipp.*, *Acut.*, 1); it seems to be a generic word meaning

"remedy" as opposed to *φάρμακον*, a specific term for "drugs" or "medicines."³

And no remedy is yet in sight for the ailing Prometheus. His deliverer (*λωφύσων*) has not yet been born (27). *Λωφύσων* may mean just this: the one who will give him rest, who will free him from his bonds. But in later times the verb, *λωφάω*, is used in a more concrete, medical sense. Thucydides speaks of the city having recovered from the plague (VI, 12), and he mentions one of the plague's symptoms abating (II, 49); in both passages the verb is *λωφάω*. And Hippocrates uses the verb; he speaks of pain abating (*Int.*, 49). The word in this passage then does more than predict Prometheus' freedom from bondage. It prophesies his relief from the physical pain he now endures; it also suggests his being cured of his sickness of soul, of the passion of rebellion that now possesses him.

These medical images with their verbal parallels in the Hippocratic corpus indicate, not that Aeschylus was familiar with the corpus itself, but that he was familiar (perhaps through Pythagorean associations) with the general Greek concept of medicine, a concept that was older than Hippocrates or than Aeschylus himself.

Alcmaeon of Croton, who had Pythagorean connections and was an older contemporary of Aeschylus, had already defined health as a balance (*isonomia*) of certain opposites, indefinite in number, and disease as a preponderance (*monarchia*) of one of them (Aetius, V, 30, 1). This theory had a strong influence upon the later Coan school and upon its familiar doctrine of humors. But even Alcmaeon's definition was inherent in the earlier Pythagorean philosophy with its emphasis upon *harmonia*, and its application to the physical and thus spiritual state of man.

Greek philosophy was not an independent growth. In part it grew from an observation of physical and social phenomena; in part it formed physical and social theory. Thus medicine is both cause and effect of philosophic speculation; the same is true of political thought. Not only that: medical and political theory seem to have been interactive, one upon the other.⁴

³ J. Dumortier, *Le vocabulaire médical d'Eschyle* (Paris, 1935), p. 56.

⁴ G. D. Thomson has, in part, anticipated this argument (*Aeschylus and Athens* [London, 1941], pp. 217-18).

Solon saw a well-ordered state as one in which there was a balance of the elements—of the classes. He himself gave the people sufficient privileges; he also protected the rich and powerful from being mistreated. He did not allow one party to dominate the other (5). Aristotle in a discussion of Solon's reforms refers to the poems; they prove, he says, that he could easily have set himself up as tyrant had he wished; the disordered state of affairs that they describe attests to this. Aristotle uses a medical figure (*νοσοῦντα*) to describe this "disorder" in the state (*Ath. Pol.*, 6, 4). The idea of a *nosos*, implicit in Solon's political poetry, becomes explicit in Herodotus; he uses the verb to describe a state of faction (V, 28). Sophocles uses it of the *polis* (*Ant.*, 1015). And Plato calls tyranny the worst disease (*νόσσημα*) of the state (*Rep.*, 544 C).⁵ Faction, tyranny: disorders of the state: the results of disproportionate power on the part of one faction, class, or political party. Parallels in medical and political theory had already produced political terms to define medical concepts (*isonomia*, *monarchia*); now those parallels produce medical figures in political expression.

Medical imagery in the *Prometheus Bound*, because it evokes this entire complex of ancient medical and political theory, is particularly forceful in its creation of the drama's present tensions. Prometheus is sick in his disproportionate sense of rebellion for the punishment he now endures. That punishment, he feels, is disproportionate to the wrong he did (1093). It is also the result of what seemed to the gods a gift disproportionate to the worth or needs of mankind (30, 507).

Other medical images do more than describe the position of Prometheus himself. For it is not only he who is disproportionate in his past action and in his present state of mind. The entire heavenly scheme is out of order. Zeus too has taken more power than is just and is now more wrathful than is right. He is, Prometheus insists, a tyrant. And no one contradicts him. He has all the symptoms: he rules unconstitutionally and with new-fangled laws (149-50); he is violent in all his ways (735-

⁵ Thucydides in his description of the Coreyrean revolt does not use the word *nosos*, but the parallels between this passage and that describing the plague at Athens make it clear that he did think of *stasis* as a *nosos*. See further C. N. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (London, 1929), especially pp. 133 ff.

7); he is harsh and accountable to none (326); and he keeps justice in his own hands (189-90).

All this calls to mind Herodotus' diagnosis of tyranny (III, 80).⁶ Otanes, in the famous Persian debate, reminds his fellows that the tyrant can do as he pleases and is not accountable, that he sets aside the laws, and that from his goods, he acquires *hybris*, general lawlessness, and *phthonos*, envy, jealousy, and suspicion.

Violent, irresponsible, above the law: all these are characteristic of the Zeus of the *Prometheus Bound*. And now suspicion: it is a disease (*νόσημα*) inherent in tyranny, says Prometheus, to distrust one's friends (226-7). Zeus whose tyranny itself is a disease, a disorder in the cosmos, is himself diseased, suspicious of his friends.

And Prometheus will endure his present lot until the mind of Zeus abates its wrath (377-8). Again, *λωφήση*: a word of medical connotation, reinforced this time by *χόλον*, literally, bile, one of the *χυμοί* or humors of the later Coan school (Hipp., *V. M.*, 18; cf. *Nat. Hom.*, 3, 4).

In his wrath Zeus is sick. For Oceanus, convinced that he can appease that wrath, asks Prometheus if he doesn't know that words are the doctors of an ailing temper: *Ὁργῆς νοσοῖσης*: a disposition that is sick in its anger.

Prometheus, taking up his medical figure, answers him:

ἐάν τις ἐν καιρῷ γε μαλθάσση κέαρ
καὶ μὴ σφριγῶντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνει βίη (381-382).

Only if one soften the heart at the critical moment and not try to reduce a passion swollen by violence. *Σφριγᾶω* has forceful physical connotation: Hippocrates used it of a woman's breasts (*Mul.*, I, 71), and it was used generally of young, healthy bodies (Eur., *Andr.*, 196; Ar., *Nu.*, 799; Pl., *Lg.*, 840 B); furthermore it was a technical term and used, medically, to describe a tumor or raw wound.⁷ *Ἰσχναίνω* too is a medical term; it describes the process used to reduce a swelling of this sort (Hipp., *Aph.*, V, 25; *Off.*, 13; *Liqu.*, 6).⁸ *Μαλθάσση* just may have in this pas-

⁶ See too Thomson, *The Prometheus Bound* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 6-9.

⁷ Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁸ Thomson, *ibid.*

sage something of its medical sense of massage (Hipp., *Art.*, 9).⁹ 'Εν καιρῷ, though not a verbal parallel, suggests the whole Hippocratic doctrine of crisis and may well be translated "at the critical moment."¹⁰

The verb λωφάω, occurs in one more passage that defines the character of Zeus. Voices in her dreams tell Io that the god is enamoured of her. They advise her to go to the meadows that his eye may find relief (λωφήση) from its desire (652-4) Πόθον: another symptom of the tyrant's disease. For, Herodotus says, the tyrant is a ravisher of women (III, 80). Again the Zeus of the *Prometheus Bound* proves himself a tyrant in his demands upon Io; only his possession of her will relieve him of this particular aspect of his disease.¹¹

Io herself, when Prometheus addresses her, asks him how it is that he knows her; for he has named the divine plague (*nosos*) that wastes and stings her with its maddening goad (597-8). Her sickness is indeed θεόσυντον: sent by Hera out of jealousy. Io's *nosos*, which is more fact than metaphor, is the result of Zeus' *nosos*. And she begs Prometheus to name the drug that will cure it (606-7). Here φάρμακον is metaphorical if νόσον is not strictly so, for what Io really asks is to know the limits of her wanderings (622-3).¹²

The Oceanids use medical terms, in fact and in image, to define the entire situation: the tyranny of Zeus, the plight of Prometheus, the madness of Io. Now they use a medical figure to refer to their own sympathy for Prometheus. They tell Hermes that they will suffer with Prometheus, for they have learned to hate traitors; there is no disease they detest more than this (1068-70). *Nosos* here carries the same political connotations that it has carried in other passages. The Oceanids are loyal to Prometheus because they are his kinswomen; they

⁹ Dumortier, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁰ Thomson points out that it receives this sense (of *akme*) from σφριγῶντα, "which signifies a ripe, prime condition of the body" (*op. cit.*, p. 154).

¹¹ Thomson notes that θάλλει (590), connoting an inflamed wound, "describes the wound implanted in the heart (of Zeus) by the arrow of Love": another medical figure to define the tyrant's passion (*op. cit.*, p. 162).

¹² Cf. lines 632, 685-6, 698-9 for other occurrences of the *nosos* figure describing Io's situation.

belong to his class, and although faction is itself wrong and a disease of the state, it is not, they imply, wrong or a "disease" to remain loyal to one's own party or class in the event of faction. Their attitude recalls that of Prometheus who had preferred to be sick if it was indeed a sickness to hate one's enemies (978). He, the aristocrat who had inadvertently helped a tyrant to power, like his kinswomen and comforters, the Oceanids, maintains his outdated, aristocratic code.¹³

So, Solon had prayed to the Muses (1, 5-6). And Theognis had made a similar prayer to Zeus (337-40). These are the men who feared tyranny (Solon, 3; Theognis, 43-52; 1081-2 b), who thought of faction as a wound in the state (Solon, 3, 17; cf. Theognis, 1133-4) and whose concept of good government embraced the idea of *isonomia* (Solon, 3, 5, 24, etc.).¹⁴ To do good to one's friends, to do evil to one's enemies, to remain loyal to one's own class: these were the tenets of the old aristocrats.¹⁵ The Oceanids are incapable of imagining others. Now Prometheus, in conflict with the tyrant, insists upon them. In the end he will modify them to accord with the new order in heaven, with the new justice which is by definition a balance of forces: a perfect proportion.

Prometheus' sufferings as they are described in medical figures

¹³ The role of Zeus as tyrant is allegorical, but Prometheus' is not strictly so. Although the tyrant, an aristocrat himself, must often have been helped to power by another aristocrat (even Peisistratus, whom Aeschylus must have had most specifically in mind, was forced at one point in his career to ally himself with Megacles), Prometheus' role does not correspond to any one situation in Greek political history; rather, it combines several roles: the "aristocrat," such as Solon, who benefited the people out of an interest in the general welfare of the state; the aristocrat, such as Theognis, who resented the tyranny out of an intense feeling for the welfare of his own class; the demos, which did, in the beginning at least, support the tyrant and whose benefactor Prometheus (as the father of *techne*) really is. Included too in the portrait of Prometheus may be a reminiscence of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogeiton; but this, obviously, cannot be pressed too far.

¹⁴ Cf. *Scolia Attica* (Diehl, 6, 10-13, 14, 23, 24, 25).

¹⁵ Implicit in these was another aristocratic standard: to be true to oneself, to protect one's own interests—an ideal which Prometheus forfeited in his disproportionate generosity to mankind, generosity which brought trouble upon himself, which was the cause of Zeus' "sickness" and the beginning of his own.

are the sufferings of his soul; it is the passions which are disordered, diseased. But that passion of rebellion which possesses him is for an extreme and entirely real physical punishment, for the sufferings of his body. His pains are as physical as they are spiritual.

Prophesying the threatened deposition of Zeus from Olympus, Prometheus says:

καὶ τῶνδ' ἔξει δυσλοφωτέρους πόνους (931).

Πόνος meant in its most general sense "toil" or "labor" (*Il.*, I, 467), and this almost always in a physical sense. In the *Iliad* it sometimes means the toil of war (*Il.*, XVI, 568), and in Pindar it is used of athletic toil, of bodily exercise (*Nem.*, IV, 1-2). *Πόνων* in this passage means the pain that results from bodily exertion; *ιατρός* gives it this concrete and physical sense. Thucydides increases the medical connotation of the word by using it specifically of disease (*II*, 49). And in Hippocrates it is a standard, technical word for pain (*Aph.*, II, 46; IV, 44, 45). So, in this passage, when Prometheus predicts that Zeus will suffer pains more galling than his own, he means two things: he means that Zeus' mental anguish will be greater than his, and he hints that Zeus' overthrow will involve physical violence. But whether Zeus' pains will be bodily or not, Prometheus' certainly are. *Δυσλοφωτέρους*, literally, "hard on the neck," enhances the physical connotation of *πόνους*.

Δυσλοφωτέρους suggests something else too: a yoke to chafe or to weigh upon the neck. For Theognis uses the word to modify *ζυγόν* (1024) and *ζεύγλην* (848).

The image suggested in *δυσλοφωτέρους* takes more definite form in other passages. Hermes chastising Prometheus for his stubbornness tells him that he struggles with the bit in his mouth like a newly yoked colt and fights against the reins (1009-10). Hermes is talking about Prometheus' resistance; he means the resistance of his soul, his attitude toward Zeus. But his physical image suggests the literal position of Prometheus; he is, after all, bound, and his resistance includes both resentment for his body's suffering and a determination to endure it.

This passage in its suggestion of the actual binding of Prometheus is reinforced by another passage. There the Titan himself had used the image of the yoke to describe his physical

punishment. Because he made gifts to mortals he bears the yoke of *ἀνάγκη*, of a forceful and inevitable constraint (107-8). Because he brought gifts to mortals: one of these gifts was the idea of yoking and harnessing animals to do man's work for him and to be a luxury to the rich (462-6). Now in return for this favor Prometheus is himself yoked, harnessed, bound. He is punished for and with his own invention; he is bound by his own device.¹⁶

It is Zeus who constrains Prometheus. This is part of his role as tyrant; he is by definition *τραχὺς*. By definition he is also a ravisher of women (Hdt., III, 80). And so, he coerces Io as well as Prometheus. He begins by compelling her father, Inachus, to drive her from home; an oracle of Apollo instructed him to do so, but it was the curb of Zeus that forced him to act (671-2). Io herself asks Zeus how she erred that he has yoked her in this misery (578-80). She is, she says, tormented by the gadfly, driven from one land to another by the gods' scourge (681-2). That scourge means the power first of Zeus and then of Hera; it also refers to the gadfly. All this makes up her sickness (597-8). Here the gadfly's sting, the heaven-sent plague is expressed in *κέντροις*, another figure of compulsion. But goads or whips, they are both symbols of Zeus' coercion, coercion which resulted in Hera's wrath and the sending of the gadfly, in the *nosos* of Io.

The Oceanids use another figure of constraint in their mild rebuke to Prometheus. What help is there for him in those men whom he served and for whom he suffers now? Didn't he see the helplessness, no better than a dream, in which the blind race of men is shackled (547-50)? Those mortals for whose sake he is bound cannot help him out of his present plight, for they are fettered themselves.

And Prometheus' comforters, the Oceanids, are themselves in danger of entanglement. Hermes tells them that if they insist upon sympathizing with the Titan, they will fall forewarned into the net of disaster (1076-9).

The art of medicine and the idea of yoking or harnessing animals were both Prometheus' gifts to men. For these gifts

¹⁶ Cf. lines 324-5, 54, 81, 265-7 for other figures of constraint describing the actual position of Prometheus.

Prometheus is bound by the yoke, and, because he is so punished, sick at soul. In fact then and in image the yoke and the healing art are associated with one another: associated by words like *πόνος* which means pain in two senses: of the body and of the mind. When Prometheus refers indirectly to his own *πόνους* by saying that Zeus will suffer worse (931), he means partly the torture of his body, partly the torment of his mind. And when Hephaestus says that Prometheus' deliverer has not yet been born, he too is saying more than one thing. The *λωφίσων* or deliverer, who is Heracles, will actually release Prometheus from his bonds and from his physical suffering; when he does this, he will help to cure him of his sickness of soul, of the passion of rebellion that now possesses him.

This entire pattern of images derives from fact, fact which belongs to the past. Prometheus is bound for and with his own device, the yoke; he is the victim of his own disposition; punished for having taught the healing art to men, he is himself sick of a rebellious hatred for the gods, sick and unable to find his cure. Now this very use in image of the medical art or of the yoke and its derivative symbols to define Prometheus' position recalls those events of the past which produced his present conflict: his gifts to mankind.

Images that describe the position of Prometheus, bound and rebellious, grow until they define the entire conflict attendant upon his own: Zeus full of wrath, suspicious of his friends and threatened with deposition from heaven, desirous of Io and chastiser of Prometheus; Io maddened and forced to wander; Oceanus confident of his ability to appease the wrath of Zeus; the Oceanids reproachful but determined to remain loyal to their kinsman, Prometheus, and threatened with destruction for that loyalty.

This same pattern of images, derived from the past to create a dramatic present, predicts the future; it anticipates the conclusion of the trilogy, and in doing this it creates the larger drama of the *Prometheus Bound*.

The Greek concept of health as an *isonomia* of powers, of disease as a *monarchia* of one power gives each of the medical images peculiar power to define the tensions of the present: tensions in the souls of its characters, tensions in the order of the universe. That same concept makes each of these images

prophetic of a future harmony or *isonomia* of conflicting powers.¹⁷

Prometheus, now sick and without a cure, will in the end reveal his secret to Zeus; in return Zeus will send Heracles to release him; he will loose him from the yoke, heal him of his illness. And Zeus will abate his wrath; he will cease to distrust his friends; he will relieve Io of her sickness, free her from the yoke that binds her, from the goad and the whip that plague her. He will be cured of his, the tyrant's disease. Both he and Prometheus will have found the harmony or *isonomia* proper to their individual souls. As a result there will be an *isonomia* of forces in the universe: the perfect proportion that is justice.

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¹⁷ Thomson remarks upon the medical imagery being prophetic of a cure to come but does not connect this idea with the concept of *isonomia*, which he discusses elsewhere (*The Prometheus Bound*, p. 11 and *Aeschylus and Athens*, pp. 217-18, 324-5).

MACEDONIAN TROOPS AT THE BATTLE OF ZAMA.

In a recent article¹ upholding the authenticity of the annalistic account in Livy of the diplomatic exchanges between Rome, Greece, and Macedon in 203-201 B. C.,² J. P. V. D. Balsdon raises the question of the 4,000 Macedonian troops under Sopater, alleged to have been present at the battle of Zama, and suggests that these troops were actually sent to Africa, but were at Carthage at the time of the battle, and fell into the hands of the Romans when the Carthaginians surrendered.

While the general conclusions about the authenticity of these annalistic passages in Livy may be accepted as valid, the solution offered to this particular point is open to several objections. First, it is difficult to see how the Macedonians could have become prisoners of war if they had merely formed part of the garrison of Carthage; there is no evidence that any mercenaries were treated as prisoners apart from those actually captured on the battlefield. Secondly, it seems strange that Hannibal did not include such a useful contingent in his forces for the decisive battle; if Zama is to be dated to the autumn of 202 B. C., as seems most probable, there would have been adequate time to do so, as the envoys from Greece, whose visit can hardly be placed later than March 202 B. C., informed the Senate that the force had already crossed to Africa.³ In the third place, after the Peace of Phoenice Philip seems to have directed his attention eastwards; with rich prizes in the Aegean to play for, he was unlikely to go out of his way to court the hostility of Rome, or renew his support of the Carthaginians when they were on the verge of defeat.

Nothing is said about this Macedonian contingent either by Polybius or Appian. It is mentioned by Livy⁴ in his account of the Greek mission at Rome in 203-202 B. C., in his account

¹ J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Rome and Macedon, 205-203 B. C.," *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), pp. 30-42.

² Livy, XXX, 26, 2 f.; 40, 4; 42.

³ Livy, XXX, 26, 3, *traiecta in Africam dici*. The use of *dici* supports the view that this was propaganda.

⁴ Livy, XXX, 26, 3; 33, 5; 42, 6.

of the Macedonian mission in 201 B. C., and in his description of Hannibal's order of battle, a passage derived, though with some misunderstanding of the original, from Polybius. It is mentioned by Frontinus,⁵ in a passage derived directly from Livy, and by Silius Italicus,⁶ who seems to have regarded it as cavalry. Consequently it is generally denied that such a contingent existed at all, and the references in Livy are ascribed to the false propaganda inserted in the historical tradition by the Roman annalists.

Propaganda it may have been, but it is not necessary to blame the Roman annalists. The Greek cities that were suffering from the depredations of Philip may have felt uncertain about the Roman reaction to their appeal; they may have feared that, after the Peace of Phoenice, the Romans might be inclined to wash their hands of Greece completely; they may have felt impelled to dangle a bait in front of the Romans, and no bait could be better than the allegation that Philip had sent a force of 4,000 men and a sum of money to help Carthage. It is probable that, for the reasons given above, this allegation was almost completely groundless, but there is no doubt that the Romans believed it implicitly.

A complication is introduced by Livy's account of the Macedonian mission to Rome in 201 B. C.; according to Livy, the Macedonians followed up their complaints against the undiplomatic behaviour of M. Aurelius by a demand for the return of the Macedonian soldiers and their commander, Sopater, who were being held as prisoners of war, a demand that the Romans categorically rejected. One solution to this difficulty would be to condemn this part, at any rate, of the proceedings in the Senate as an annalistic accretion; but it is difficult to do this without casting considerable doubts on the authenticity of all these diplomatic exchanges. A preferable solution is to regard the allegation of the earlier Greek envoys as having, as most successful propaganda does have, some slight foundation in fact. It is a well-attested fact that the Carthaginian recruiting-officers were busy during this period raising mercenaries in Spain, the Balearic Islands, Liguria, and Cisalpine Gaul;⁷ it is therefore

⁵ Frontinus, *Strat.*, II, 3, 16.

⁶ Silius Italicus, *Punica*, XVII, 418 ff.

⁷ For Spain, Livy, XXX, 7, 10; 21, 3. For Cisalpine Gaul, Livy,

not improbable that they included Macedon in their activities. The force they raised there may well have been a small one, so small that it does not appear in the list of mercenaries given by Polybius and Appian;⁸ it may well have been an unofficial one, raised privately by Sopater, and commanded by him.⁹

The picture now becomes somewhat clearer. The Macedonian envoys demanded the return of these mercenaries and their commander, Sopater (*Macedones duxque eorum Sopater, qui apud Hannibalem mercede militassent*). In doing this they were carrying out Philip's practice of meeting accusations by counter-accusations.¹⁰ The Romans, in reply, repeated the substance of the Greek allegation, which they regarded as substantiated by the fact that some Macedonians had been found among the prisoners taken at Zama, and claimed that the force had been sent with the king's official sanction and constituted a flagrant breach of the Peace of Phoenice. Both parties were talking at cross-purposes, as is indicated by the fact that the Macedonians replied *perplexe*.

In conclusion, it seems that the belief that a force of 4,000 Macedonians was sent to Carthage arose out of Greek propaganda put forth at Rome in 203-202 B. C. The allegation was probably false, but based on the presence of a very small party of Macedonians among Hannibal's mercenaries, whose release was demanded by the Macedonian envoys in 201 B. C. Livy was so convinced of the truth of this allegation that he felt compelled to find a place for the 4,000 Macedonians in Hannibal's order of battle by inserting them in the second line.

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XXXI, 10, 2; 11, 5; 19, 1. It seems most probable that Hamilcar had been left behind to raise mercenaries. The fact that Gauls, Moroccans, Ligurians, and Balearic Islanders are stated by Livy, Polybius, and Appian to have made up the Carthaginian front line is evidence that recruiting officers had been active in these places.

⁸ Polybius, XV, 11; Appian, *Punica*, 40.

⁹ See E. J. Bickerman, "Bellum Philippicum," *C.P.*, XL (1945), p. 143, n. 77: "There may have been some Macedonians among Hannibal's mercenaries at Zama."

¹⁰ Polybius, XVIII, 4 ff.

A NOTE ON THE ΠΙΣΤΕΙΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S
RHETORIC, 1354-1356.

In the opening pages of his *Rhetoric* Aristotle devotes some time to the consideration of the *πίστεις*. In a work which views rhetoric as an effort to elicit true judgment¹ directed towards action in an instance where the act of judgment is essentially free, this is quite understandable. For the *πίστεις* are the elements whereby this judgment is induced.²

Since the word *πίστις* in various forms is an operative word in the rest of the *Rhetoric* and since Aristotle spends some time upon it in the opening numbers, a clear understanding of the word would appear necessary.

As a matter of fact traditional exegesis of the *Rhetoric* has indiscriminately identified the word with the *πίστεις ἐντεχνολογικαί* (1355 b 35) and has then gone on to identify these with *ἥθος*, *πάθος*, and *ἐνθύμημα*, which become "methods" or "modes" of proving.³ One serious problem with this is the fact that Aristotle nowhere in the *Rhetoric* explicitly identifies enthymeme as he does *ethos* and *pathos* with the *πίστεις ἐντεχνολογικαί*.

Actually the word *πίστις* will not sustain a univocal or monolithic interpretation. It operates on three levels.

¹ See 1355 a 14-24; 1356 a 15 ff.; 1357 a 2 — b 4; 1377 b 21; 1391 b 8 ff.; 1402 b 31 ff. All text references are to Roemer (Teubner, 1923).

² As is clear from 1354-56.

³ And they are called the non-logical (*ἥθος* and *πάθος*) and the logical (*ἐνθύμημα*) methods of proving with rather disastrous consequences for Aristotle. For we have the strange inconsistency of Aristotle damning the "non-logical" *pistis* on one page of his text (1354) and incorporating it with the "logical" shortly later. For some commentators this is open contradiction. One does not have to subscribe to the inerrancy of Aristotle in refusing to believe that Aristotle was totally incapable of recognizing what many commentators over the centuries have perceived. See Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London, 1867), pp. 99 ff., 140 ff., and his *Commentary* (Cambridge, 1877); E. Havet, *Étude sur la Rhétorique d'Aristote* (Paris, 1846), pp. 27-31; Vater, *Animadversiones ad Aristotelis Librum Primum Rhetoricum* (Saxony, 1794), pp. 10-13 is more circumspect but does not remove the problem, and the same may be said of Spengel in his commentary (Lipsiae, 1867): see *sub* 1354 b 18.

a) The first meaning presents us with *πίστις* as source material, or the subject-matter capable of inducing in an audience a state of mind called *πίστις*, or belief, if employed correctly.⁴ In general these are the *πίστεις ἄτεχνοι* and *ἐντεχνοί*. It is the latter which concern us here. The entechnic pisteis, in Aristotle's words, are *ἦθος*, *πάθος*, and not *ἐνθύμημα*, but rather, *ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ* (1356 a 3). This last it appears should be called something like *τὸ πρᾶγμα*, the subject in itself considered in its logical aspect, or the subject considered under those aspects which appeal to the intellect just as *ethos* and *pathos* are aspects of the subject which appeal to the emotions, the feelings, the will.⁵ This third pistis is called *πρᾶγμα* because we have no textual statement which identifies it as *ἐνθύμημα*, and because it is elucidated by Aristotle in such a way (1356 a 19-20) as to justify some such term. One might also add that in the *Rhetores Graeci*⁶ Minucianus calls these pisteis: *ἠθικαί, παθητικαί, λογικαὶ αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πραγματικαί*, while Dionysius of Halicarnassus⁷ speaks of them as *πρᾶγμα, πάθος, ἦθος*. In this meaning the third pistis, *πρᾶγμα*, is the logical, rational, intellectual aspect of the subject under discussion.

The entechnic pisteis when understood as source material are what Aristotle calls the *ἐνδεχόμενα πιθανά* in a subject:⁸ those elements most likely to help create belief.

⁴ Eg. 1356 a 6 ff. It appears that attention should also be called to the fact that in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle recognized as Plato did in the *Phaedrus* that we accept propositions and make judgments as human beings with the whole complex of intellect, will, emotions, feelings coming into play.

⁵ One has but to consider the explanation of *ethos* and *pathos* in 1356 a 5 ff., and the statement made about *ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ* in 1356 a 19-20. And when in this first book from 1358 onward Aristotle discusses the material topics for the premises of enthymemes in the three genera of rhetoric we find that he is deriving them from the subject-matter under discussion.

⁶ *Rhetores Graeci* (ed. Walz), IX, p. 601; see also V, p. 506.

⁷ *Lysias*, 16 ff. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer* (Leipzig, 1885), p. 177, says that the use of *πίστεις πραγματικαί* goes back to Aristotle 1356 a 1-4; see also Süß, *Ethos* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 126, 130, 147 who speaks of this third pistis as *πρᾶγμα*. Spengel in his commentary (*sub* 1356 a 21) apparently identifies this third pistis with enthymeme, but his remarks on 1354 b 18 would appear more to the point when he speaks of this pistis as "ex re ipsa."

⁸ See 1355 b 10-11, 26.

We find *πίστις* in this meaning in 1355 b 35, 37 ff., 1356 a 1, 13 (and it would seem apparent that its meaning here is a far-cry from 1355 a 5), 1356 a 21 (the word *τούτων* which refers back to *πίστεων* of 1356 a 1).

b) In its second meaning we find *πίστις* as the method or technique whereby one utilizes the material, gives this matter form, so to speak, and produces the state of mind, *pistis*, in the audience. For *πίστις* like *ἐπιστήμη* is the result of some sort of demonstrative process.⁹ Here it is that the enthymeme and paradeigma should be placed, it would appear. For in rhetoric they are the logical instruments which one is to employ in constructing probable argumentation directed towards *krisis*, or judgment.¹⁰ The most obvious examples¹¹ of this usage would be:

1355 a 5: where the statement in Greek says quite simply: *πίστις* = *ἀπόδειξις*, *ἀπόδειξις* = *ἐνθύμημα*. Thus *pistis* here is enthymeme (1414 a 35-7 seems a clear confirmation of this).

1355 a 7, 28.

1356 a 21: and because of the meaning of *πίστευς* it would seem that the *ταῦτα τρία*, or variant, found in a number of the MSS would be a reading preferable to the *ταύτας* of A^c for it would refer back to *πίστεων τρία εἶδη* of 1356 a 1. The implication of this is drawn in the conclusion.

c) Finally there is the meaning of *πίστις* as the state of mind produced in the audience. Evidence of this usage would be 1355 a 5 (*πιστεύομεν*), 1356 a 6, 19.

The ostensible result of this distinction on *πίστις* is that we find that the *πίστευς* as source material for demonstrative proof consist of *ἥθος*, *πάθος*, *πρᾶγμα*, whereas the *πίστευς* as modes of demonstration are *ἐνθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα*. This is contrary to the traditional interpretation which speaks of the *πίστευς* as three independent modes of rhetorical demonstration: non-, or quasi-logical, *ἥθος* and *πάθος*, and logical, *ἐνθύμημα*. The consequence of this traditional interpretation is a series of insoluble difficulties in this opening passage:

⁹ See 1355 a 5-6.

¹⁰ See 1356 a 34 — b 11.

¹¹ 1354 a 13, 15; b 21 also appear to be instances of this usage.

- 1) It confers a univocal meaning upon πίστις which is impossible.
- 2) It overlooks the fact that in the light of the extensive treatment of ἥθος and πάθος in the *Rhetoric* one might well ask how Aristotle's treatment of these differs from that of his predecessors, and by the same token, why, if the main function of πίστις is logical, or demonstration by enthymeme, Aristotle's consideration of ethos and pathos is not ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος (1354 a 15 ff.).
- 3) It ignores the fact that παράδειγμα is the correlative of enthymeme as a method of demonstration.¹² In the light of such correlation one is forced to ask the meaning of 1356 a 1 ff.: πίστεων τρία εἶδη. If the third pistis is the enthymeme, then there are four kinds of pisteis.¹³

Consequently it is suggested that the enthymeme is not the third pistis. Rather must we recognize that there are three entechnic sources for inducing belief: ἥθος, πάθος, πᾶγμα. They are called entechnic because they have to be selected and ordered by the rhetorical dynamis, that insight which scans the total material and chooses the ἐνδεχόμενα πιθανά in a subject, and because they are capable of being given a form by the rhetorical method of demonstration. These three sources are integrated and made into effective rhetorical demonstration by means of the enthymeme and example whereby they become πίστις as a method of producing belief in the minds of the audience. This is what Aristotle calls the ἐντεχνος μέθοδος (1355 a 4).

This is to say that the three pisteis as sources for rhetorical demonstration are informed or ordered by the demonstrative process, i. e. the inferential process of deductive and inductive reasoning, namely, enthymeme and example. Thus Aristotle brings into rhetoric his theory of deductive and inductive reasoning which for him is absolutely essential for all demonstration. Specifically with respect to the enthymeme we find that

¹² This is stated a number of times in the *Rhetoric*; see especially 1393 a 23; also 1356 b 6 ff., 1368 a 29 ff., 1392 a 1 ff., 1394 a 9 ff., 1418 a 1 ff. It also appears in *Post. An.* 71 a 9-11.

¹³ While one does not wish to go out of the context of the numbers proposed in this Note it still seems but right to indicate a typical problem one must encounter in the *Rhetoric* if one views the enthymeme as the third pistis: the premises of enthymemes are εἰκότα, σημεία and τεκμήρια, and these premises are derived by Aristotle from ἥθος, πάθος, πᾶγμα, as co-equal sources.

the enthymeme is something which stands apart from the three entechnic pisteis by reason of the fact that it is the logical instrument which employs these pisteis in constructing probable argumentation directed towards krisis, or judgment. The enthymeme is the instrument, namely the syllogism of rhetoric (1356 b 5), which utilizes the material offered by the three pisteis and marshals it into an effective form of demonstration. It is Aristotle's introduction of the inferential methodology of his philosophical system into the field of rhetoric.

In the light of the preeminent part Aristotle assigns to the syllogism as a demonstrative process it is not difficult to understand what he means when he speaks of the enthymeme as *κυριώτατον τῶν πίστειν* (1355 a 7). But it becomes far more intelligent as the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως* (1354 a 15). In this respect it is the container, that which incorporates, or embodies, the pisteis: ethos, pathos, pragma, imposing form upon them so that they may be used most effectively in rhetorical demonstration. The enthymeme in the field of probable demonstration which is the demonstration of Rhetoric parallels in a broad sense the role of apodeixis, or the demonstrative syllogism, in the field of Metaphysics, just as the practical syllogism plays a similar role in his Ethics.

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REVIEWS.

HARRY A. WOLFSON. *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. xxviii + 635. \$10.00.

News that Harry A. Wolfson, Professor of Hebrew Literature and Philosophy in Harvard University, was turning his attention to patristic thought was noted with considerable interest by students of philosophy, theology, the classics, and western culture generally. The first fruit of this undertaking, the volume under review, amply justifies that interest, for it provides in lucid fashion a masterful summarization and discerning penetration into a *terra incognita* (for all save a few specialists) which is, nonetheless, a crucial link between the classical age and medieval and modern thinking. Intended as the initial volume of Book III in a *magnum opus* on the "Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza," this latest contribution of Professor Wolfson forms part of his own distinctive approach to the history of Western philosophy, fitting into a definite structural outline and based upon a particular methodology. Something may be said about these factors at the outset.

In previous writings, Wolfson has outlined his assumption that philosophy falls into three historic periods. One is ancient Greek philosophy which did not know scripture; the third is philosophy since the eighteenth century which has tried to free itself from scripture. In between the two is an intervening period that others call medieval or Christian philosophy, with two appendices: Philo, a sort of postscript to ancient Greek philosophy, and Arabic Moslem and Jewish philosophy, a prefatory note to thirteenth century scholasticism. But Wolfson, having made his own Darwinian "voyage of the Beagle" in search of philosophic specimens, sees the materials of this middle period somewhat differently: they are all streaked with material drawn from religious literature (the Old and New Testaments, the Koran), they take on a new form (not the diatribe or dialogue, but the homily or running commentary on some scripture text), and mark a fundamental break in philosophical doctrines. Thus "medieval philosophy," to Wolfson—and here I quote his view from an earlier work, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* (2 volumes; Cambridge, Mass., 1947), II, p. 445—is "the common philosophy of three religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—consisting of one philosophy written in five languages," Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic, and Hebrew. Though this one "medieval" philosophy continues pagan thought, it means also a "radical revision," characterized, above all, by the notion that there is a single infallible source of truth, revelation—i.e., the Scripture. Reason, which finds truth also, must take the data of this scriptural "given," and build its philosophical system

thereon. This new school of philosophy, where revelation in scripture is so stressed, Wolfson holds, to state his theory concisely, was founded by Philo, reigned dominant for seventeen centuries in European thought, and then was challenged by Spinoza who attacked the belief in revelation and sought to restore philosophy to its status before the "Philonic revolution." Thus "medieval" philosophy is actually the history of the philosophy of Philo, for nothing new really happened for seventeen centuries in philosophy until Spinoza pulled down what Philo and others had built up. This thesis must be understood because it provides the basis for Wolfson's approach to the Fathers in his latest book: they are analyzed in the light of Philo.

The thesis also explains the structural outline into which this particular volume is to be set. Book I, yet unwritten, will provide a General Introduction on the Greek thinkers to the "Structure and Growth of Philosophic Systems from Plato to Spinoza." Book II consists of the two volumes already noted about Philo. The newest work is the first volume of at least two on *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, the title for Book III. An earlier work, *Crescas' Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1929) will presumably fit somewhere into the series, and the final book has already been published as *The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of his Reasoning* (Cambridge, 1934).

The subtitle of this last work offers an insight into the particular methodology of Wolfson which runs through all these books. It is what he calls "the hypothetical-deductive method of text study," the attempt to reconstruct, since no philosopher ever tells us all the procedures of his reasoning completely, the latent process involved, his presuppositions, and their modifications, in the light of which the uttered or recorded words are to be understood. Wolfson himself has described it thus: "the purpose of historical research in philosophy, therefore, is to uncover these unuttered thoughts, to reconstruct the latent processes of reasoning that always lie behind uttered words, and to try to determine the true meaning of what is said by tracing back the story and how it came to be said, and why it is said in the manner in which it is said" (*Philo*, I, p. 107). Such an adaptation of the historical method can become a subjective, psychological approach misdirected by an analyst who is swayed with his preconceptions, but certainly the technique in Wolfson's hands becomes a fascinating tool of research. It is thus in line with this method of approach that he can write in his new volume on "whether Apollinaris in his insistence upon one nature meant to deny only a human nature in Jesus or whether he meant to deny in him also a bodily nature," even though the question is never discussed by Apollinaris directly (pp. 434 ff.)!

Having indicated the grounds of presupposition upon which Wolfson takes his stand, we may now characterize briefly the volume under review, say something of its contents generally, and direct some specific comments at salient issues which arise.

The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Volume I, it should now be clear, forms a definite parallel to the author's *Philo*; the one dealt with a Jewish version of Greek philosophy, the other has to

do with a Christianized version of it. But this initial volume actually parallels only three of the twelve chapters in *Philo*, thus suggesting some idea of the scope of the work envisioned, since of the subjects treated faith and reason develop out of Philo's presentation, but the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation have a separate origin and history generally apart from Philonic thought.

The style of writing is especially to be commended for its clarity. First a working hypothesis for each section is suggested as "analysis and forecast"; then there is a study of representative texts to illustrate this point, with miscellaneous "problem" texts also being taken up—the insights here are sometimes especially significant; and finally there is also a workmanlike summary. A few sections—and the book definitely shows that it was written in smaller units—have appeared in such periodicals as the *Jewish Quarterly Review* (pp. 112-27) and *Church History* (pp. 204-17), but generally the outline proceeds smoothly along with careful transitions. There is a modesty combined with forthrightness throughout that states findings accurately and incisively and yet which allows that texts can admit of other interpretations. The book, it should be added, is no *Dogmengeschichte* or church history—it often omits significant doctrines if the underlying philosophical problem is the same as another previously discussed (e. g., pp. 607 ff.), and the closest work of the type I can think of is G. L. Prestige's *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1936), a treatment to which Wolfson often refers, which grew out of research on terms concerning the Incarnation and Trinity for the long-promised Oxford Lexicon of Patristic Greek and which at times betrays this lexicographical approach. Wolfson's book is less lexicographical, though without ignoring such matters, and often more detailed—especially on backgrounds in Greek thought and of course, Philo, a weakness in Prestige pointed out, e. g., by T. Verhoeven ("Monarchia dans Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean*," *Vigiliae Christianae*, V [1951], p. 44).

The subtitle of Wolfson's volume, *Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*, provides an accurate, if only partial, description of its contents. Part I takes up Faith, along with Reason. Paul to the contrary, who had contrasted the wisdom of God and the wisdom of the world and who disdained any philosophical props for his Gospel, a philosophized Christianity with growing use of allegory did arise under the apologists and fathers, because some converts were trained in philosophy and because the discipline provided a help in apologetics and an antidote to Gnosticism—more of this latter point later. Certain scriptural presuppositions, however, went over into this philosophized Christianity; Wolfson lists no fewer than six of them (in addition to certain specific elements of the Gospel like the Incarnation) that parallel Philo's eight similar presuppositions: the existence of God, the unity of God, his creation of the world, divine providence, the revelation of the law, and the existence of ideas. One wonders, however, whether the influence in many of these was Philonic or rather from the source to which both Philo and the fathers turned, the Old Testament.

There was a handmaiden to scripture, however: philosophy. And although patristic thought always subordinated the latter to the

former, there were three possible ways of relating the two. It could be said, in traditionalistic terms, that "simple" faith in the teaching of the scripture is sufficient, and any search for philosophical demonstrations of matters in which one already believes *diminishes* their merit; this was the answer of Tertullian. Or one might hold that while simple faith has merit, faith supported by philosophic demonstration has *greater* merit; this rationalistic solution was offered by Origen. Or one could assume that simple and rational faith are of *equal* merit, as Clement of Alexandria and Augustine seem to do. Underlying the whole matter, Wolfson seeks to show, is a different view of faith: a "single faith theory" in Origen and Tertullian, in which faith means the acceptance of scriptural teaching on mere authority, the merit of which acceptance is either diminished or increased by philosophic rationalization; and a "double faith theory" in Clement and Augustine, in which faith is the acceptance of scriptural truth on mere authority *or* as rationally demonstrated truth. But is *pistis* always only so propositional in the fathers, devoid of the elements of personal trust it had for some New Testament writers? Further, does the attitude of the individual patristic writer toward philosophy help temper his view of faith, so that Tertullian, for whom Athens and Jerusalem have no concord, wants only simple faith, and Origen, philosopher by nature, following in the wake of Clement, cannot conceive of genuine Christianity which omits the insights of the Greek intellect?

Part II turns to the Trinity, the Logos, and the Platonic Ideas. The biggest problem Wolfson sees in the Trinitarian formula is the confession of the Holy Spirit: this was not inherited from Judaism. His own suggestion here conceives a three-stage process of development, whereby first baptism was "in the name of Jesus Christ," followed by "good and fitting words" addressed to the baptizand and the promise, "Ye shall receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit," as apparently practiced in Jewish circles; stage two, in baptism of gentile converts to Christianity, saw the use of the liturgical phrase, "... in the name of God, ... in the name of Jesus Christ," coupled directly with the promise of the gift of the Holy Spirit; the final step, perhaps for symmetry, made the phrase "in the name of God and of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 146 f.). Wolfson also sees a distinct change taking place in the concept of the Spirit under the influence of Paul and others at this time. Granted, however, that the *theology* of the Spirit was slow in being formulated articulately in the early church, does this prove that the sense of the *reality* of the Spirit was as slow in developing in the early Christian communities? Several times, as in this example, Wolfson's approach suggests the distinct notion of the Spirit as a later development, and so far as philosophic speculation over the nature of the Spirit goes, this is true. But in actuality the importance of the Spirit does not seem to rise in a steady curve, but certainly was more intense in the early days, then diminished until the Montanistic revival. In regard to the particular theory cited above, the evidence in Acts does speak of those who are baptized in the name of Jesus Christ then receiving the Holy Spirit (2:38), but the same book at 10:44-48 also talks of gentiles being

baptized under the same formula *after* the Holy Spirit had fallen upon them. In short, the Spirit at times appears the "self-evident" *sine qua non* in the life of the primitive community, "the reality on which the Church is founded," as E. Stauffer has put it in his *New Testament Theology* (London, 1955), p. 165, and an approach that examines primarily the philosophical interest in the Spirit misses something of the more likely course of development.

The changing concept of the Spirit in the early church which Wolfson finds amounts to this. Paul identified the Holy Spirit with the preëxistent Christ or wisdom, of whom Jesus is an earthly revelation; thus he can speak indifferently of the spirit of Jesus Christ (Phil. 1:19), the spirit of God's Son (Gal. 4:6), or the Holy Spirit—a trinity appears after the life of Jesus, but prior to that there is only God and the preëxistent Christ. Matthew and Luke, on the other hand, regard the Spirit as the begetter of Jesus and, while for them also there is no trinity prior to Jesus' birth, the preëxistent binity is God and the Spirit. John, finally, identifies the preëxistent Christ and wisdom of Pauline thought with the Logos of Philo, and since he makes no clear statement on the distinctness of the Spirit and the Logos, the Johannine binity prior to Jesus' birth consists of God and the Logos. Although the Apostolic Fathers generally continued to identify Logos and Holy Spirit, the Apologists differentiated them. This step raised the question of the preëxistence of the Logos and the Holy Spirit within the Trinity, and two views on it appeared: the one, following Philo, envisioned two stages of existence prior to creation for the Logos (as a thought of God, with Him or in Him; and then as an incorporeal being begotten by God before creation); the other view, championed by Irenaeus and Origen, saw only one stage of existence for the Logos prior to creation, eternal generation. The second view prevailed for psychological reasons, though Wolfson, contrary to some other investigators, concludes Clement of Alexandria retained the two-fold stage. A brief word is added on the relation of the Platonic ideas to the Logos. Philo already had viewed the Logos as the place of the intelligible world or totality of ideas, and the fathers followed this. But since, unlike Philo, they made the Logos begotten of God, rather than a creature of His, they could say these ideas always existed in God.

Part III, the longest section and the heart of the book, takes up the three unique mysteries of patristic thought. First comes the mystery of the generation of the Logos, where, since the Logos was regarded as more than a creature made by God, and under the influence of the miraculous birth stories, the Hebraistic concept of God as an artisan producing something unlike himself shifted to the Greek figure of a begetter, begetting someone like himself. Concerning the physical analogies the fathers employed to "explain" this mystery, Wolfson's judgment that "use of the Stoic expression 'internal' (*ἐνδιάθετος*) Logos' and 'uttered' (*προφορικός*) Logos' . . . is more likely taken over indirectly through Philo" than "directly from the Stoics" (p. 299), sounds like special pleading, especially when he must go on to quote Irenaeus' opinion that gnostic error derives from this *Stoic* analogy (p. 299). And is the figure of a fire

or torch kindled by another fire or torch (pp. 300 f., cf. 359 f.), similarly used, a partial source for the later creedal phrase, "Light of Light"?

The second mystery is that of the Trinity. Paul in his use of *kyrios* and other terms for Jesus did not necessarily mean to state that Jesus was God, a view for which Wolfson can find an important ally in Martin Werner, *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas*² (Bern, 1953), pp. 307 ff.; nor did John "necessarily mean to assert the divinity of the Logos" (p. 306, though on the phrase cited in note 22, that Jesus called the Father "the only true God," the rest of that verse, 17:3, should be noted and the claim of 10:30). However, with the rise of the belief in the preëxistence of Christ and the Spirit, the problem arose of how to deny any sort of pagan-sounding tritheism and yet of how simultaneously to cling to the Jewish idea of One God, while giving full due to conviction about Jesus and the Spirit to which experience had led the Christians. The solution was rejected of keeping the names "Son" and "Spirit" while denying them any reality, so that God appeared like a single mountain with three faces visible at different times to men. The ultimate solution was that, while the members of the Trinity are each a real individual species, their unity is only relative—either a unity of rule, as in the apologists, or a unity of substratum (*ousia* or *substantia*). These two solutions are traced out in Origen, Tertullian, Basil, John of Damascus, and Augustine. Wolfson sees two possible sources for the unity of rule motif: scripture and philosophy; but a third possibility is suggested by T. Verhoeven in his Dutch dissertation, *Studiën over Tertullianus' Adversus Praxeum* (Amsterdam, 1948), pp. 108 f., in current governmental administration, a view which has much to commend it. Throughout, this unity of rule does not seem to get the attention it deserves. *Oikonomia*, closely associated with the word *monarchia*, was, after all, Tertullian's term for the Trinity, as Prestige, *op. cit.*, p. 98, shows, and only by a curious accident did it become the normal word for Incarnation later on. *Oikonomia* also was a patristic term for what moderns call *Heilsgeschichte* (cf., e.g., O. Cullmann, *Christ and Time* [Philadelphia, 1950], pp. 77 f., 223), and there seems good evidence that the earliest view of the Trinity was a *heilsgeschichtlich*, economic, or functional one (on which see Verhoeven, *op. cit.*, pp. 136 f.; O. Lillge, "Das patristische Wort *oikonomia*" [microfilmed dissertation, Erlangen, 1955], pp. 63-9; and F. Loofs, *Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte* [Halle, 1950], pp. 76, 107 ff., 122 f., and 192 ff.). Admittedly the idea of a unity of substratum later replaced it, but in the development of the doctrine of the Trinity this motif seems to have a greater place than is often accorded it.

The final mystery is that of the Incarnation. The treatment here of the backgrounds in Aristotle and the Stoics for the types of physical union suggested to explain the "two-natures-one-person" formula is especially well done, and the coverage of orthodox and unorthodox usage of these analogies very thorough. Wolfson is at his best in tracing how the old Greek analogies crop up in father after father with subtle variations and in tracking down such difficult topics as *perichoresis* (pp. 418-28) and the seventh century effort

at reunion between Dyophysite and Monophysite—in this last discussion the approach comes closest to straight historical narration of a series of complex events which proved the adage, *si duo dicunt idem, non est idem*.

To conclude this overlong survey of a book that says always more than a reviewer can do justice to, Part IV discusses "The Anathematized." The thorny question of a pre-Christian Gnosticism is answered by the conclusion there was a pre-Christian *gnosis* but "no group of people prior to the rise of Christian Gnosticism are known to have been called Gnostics" (pp. 500 f.), a view somewhat different from E. Dinkler's, who decides for such a phenomenon (in *The Idea of History in the Ancient Near East* [New Haven, 1955], p. 207, cf. especially note 43, where the bibliography supplements and balances admirably that of Wolfson on p. 498, note 14). Reversing Harnack's famous formula, Wolfson calls Gnosticism the "verbal Christianizing of paganism" (p. 503) and reconstructs two gnostic systems, that of Cerinthus, whose Christology is Ebionite, and that of Simon, whose is Docetic. In each case there are three tiers of supramundane beings: a supreme God; a preëxistent Christ and/or Holy Spirit; and angels and powers, including the creator-god of the Old Testament. Here there was quite possibly influence, it may be added, from the "angel Christology," which M. Werner, *op. cit.*, pp. 302 ff., maintains was the primitive Christian view: it assumes Christ was an angelic being from the lower tier whom God picked out to be Messiah (cf. the reviewer's note, "Martin Werner and 'Angel Christology'" in *The Lutheran Quarterly*, VIII [1956], pp. 349-58). Other gnostic schemes are analyzed on the basis of these two systems, the surprising conclusion offered that Gnosticism was not a philosophy, especially in contrast to Philo and the church fathers, and a discussion on heresies closes the volume.

A few obvious misprints need correction: p. 9, note 70, read "Aratus" for "Oratus"; correct "begotten" (p. 169, bottom), "goodhood" (p. 343, middle), "Augustin" (p. 350, line 1, to conform to "Augustine" elsewhere), "ffesh" (p. 418, middle), and block in the reference given on p. 122, note 16 as "p. 00" to read apparently "p. 112." Perhaps the truest appraisal for this significant book is to say, however, that readers will look eagerly for Volume II, which promises to deal with creation, divine attributes, and resurrection among other things.

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JOSHUA WHATMOUGH. *Language: A Modern Synthesis*. London, Secker and Warburg; New York, St. Martin's Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 270. \$4.75.

Professor Whatmough's book is the latest addition to the long series of works entitled *Language*, which includes such distinguished treatments as those of Jespersen, Vendryes, Sapir, and Bloomfield. Most of these have been expositions of the whole field of linguistics,

presented in a systematic fashion. Whatmough's *Language*, on the other hand, is primarily a discussion of certain aspects of linguistic theory, particularly as it has been affected by recent developments in cybernetics and communication theory.

The structure of the book follows a reasonably clear pattern. After a brief "Introduction" (pp. 1-4) and a further prefatory chapter on "Scope and Method" (I, pp. 5-17), three chapters present the background against which the study of language is carried on. Their titles are, however, somewhat misleading. Chapter II, "Languages in History" (pp. 18-34), actually presents both a historical picture of the expansion of certain language groups and a description of the present-day extension of a number of the world's major languages.¹ "Languages in the Present" (Chapter III, pp. 35-50) belies its name in that it is concerned rather with structural features and types of languages, mostly of the present day but also some no longer spoken (e.g. Latin, Old English). The fourth chapter ("Bilingual, Multilingual and Interlingual Communication," pp. 51-65) is also clumsily named, and might have been called, more briefly and accurately, "Languages in Contact,"² since it deals with situations which arise when speakers of different languages meet.

A convenient bridge for the transition to language itself is afforded by the problem of meaning (treated in Chapter V, "Words and Meanings," pp. 66-85). Before coming to the central subject-matter of the book, however, Whatmough goes off on a tangent in Chapter VI, "The Uses of Language" (pp. 86-107), in which he distinguishes several varieties of discourse (e.g. informative, dynamic, emotive, and aesthetic, pp. 88-91) and ends up on the non-linguistic topic of style. But in Chapters VII-IX, he returns to his main subject. "The Structure of Language" (pp. 109-26) is concerned with the major units (phonemic, morphemic, syntactic, and lexical) of linguistic structure. In "The Analysis of Language" (pp. 127-48), Whatmough takes up certain (not all) analytical techniques, particularly sound spectrography and the identification of grammatical constituents and categories. "The Neural Basis of Language" (pp. 149-80) integrates the cerebral aspects of speech with current information theory, especially with regard to the analogy between human linguistic activity and the working of electronic devices, and with regard to considerations of statistical probability in language structure. On the basis of this latter, Whatmough sets up a theory of "selective variation" in language (pp. 163 ff.), concluding that "language strives towards equilibrium" (p. 169) and ascribing regularity of sound change to this factor (pp. 169 ff.)

¹ A map of the "Chief Languages of the World (after Schmidt)," inserted opposite p. 22 in the London edition, is contained in both end covers in the New York edition, though still listed in the Table of Contents. The map itself is rather curious; there seems to be no discoverable rationale in the choice of languages to be included, of colors (black and red) for the printing of their names, nor of regions for the language names to be placed in.

² Despite the existence of a monograph with this title (by U. Weinreich [New York, 1953]).

After the central section dealing with the structural essence of language itself, Whatmough devotes the last three chapters (X-XII) to language in its social setting and function. Chapter X ("Language: Society, Individual and Symbol," pp. 181-98) discusses the rôle of language as a bond in society and within the single individual, through its function as symbolizer. "Mathematics, Statistics and Linguistics: The Mechanics of Language" (pp. 199-220) deals primarily with statistical considerations of frequency, especially as applied to literary style, teaching of languages, and translation machines. The final chapter, "Language and Life" (pp. 221-40), is primarily a discussion of the relation between language and thought, to a large extent devoted to an attack on the "Whorfian hypothesis" (*v. infra*), and foreseeing a "redesigning" of human language. The book is then concluded by a series of appendices (pp. 241-58),—most of which might just as well have been included in the text without rendering it any more saltatory than it already is,—a useful glossary (pp. 259-63), and an index (pp. 265-70).

Whatmough's *Language* is written in an interesting, vigorous, salty (often peppery) style, which makes it easy reading. On occasion, there are evidences of insufficient *labor limae*, so that some infelicities have remained in the text, e. g. the sentence on p. 61 beginning "It is unusual for the different sexes to be differentiated linguistically . . ." (this gets interesting: how many different sexes?), or the adjective *unsoluble* for *insoluble* (p. 212). A curious error in a Latin title has crept in: *De imitatio Christi* (p. 204). Whatmough indulges in a few deliberate linguistic idiosyncracies,³ which need not disconcert the intelligent reader. Perhaps more serious is the tendency to repetition of the same material, for instance the discussion of the new linguistically-based state of Andhra (pp. 29, 62), that of "polysynthesis" (pp. 42, 48), or the disjointed mentions of the use of a reduced "international" English in aviation (pp. 54, 55, 56).

There are many interesting and meritorious features of Whatmough's *Language*. The relation of linguistic phenomena to recent developments in fields allied to linguistics, especially communication theory and brain physiology, is presented with the vigor, the enthusiasm, and also the incoherence that often characterize a new discovery. The linguistic exemplifications are chosen from a wide field and are usually appropriate to the discussion, especially when they are taken from the Indo-European languages. Competent linguistic historians have long known that the postulate of regular sound change was thoroughly justified by the successful results it has given in practice; Whatmough formulates a theoretical basis for this postulate in the systematic, statistically-based orderliness of language (pp. 169 ff.).

However, there are large bits of pre-scientific eggshell still adher-

³ E. g. his imposition of non-English patterns of word-formation on English, as in the adjective *phonematic* instead of the normal *phonemic* (cf. C. D. Buck, *C. P.*, XL [1945], p. 47). In *morphome* for normal *morpheme*, a happenstance of Greek historical word-formation is allowed to dictate English structure.

ing, as it were, throughout the work. The old notion that a word's earlier meaning somehow determines its present meaning and relation to other words—a belief which retarded linguistics and led etymologists off on tangents, from Varro and Isidore of Seville to the Renaissance,—crops up on various occasions, as when Whatmough connects "say" and "see" on the basis of a supposed common origin;⁴ or when he puts together "the spoken word (λόγος) and the reading (*lego*) of its written equivalent" (p. 240). Value-judgments, which in linguistics (as in other scientific activity) can have a basis only in personal preference or prejudice, occur frequently, as in the reference to "the mass butchery of words that has gone on in Russian since 1917" (p. 206) or the sentence "the usual product [of linguistic symbiosis of non-literate groups] is a 'creolized' language, not really a fusion of both, but a debased form of one" (p. 60). Whatmough's value-judgments often extend to non-linguistic matters as well: in the creation of the new state of Andhra, "wiser counsel might deplore these separatist tendencies . . ." (p. 29). Even a slight acquaintance with the New Zealand situation leads one to query ". . . the splendid recovery from the impact of Western European civilization that distinguishes the Maori of New Zealand" (p. 33).

Unfortunately, the actual data which Whatmough cites are often inaccurate or questionable. A few examples: would the spread of the early Indo-European languages really have been impossible without the much earlier domestication of the horse or the invention of the wheel (p. 21)? (How did the American Indians—whose fleetness of foot Whatmough cites on the same page—manage to settle the two Americas and establish the Mayan, Aztec, and Inca civilizations?) In saying that "until recently, Western Europe was unaffected by linguistic 'politik'" (p. 26), Whatmough neglects such nineteenth-century instances as Schleswig-Holstein, Alsace, or the German-ruled parts of Poland. Rapid-speech forms such as /šúðəv/ for *should have* or /wéjəmin/ for *wait a minute*—which Whatmough misleadingly writes *should of* and *wayamin*, respectively (pp. 42, 48)—are hardly examples of "polysynthesis," but simply morphemic reductions in fast speech such as are normal in English and many other languages. That linguistic differentiation of the sexes is unusual (p. 61) is very questionable; if we include features of intonation and lexicon, it would probably be hard to find a language in which there was no sex differentiation. The definition of "true" grammatical gender as "agreement of endings in the adjective and noun" (p. 142) is rather narrow and rigid. Does President Eisenhower really "appear to talk exactly like his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather" (p. 165)? French *ai* and *avons* are not directly from *habeo* and *habemus* (p. 248); since Whatmough's main concern here is with the analogical levelling of the Old French verb roots *am-* "love" to *aim-* and *parol-* "speak" to *parl-*, perhaps it would have been better to take the second person singular and plural of a non-radical-changing verb such as *chanter* "sing" for

⁴ I am informed by colleagues in Germanic linguistics that this connection is at best doubtful.

comparison with *amer* and *parler*. At various points (e.g. pp. 47-8, 223), Whatmough refers to the supposedly amorphous character of Aranta linguistic structure, presumably relying on Sommerfelt's wholly inaccurate and distorted misrepresentation;⁵ a competent, thorough description has since revealed Aranta to be a normal language like any other.⁶

There are two schools in present-day linguistics—or, perhaps, two current approaches to linguistic analysis—with which Whatmough disagrees emphatically, and which he repeatedly attacks: the “behavioristic” or “mechanistic” viewpoint (pp. 12-13, 14, 198) and the “Whorfian hypothesis” (pp. 37, 85, 186-7, 225-7). But Whatmough so misrepresents both of these points of view as to deprive his counter-arguments of most, if not all, of their value. Whatmough's reader would get the idea that “behaviorists” in linguistics deny the existence of any activity which cannot be ascribed to habit or chance—a fantastic misconception. As has repeatedly been pointed out,⁷ a scientific approach to linguistic analysis involves avoiding the assumption of a non-physical (“mental”) factor in language, and anyone who avoids such an assumption is best called, not a “mechanist” or “anti-mentalistic,” but a “non-mentalistic” or “operationalist.” Whatmough himself, despite all his attacks on the straw men that he sets up as “mechanists,” is a perfectly good non-mentalistic in practice, as in his discussion of the neural basis of language (Chapter IX) and especially of consciousness (p. 150).

Even worse is his misrepresentation of the suggestions which the late B. L. Whorf made concerning the relation between linguistic structure and man's outlook on the universe. In a series of articles,⁸ Whorf suggested that, to a large extent, a naïve speaker's analysis of things around him might be influenced by the analysis implicit in the grammatical or semantic categories of his language. Philosophers are often unaware of this danger, and are likely to ascribe to the structure of the universe features which are merely part of the structure of their native language. Notorious examples of this tendency in philosophy are the Aristotelian “categories,” which are of course mere reflections of the main Indo-European parts of speech; and the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*—of which it has been observed that Descartes might just as well have proven his own exist-

⁵ *La langue et la société* (Oslo, 1938). The competence of this analysis may be judged from the fact that Sommerfelt takes *talpa* “moon” as equivalent to “something stable (*ta*) which returns (*lpa*),” whereas actually the root is *talp-* and *-a* is an ending.

⁶ Cf. “Aranda Phonetics and Grammar” (*Oceania*, XII [1941/2], pp. 255-302; XIII [1942/3], pp. 74-101, 177-200; XIV [1943/4], pp. 68-90, 159-81, 250-6; also separately, *Oceania Monograph*, No. 8), by T. G. H. Strehlow, a trilingual native speaker of Aranta, German, and English, and a competent linguistic analyst and anthropologist.

⁷ E.g. by L. Bloomfield, *Linguistic Aspects of Science* (Chicago, 1939), pp. 13-14, and *Language*, XX (1944), pp. 51-2; R. A. Hall, Jr., *Italica*, XXIII (1946), pp. 32-3; C. F. Hockett, “Biophysics, Linguistics, and the Unity of Science,” *American Scientist*, XXXVI (1948), pp. 558-72, reprinted in *ETC.*, VI (1949), pp. 218-32.

⁸ Reprinted most recently in B. L. Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality* (ed. J. B. Carroll, New York, 1956).

ence by saying "I stand on my head, therefore I exist," since the whole proposition depends on the identity of the first person singular in the two verbs. Whorf pointed out further that an equally naïve philosophy of existence, had it been developed on the basis of an American Indian language such as Hopi, would probably have set up quite different categories, and that the speakers of Hopi had at their disposal such ready-made features of verbal aspect as punctual and segmentative to indicate characteristics of vibratile phenomena which modern physics regards as fundamental. In this respect, Whorf observed, "the Hopi language maps out a certain terrain of what might be termed primitive physics."⁹

Yet Whatmough speaks (p. 227) as if Whorf had said that a Hopi physics comparable with "standard average European" physics existed: "To say that 'Hopi' physics is different from 'Standard Average European' physics (whatever these varieties of physics may be) is a curious error: there is no 'Hopi' physics at all." (Again the straw-man technique.) The "Whorfian hypothesis" does not imply "that scientific theory is nothing more than a mere receipt from a standard average western European language" (p. 85). On the contrary, the basic point is that scientific theory, to be truly objective, must free itself from the limitations of any and every linguistic structure. Certainly, to say "It is more likely that in standard average European the structure of language has been made to correspond with what the speakers of it have discovered about their universe" (*ibid.*) is on the face of it ridiculous.¹⁰ Both the Haitian *nèg-mòn* or "hillbilly" and the sophisticated Parisian intellectual have arrived at widely different conceptions of the universe from those of their common linguistic ancestors who spoke Latin two thousand years ago; yet the basic structure and grammatical categories of Latin, modern French, and Haitian Creole are very much the same once we penetrate beneath the surface, and certainly have not been made to correspond with any individual's or any generation's discoveries about the universe. Sapir's observation¹¹ is much more accurate: "It is almost as though at some period in the past the unconscious mind of the race had made a hasty inventory of experience, committed itself to a premature classification that allowed of no revision, and saddled the inheritors of its language with a science that they no longer quite believed in nor had the strength to overthrow."

Whatmough's theory of "selective variation" in linguistic structure is essentially Darwinian (as he himself admits, p. 175), and a kind of "survival-of-the-fittest" theory. It would imply that "drift" in language is more or less teleological, and can be more or less consciously controlled by human will in accordance with human discoveries and knowledge of the world.¹² This is a rather unrealistic

⁹ *Language*, XII (1936), p. 131.

¹⁰ For a trenchant refutation of the fallacy that changes in philosophical outlook determine changes in linguistic structure, cf. especially A. A. Hill, *Language*, XXVIII (1952), pp. 258-60.

¹¹ *Language* (New York, 1923), p. 105.

¹² An even cruder type of "adaptation" theory appears in the state-

notion, to say the least of it. Humans are, on occasion (though rarely), aware of insufficiencies in their linguistic structure, but no individual or group could ever—given the present organization of any human society, even a dictatorship—do anything effective about it.¹³ To date, no method, even that of “glottochronology” (which, at best, is open to serious question as to its dependability¹⁴) can give us enough depth of historical perspective so that we can say in which direction language, as a human institution, either is moving or “ought to” move. Until we have more effective tools for this kind of analysis, we would do well to leave all speculation on this point, and such theories as that of “selective variation,” in the limbo to which current linguistics has relegated them.

Over against the undoubted merits of Whatmough's *Language* we must set at least equally grave defects. Whom, therefore, will it benefit? Certainly not beginners; in fact, I know at least one undergraduate who has been rendered contemptuous of linguistics by the content of the book. Advanced scholars will find many parts of it interesting, but little in it that is both new and acceptable. It will probably be of most benefit to the intermediate student, who will be interested and stimulated, but who will have enough critical knowledge and judgment to sift the wheat from the chaff.

As we have seen, various chapters of Whatmough's *Language* are somewhat misnamed; perhaps the book as a whole should have had a different title. On the model of such famous combinations as *Tristan and Isolde*, or *Romeo and Juliet*, a name like *Philology and Cybernetics* might have been appropriate. However, its content is comparable to the first ecstatic, rapturous, incoherent outpourings after the love-potion has been drunk. We are still far from the *Liebesnacht*, to say nothing of the *Liebestod*.

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ment “If the environment becomes too severe and so hinders adaptation altogether, then the language is said to die—like Etruscan in ancient, or Tasmanian in modern times” (p. 174). Of course, the complete abandonment of a language is due to factors which have nothing at all to do with linguistic structure and its adaptation to the world. At best, the remark quoted involves a semantic confusion over the terms *adaptation* and *environment*.

¹³ Some may remember the totally futile effort of the Fascist government, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, to eliminate the *Lei* form of address from Italian—and yet, if there ever was a linguistic feature which caused trouble to both native speakers and foreigners, it is the Italian *Lei* pronoun of direct address. The ordinary individual, when confronted with an insufficiency in linguistic structure, is reduced to plaintive but ineffectual lamenting, as in the following quotation from E. N. Westcott's *David Harum* (Chapter 9): “‘Well,’ she admitted hesitatingly, ‘I said to him something like what I have said to you, that it seemed to me that Mr. Lenox came very often, and that I did not believe it was all on his account, and that he’ (won't somebody invent another pronoun?) ‘always stayed when you were at home—’” The Algonquian obviative was clearly called for here.

¹⁴ Cf. most recently S. C. Gudschinsky, *International Journal of American Linguistics*, XXII (1956), pp. 212-13.

T. B. L. WEBSTER. *Greek Theatre Production*. London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1956. Pp. xv + 206; 24 pls. with 38 illus. 25s.

The author is professor of Greek at the University College of the University of London. He has already published several books which show his deep understanding of Greek drama: *Introduction to Sophocles* (Oxford, 1936); *Greek Art and Literature* (Oxford, 1939); *Studies in Menander* (Manchester University Press, 1950); *Studies in Later Greek Comedy* (*ibid.*, 1953). More and more he has attacked the important task of combining his expert knowledge of Greek plays with the study of monuments related to the dramatic literature. He uses particular vases and terracottas in the following papers: "South Italian Vases and Attic Drama," *C. Q.*, XLII (1948), pp. 15 ff.; "The Masks of Greek Comedy," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXII (1949), pp. 97 ff.; "Masks on Gnathia Vases," *J. H. S.*, LXXI (1951), pp. 222 ff.; "Notes on Pollux' List of Tragic Masks," *Festschrift Andreas Rumpf* (1952), pp. 141 ff.; "Greek Comic Costume," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXVI (1954), pp. 582 ff.; "The Costume of the Actors in Aristophanic Comedy," *C. Q.*, N. S. V (1955), pp. 94 ff. Webster has also edited the *Dramatic Festivals of Athens* by Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford, 1953); cf. *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 306 ff. Thus Webster was well prepared for this book, and it is necessary to know some of these papers in order to understand the scope of the book.

Webster deals neither with the theater buildings as architecture, nor with the festivals as to their organization and special features, nor with the chorus and the actors as to their movements and delivery of their parts in speech or song. He restricts himself to scenery, staging, and costumes. These points have been dealt with by Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*,—with the exception of Chapter IV on costume—and by the reviewer in her books always in connection with the pertinent chapters. Webster's original approach consists in his arrangement of the material in five chapters dealing with five different regions: Athens, Sicily and Italy, Mainland Greece, The Islands, Asia and Africa. In each geographical division scenery, masks, and costumes are discussed in chronological order, from the pre-dramatic period to the Graeco-Roman period. Webster lays great stress on the "pre-dramatic performances which were developed into drama and survived alongside drama" (Introduction, p. XI).

Webster has compiled a list of some 1,500 monuments as base for his research. He started with the *Denkmäler zum Theaterwesen* and *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater* by the reviewer, added the monuments discussed in the *Comicae Tabellae* by Antonia Simon, and added a considerable number beyond these. From this list he has selected a catalogue of 267 monuments (pp. 174-94) for discussion in this book, and about three dozen numbers from this catalogue for his illustrations.

Chapter I, "Athens" (pp. 1-96) comprises about half of the book, naturally, as classical drama was created here. Webster gives a vivid description of the classical theater, emphasizing how different it was from our modern one (pp. 1-28). There was close relation between the action and the spectators, who sat around the orchestra

where the chorus, the intermediate between actors and audience, performed. The high Hellenistic stage, however, cut off this contact . . . "before the end of the fourth century: tragedy became hieratic and comedy respectable" (p. 21, cf. p. 169). Webster (pp. 8 f.), in contrast to Pickard-Cambridge (*op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.), believes, as does the reviewer, that the ekkyklema was used in the classical theater. How can we otherwise understand the clear caricatures of this machine in Aristophanes? On the other hand, the author plays still with the idea of a low stage for the classical theater (pp. XIII, 5, 7, 12, 22, 109, 147, 150, 165 f., 170), and consequently he does not realize the close contact of actors and chorus. His only monumental evidence is the Perseus vase (his Pl. 14), which, however, in the opinion of the reviewer, is a private performance, not one given in the theater of Dionysus (cf. my forthcoming revised edition of the *History of the Greek and Roman Theater*).

The costumes are described according to their origin (pp. 28-35), for tragedy (pp. 35-55), Old and Middle Comedy (pp. 55-73), and New Comedy (pp. 73-96). For the origins there are only the padded dancers, who are seen on Corinthian, Spartan, Boeotian, and Athenian vases and are connected with Dionysus (Pl. 5), already discussed by Webster in his article in *Rylands Bulletin*, XXXVI (1954), pp. 582 ff. The author believes that satyrs, as they appear on so many Attic blackfigured vases, entered the satyr play not before about 500. The reviewer believes that they were already used by Arion, and a satyr mask of the sixth century is found in Samos (Pl. 6b). A hairy satyr who is the counterpart to a naked fat man on a cup in Florence (Pl. 2), Webster calls carnival giants. He believes (p. 19) that the Eirene in Aristophanes' *Peace* is such a carnival giant, who is pulled up from the cave and then forward. Webster sees men dressed as nymphs or menads in an Attic kylix in Amsterdam of the middle of the sixth century (Pl. 3). But the men wear the same long dress which all older and dignified men wear in the archaic period. It is a gay dance, but the participants are men in festival dress, and not forerunners of the *Bacchae* of Euripides. Thus the survey for the origins is meagre, as Webster himself states. The only result, which is well known, is that the padded dancers are the forerunners of the costume of old comedy and of the phlyakes.

For the many representations of tragedy Webster rightly emphasizes that the vase painters wavered between myth and reality (pp. 29, 32, 41, 132). He discusses the literary evidence for the development of the mask, based on the references assembled by Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 ff. He believes that Aeschylus introduced "frightening" masks—an interpretation of δεινός which I cannot share. It means powerful, see Sophocles, *Ant.*, 333:

πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοῦδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει·

Many wonders there are, but none is more wonderful (or powerful) than man.

The masks on the Piraeus relief, the Pronomos vase, and the fragment with an actor in a female role (Pls. 8-9) are indeed powerful and not frightening. The main part of the discussion of tragic masks (pp. 45-55) is given to comparing Pollux with existing monu-

ments, as Webster has already done in the *Festschrift Andreas Rumpf* (pp. 141-50). He does the same even for some masks of Old and Middle Comedy (pp. 57 ff., and 62 ff.) and with more right for New Comedy (pp. 75 ff.). The reviewer does not believe that in the creative classical period there already were standardized masks. The guilds of the Hellenistic and Roman periods had to carry around only a certain amount of masks which would be adequate for new plays as well as for revivals of older plays. That is why Pollux' catalogue can be illustrated from the existing monuments and some of the masks seem to have ancestors among the masks of the classical period. I see, however, a great difference between such masks as the dignified mask of a woman held by the actor in the relief in Copenhagen (Pl. 9) and the Phaedra on the Roman painting on marble from Herculaneum with its exaggerated features (pp. 42 f.).

The material which Webster uses for Old and Middle Comedy comprises twelve Attic vases, more than one hundred and fifty different types of Attic terracotta statuettes, and three marble reliefs. He illustrates only one vase (Pl. 15a), the three marble reliefs (Pls. 16, 18d, and 19), and a few terracottas (Pls. 17 and 18a-e). The others he quotes from his list and Pollux for special masks. He distinguishes twenty-four masks among the terracottas and vases, which he enumerates with the capital letters of the alphabet. "In spite of the very considerable variety of masks they are not enough for Aristophanes' larger cast . . ." (p. 66), and thus Webster tries to allot masks to the twenty-seven characters in the *Acharnians*. As his list is not sufficient, he concludes that: "Either standard masks are an illusion or several characters wore the same mask" (p. 68). The author chooses the second alternative, the reviewer the first. Webster's conjectural allocation is very clever and it shows how the masks which we know *could* be used for producing the *Acharnians*. But the creative artists of the fifth and fourth centuries certainly did not confine themselves to only two dozen masks. As each comedy by Aristophanes is different from the others, thus not only portrait masks but character masks for each person were certainly invented. Pollux, IV, 143 tells us that the masks of Old Comedy were likened to the faces of the persons lampooned or were formed in a more ridiculous way: τὰ δὲ κωμικὰ πρόσωπα τὰ μὲν τῆς παλαιᾶς κωμωδίας ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῖς προσώποις ὧν ἐκωμῶδουν ἀπεικάζετο ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ γελοιώτερον ἐσχημάτιστο. New Comedy in contrast could have a mask for each character in its small cast. This is true for the *Persa*, *Amphitruo*, and *Menaechmi* of Plautus, which Webster regards as exact reproduction of Greek Middle Comedy. I believe that they are a mixture of New Comedy and Italian tragicomedia, the *Amphitruo* particularly being an adaptation of an Italian farce testified by a Phlyakes vase. Thus their masks certainly were different from those of Greek Comedy.

That New Comedy (pp. 73-96) has a standard costume and standard masks is evidenced in a multitude of monuments all over the Greek world. Webster uses the Latin imitations on equal footing with the Greek originals. He follows Robert, *Die Masken der neueren attischen Komödie* and Antonia Simon, *Comicae Tabellae* in considering the list by Pollux as a primary source, with the help of

which he identifies the forty-four masks on 78 existing monuments. He enumerates the masks with Nos. 1-44. He illustrates only the well-known Dioskurides mosaics (Pls. 21-22) and the two marble reliefs of a comedy in Naples and the Menander relief in the Vatican (Pl. 24). All the other monuments are quoted from his list (pp. 186 ff.). In a very subtle way Webster discusses each mask as to its character, its representation in art, its use in definite preserved comedies, its identity with or derivation from earlier masks, and the question which characters in Greek plays or Roman adaptations wore masks. This chapter is full of fine observations and suggestions. Thus he states that the following new masks cannot have been created before Menander created the New Comedy of Manners: the leading old man, the man with wavy hair, the *leno*, *eikonikos*, *panchrestos*, dark youth, curly youth, delicate youth, curly-haired wife, graying garrulous, the wife's maid, the fullgrown and the blooming *hetairai*. An interesting suggestion is that the members of each household were marked by the same hairdressing, thus one household by a roll of hair, another by wavy, and a third by curly hair.

The reviewer would like to make more differentiation between the Greek and Roman monuments and plays, although she realizes the difficulty. She believes, however, that there were as yet no standardized masks for Menander, just as there is no definite pattern for his plays. Although we have only fragments there is a wealth of different motifs in his plays in contrast to Plautus and Terence. The reviewer is of the opinion that the relief in the Lateran (Pl. 24b), for example, and its replica in Princeton (*Festschrift für Rumpf*, pp. 14 ff., Pl. V) can be explained better with the help of the *Samia* by Menander than from Pollux. She also objects to considering Plautus as an equal of Menander. For example, Webster (p. 85) gives the same mask of the little housekeeper to Staphyla in the *Aulularia* and to Sophrone in the *Epitrepontes*.

The reviewer differs from the author also in some interpretations of the monuments. The mosaic with women of Dioskurides (Pl. 21) is treated (pp. 23, 85 f., 104) as an illustration to Menander's *Synaristosai* (Women at Breakfast) which Fränkel (*Philol.*, LXXXVII, p. 114) and Süß (*Rh. Mus.*, 1935, pp. 16 ff.; 1938, pp. 97 ff.) have identified with the *Cistellaria* by Plautus. Even if the *Cistellaria* is based on the *Synaristosai*, I do not believe that either can be represented on the mosaic. The Menander comedy as well as the one by Plautus begins with women at breakfast. There is, however, no breakfast as there ought to be one if the Greek play was named from it. Only the old hag drinks wine. There is nothing to eat or drink for the two young women, unless they consume laurel and incense, which are on the table. Dioskurides comes from Samos, and the mosaics are found in the "Villa of Cicero" at Pompeii. Thus they do not even belong to the Athenian monuments, but rather to one of the next chapters. In the lost wallpainting of Pompeii (Bieber, *History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, Fig. 237; Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, Fig. 98) I do not believe with Webster (p. 80) that a simple soldier is represented. He is a braggart officer followed by an ordinary young soldier and speaking to his parasite who bows to him devotedly. In the wallpainting from Herculaneum

(Bieber, *op. cit.*, Fig. 228) the man spying on the gay couple is certainly a father, not a leading slave, as Webster (p. 83) assumes.

It is an excellent idea to treat Sicily and Italy as a separate area (pp. 97-127). In the Introduction Webster reminds us that in the early fifth century Epicharmus wrote his comedies, while tragedy came from Attica. The theater buildings are different from those in Athens, but Webster believes that the relative positions of actors, chorus, and audience in western theaters was the same as in the corresponding periods of Athens. He believes that the plays of Epicharmus and his successors were given by padded dancers, as comedy in Corinth was, and Syracuse was colonized from Corinth. The fact that the specially southern Italian comic entertainers are quoted as a parallel to the Spartan *deikeliktai*, by Sosibius in Athenaeus, 621d, applies, however, to the farces, which as the reviewer believes, were not written by Epicharmus. He probably wrote mimes with mythological subjects and with philosophical tendencies, which appealed to Plato. These were played in the dress of everyday life.

We know much more about the plays of the fourth century from South Italian vases, from which Webster gathers indications of scenery (pp. 101 ff.). He dates them according to the research of Trendall (*Frühitaliotische Vasen and Paestan Pottery*): early South Italian 440-370; Apulian fourth century; Gnathia, middle fourth until about 270; Campanian, third quarter of the fourth century; Paestan, chiefly Assteas and his successors, 360-330. Webster uses them to sketch a history of the production in Italy of Attic tragedies and satyr plays, which comprise Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*, the *Cyclops* and Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. He rightly interprets the vase from Tarentum with two heroes before a colonnade and two women listening from side porches (Pl. 10) as a wooden theater building in contrast to Rumpf (*J.H.S.*, LXVII [1947], pp. 13 f.), who explained it as a real—not a theater—palace. Webster rightly compares it to the Campanian Krater in Paris (Bieber, *op. cit.*, Fig. 175), in which Orestes and Pylades stand before the central building, while the temple of Artemis and the dwelling of Iphigenia are represented in the projecting wings. The reviewer does not believe that Iphigenia lives in the temple (Webster, p. 105). Was a priestess ever allowed to do that? Webster is right in assuming columns as a decoration of the fourth century theater. The Paestan vases with the Madness of Heracles (Trendall, *Paestan Pottery*, Pls. 6-7) and Heracles and Apollo at Delphi (Trendall, Fig. 16; Bieber, *op. cit.*, Fig. 355) suggest doorways and roofs. Webster soberly remarks that the vase painter was more concerned with reminding his clients of essentials than in giving a photographic impression. The stage, however, which appears on so many Paestan and Apulian vases was certainly not used in the permanent but in the temporary theaters which were erected in the market places, sanctuaries, circus, and stone theater for the popular farces and tragicomedies. Such a one is, for example, also the Apulian vase in the Metropolitan Museum (Bieber, *op. cit.*, Fig. 381). The *tragoedos* holds the mantle of the thief, who has been stripped. He thus is part of the tragic comedy,

in the opinion of the reviewer, not representative of a tragedy which was followed by the comedy (Webster, pp. 98 and 109).

The costume of the fourth century is only alluded to for tragedy in the vases of the fourth century (Webster, pp. 110 ff.). Webster believes that the essentials of the costume ran parallel to those in Athens. He again identifies the masks of tragedy and comedy on Gnathia vases (Pl. 11) with such from Pollux' list. The comic scenes on Phlyakes vases, of which he illustrates only two (Pls. 15b and 20), he also identifies with those of Attic comedy and Pollux and distinguishes them with capital letters. Here again I believe that this popular farce has much more variety than the later list of Pollux, though of course the Latin comedy took over at least the four standard masks, developed in the later Atellane farce. The man running away with a cake on the Berlin vase (Bieber, Fig. 375; Webster, pp. 65, 82, 112) is not a parasite, who does not steal, but provokes invitations to meals. Webster points out rightly that the hanging masks on Gnathia vases might be regarded as the beginning of the decorative use of masks which is common in the Hellenistic age (p. 118).

A very valuable chapter is the one dealing with Pompeii and Herculaneum (pp. 119 ff.). Webster points out that the many painted, marble, and bronze masks found in these Campanian cities cannot be much different from the masks which the citizens saw in their large theaters. He describes four houses: the House of the Centenary and another one with alternating tragic and comic scenes, one with groups of dramatic masks, and the House of the Golden Cupids (*Amorini dorati*) with many marble masks in relief and in the round. These examples show how the tradition of Hellenistic Tragedy and New Comedy was alive in these small but cultivated cities during the first centuries B. C. and A. D.

In the chapter on Mainland Greece outside Attica, Webster deals with Sparta, Corinth, Boeotia, Megara, Olynthus, and Delphi (pp. 128 ff.). Sparta, Corinth, and Boeotia have produced many vases with padded dancers, named *Deikeliktai* in Sparta and *ethelontai*, volunteers, in Boeotia (Pl. 5). Webster believes that the satyrs, to whom Arion gave verses to sing according to Suidas, were such padded dancers. He, therefore, believes that this form of entertainment contained the seeds of later tragedy, satyr play, comedy, and dithyramb (p. 135). The reviewer is of the opinion that only comedy continued to use the costume of the vegetation demons represented as padded dancers in the cult of Dionysus, while the satyrs cannot have been different from the hundreds of representations as human beings with animal tails and ears, which must have been the costume of Arion's dithyramb and later of the chorus of the satyr play. The dithyramb was sung in the festival dress of the day and the tragedy in the solemn robe and serious mask given to it by Aeschylus. Megara transmitted to Athens Doric comedy. Olynthus is important because replicas of Attic statuettes, for examples three replicas of the fourteen from a set in New York, date these types before 348, when it was sacked by Philip of Macedon.

The Islands are discussed in a short chapter (pp. 145-55), and indeed, only Delos is important for the history of the theater. Web-

ster gives an excellent interpretation of the difficult inscriptions found there, which are our most complete set of records of the Hellenistic production (*I. G.*, XI, 2, Nos. 105-33; 142 f.). He adds a short discussion of the masks set in floral patterns serving as borders to mosaics, as they were later also used in Pompeii. He tries again to identify them with comic masks in the list of Pollux.

In the last part: Asia and Africa (pp. 156-63) Webster tries to prove that dances of ugly women in honor of a Gorgonheaded Artemis were performed in the archaic period. His evidence, however, does not convince the reviewer. The Rhodian plate (British Mus. A 748), like the Gorgo in Korfu, is really a Gorgo Medusa and she dances as little as the Infatuation described as a strong runner and the Prayers as wrinkled, squinting, lame old women in the *Iliad*, IX, 502-7. The satyr mask from Samos (Pl. 6b) proves that in Asia as in Attica, masks of satyrs in the shape used in the later satyr play were used in the sixth century, as Higgins has seen (to British Mus. 523). The importance of Asia for the Hellenistic period is testified by the theater buildings in Ephesus, Priene, and many others, as well as by the terracottas from Myrina, most of which Webster again identifies with masks in the list of Pollux. I believe with Bulle against Webster (p. 162) that the mosaics made by Dioskurides in the neighboring island of Samos ought to have been used here for production in the theaters of Asia Minor, not for Athens. On the other hand, the Boscotrecase frescoes are rightly compared with the description of a small theater at Tralles in Asia Minor and used for clarifying our ideas about performances in the Asiatic theaters.

In the Conclusion (pp. 164 ff.) Webster draws a clear picture of the general development of theater production. The pre-dramatic dances were widespread, but became sub-dramatic when the Athenian dramatic festivals exercised an all-powerful influence. Webster distinguishes a pre-Periclean, Periclean, Lycurgan, Hellenistic, and Roman Theater. Mythological comedy exploited the contrast between the appearance of the actors and their heroic names. The actors of New Comedy were dressed like well-to-do Athenians of their own time. Tragedy and comedy became international in the Hellenistic world. Production was standardized and the actors from all over Greece performed at many different festivals. A high stage separated now the actors from the audience, and the background consisted of large panels set in wide openings, with fantastic palaces and temples for tragedy, a rich man's dream of a town house for comedy, and an imagined Arcadia for the satyr play. This imaginary architecture was solidified to form the Roman *scaenae frons* (p. 172).

The reviewer agrees with this general picture except for three points. She does not believe in the low stage (see above). She does not believe that Aeschylus had already used the equipment of the Periclean theater. This rather originated from the demands which Aeschylus and his successors made on the stage manager. She does not believe that masks, sleeved chiton, and the *kothornos* of tragedy were taken from pre-dramatic performances. They were given by Aeschylus to the actors taken from the cult of Dionysus. The *onkos* is a late archaic hairdress, the long hair built up over the forehead.

It was kept on in tragedy as was the archaic wedge-shaped beard in comedy. It was not introduced by Lyeurgus, but by Aeschylus. In the Hellenistic time it was made artificially higher, as was the *kothornos* by adding thick soles (p. 163, Pl. 12). This occurred in the third century B. C. when the high stages were built in the East, followed by the West in the second century.

The book is written in an admirable and clear style. Yet it is difficult to read. For this there are several reasons. One is the fact that so many monuments are discussed and so few illustrated, which has, of course, its reason in the high cost of production. Second, the references to these illustrations and to others in the list of the book are difficult to find. The instruction is given on page 7, note 1: "References are to the list of dramatic monuments at the end of the book, where references to modern views discussed in the text will also be found. Those numbered in *italics* are also illustrated in the plates." The list of plates, page VII, instructs us: "References at the end of the captions refer to the List of Monuments." This list of monuments is divided into A. Tragedy and Satyr Plays; B. Old and Middle Comedy; C. New Comedy; F. Origins. Each section begins with 1, so that the same number appears in the text combined with one of the four letters, which have sometimes been left out. This makes the finding in the list more difficult. The *italics* can easily be overlooked and even have sometimes been overlooked by the printer and editor, see p. 61 (e. g., 13 instead of *B 13* = Fig. 17c); p. 113 second line from below (*B 32* instead of *B 32* = Fig. 15b); p. 140, third line from below (*C 23* instead of *C 23* = Pl. 23); and p. 144 (*B 13* instead of *B 13* = Pl. 17c.) When one has found the plate or a reference in the text, one has to go from here to the list where the references to modern views are found, but not always the best illustrations. Neither Furtwängler-Reichhold for vases, nor Beyen or Hermann-Bruckmann for wall paintings and mosaics, nor von Gerkan for Priene, nor Phyllis Lehmann for Boscoreale is quoted.

Third: The learned author expects the reader to have the same comprehensive knowledge of all plays preserved and of all the monuments quoted but not illustrated as he possesses himself. I hope that he will educate many of his students to this high level. In the meantime I suggest that in the second edition of this valuable book he make things easier by quoting his plates and the best illustrations in the text or footnotes.

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NEW YORK.

M. L. CLARKE. *The Roman Mind, Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956. Pp. viii + 168. \$3.75.

This admirable study brings together the strands of history, religion, literature, and philosophy which made up much of the living fabric of Roman culture from the last years of the Republic through the first two centuries of the Empire. Professor Clarke acknowledges in his Preface that he has neglected the intellectual history of the earlier Republic and has not attempted a full treatment of Roman religion, but he expresses the hope that even so his book will be useful to the student and general reader for its discussion of aspects of Roman life that tend to be passed over in the standard histories. To this reviewer the author's modestly stated ambition has been happily and completely fulfilled by his performance in *The Roman Mind*.

After justifying the study of Roman thought not for its originality or the intrinsic worth of the doctrines concerned but because of the particular men who held and applied them to politics and literature, the author describes the adaptation of Greek ideas at Rome, the impact of these concepts on the inherited republican tradition, and the resulting viewpoints of Rome's writers and statesmen. The Introduction and first chapter, "The Background of Thought in the Ciceronian Age," set the stage by describing the transition from traditional republican *mores* to the new Greek ideas. The clash of the old and the new in the second century B. C. is well illustrated by the personalities of Cato the Censor and Aemilius Paulus. The one was personal supervisor of his son's training in the practical arts, but the other was more concerned to give his children a good Greek education. Similarly, the success of Greek philosophy in permeating Roman life in the last century of the Republic is revealed by a comparison of the two Catos. The Elder fought a life-long battle against the infiltration of Hellenism, but the Younger only a century later embodied in himself an almost perfect harmony of Roman traditions and Greek ideas. Although Greek thought in the form of the Hellenistic philosophies and rhetorical theory had achieved a permanent place in Roman life in the last century of the Republic, the content of Cicero's orations, the best available evidence, continued to reveal the traditional political and ethical conservatism. Yet this display of Roman sentiment in the speeches must be set against Cicero's philosophical works, where the spirit is the Greek one of disinterested inquiry.

Chapters II and III discuss Epicureanism and Stoicism, both popular near the end of the Republic. The philosophy of the Garden contained much that was hostile to Roman ways, such as its utilitarian ethics and its rejection of family sentiment and public service, but its promise of freedom from fear and vain desire proved to be for many a congenial sanctuary from the chaos of first century life. But in the long run Stoicism by being less rigid doctrinally was more acceptable to the Roman temperament. In the paradoxes and its impossible dogma of the ideal wise man it too had its share of the alien and unsympathetic, yet despite these handi-

caps it accommodated itself to the Roman outlook on religion, the family, and public and private virtue. Panaetius and Posidonius were instrumental in the liberalisation of the earlier orthodoxy which made the Middle Stoa an attractive combination of the theoretical and the practical, optimistic and confident in man's role as the lord of creation. In view of this balance it is remarkable that this form of Stoicism was relatively short-lived, for in the early Empire its adherents returned to the uncompromising faith of Zeno and Chrysippus.

The political thought and philosophy of Cicero as the chief representative of his age are the central subjects of the next two chapters. His views on statecraft come from an analysis of *De Republica*: the preference for the mixed constitution, the Stoic concept of law as the dictates of right reason in accord with nature, the justification of Roman imperialism and much else are treated by a mind that here reflects a balance of Greek *paideia* and Roman pragmatism. Cicero's approach to philosophy was less consistent. His epistemology was Academic, his ethics Stoic, his general approach eclectic. Moreover, philosophy for him seems only to have been a temporary refuge during the stormy periods of his life; as Clarke well points out, when the opportunity presented itself, the preaching of the *Tusculans* quickly gave way to the invective of the *Philippics*. In this Cicero is representative of the schism in the Roman soul which never completely harmonized Greek intellectualism and speculation with native tradition and sentiment. His philosophical works certainly impress us if only as a sign of the high level of culture of his time, but by virtue of a life and death in accord with the Stoic ideal it was Cato and not Cicero who became the patron saint of philosophy in the early Empire.

Chapters VI-VIII follow with studies of the philosophy, religion, and national spirit of the Augustan age. In this period philosophy ceased to be an intellectual discipline as the quest for peace of mind gave it instead a quasi-religious role. Doctrinal distinctions of the various schools were blurred by a generation weary of strife of any kind and in this situation of indifference Stoicism as the strongest school tended to prevail. In addition Epicureanism was out of tune with the Augustan program for a moral and religious regeneration. This carefully cultivated renaissance was itself doomed to fail despite the determination of the *princeps* and the high art of his poets, for the state religion was but a complex of ritual and cult which could never satisfy the deepest needs of the individual. Even in the writers who supported the new order there is a curious antipathy towards many aspects of their society. Material progress is suspect, martial glory ignored, and the heralding of the second Golden Age brings with it very little satisfaction. Only Virgil in his creation of Aeneas was true both to the Roman past and to the contemporary moral sensitiveness. Plainly the Roman tradition of itself could not satisfy the minds and spirits of men. Philosophy, education, and many aspects of literature remained Greek. The distinctively Roman contribution to the growing cultural homogeneity of the early Empire became less and less identifiable.

The next three chapters (IX-XI) examine the political ideas, religion, and Stoicism of the early Empire. If the rule of one man

brought an end to freedom and to classical political theory, at least the problem of the individual's attitude to the ruling power remained. Lucan simply never accepted *pax* in the place of *libertas*, Seneca tried to have the better of both worlds, and Tacitus, aware of the necessity for the Empire, inclined to a middle course away from the extremes of subservience and defiance. In such an atmosphere the questions of fate, free will, and providence naturally became important. Stoic orthodoxy equated fate with God and nature, so that acceptance of one's lot was to be in harmony with the divine reason. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Stoicism fostered religious feeling and practice. Rather the emphasis was placed on inner resources, on the ability to make oneself virtuous and happy. The only province left to traditional religion was the area of sentimental patriotism. In the period from Nero to Marcus Aurelius Stoicism became less a system than a way of life in which action and virtue were most valued. Its ideal of self-sufficiency and self-discipline appealed to the upper class not only because of the hazards of public life but because of that *taedium vitae* which the very luxury of the times engendered. In Marcus Aurelius, last of the Roman Stoics, the practice of self-restraint reached its highest refinement as he sought above all to be true to himself and to the deity within.

The penultimate chapter on *humanitas* is the most original in the book. As a counter to the Stoic ideal of reason as the absolute standard for all human activity Clarke points to the Ciceronian *humanitas* of the cultured, genial, tolerant man of affairs, another ideal for man which influenced the Romans. Improving on the definition of Aulus Gellius (XII, 17) for this word, he says the concept includes both *παιδεία* and *φιλανθρωπία*. A characteristically Roman scepticism about the powers of the mind and a preference for the amateur as against the professional approach to intellectual problems remain, after all Greek aspects of the concept are acknowledged. By the second century, however, the Ciceronian ideal was finished. The narrow *παιδεία* of the schools with its pedantry and professionalism had supplanted the more spacious concept of *humanitas*. An Epilogue concludes the book by briefly tracing the survival into Latin Christianity of the various elements of Roman thought. As the struggle between Rome and Christianity was longer and more intense than that between Greece and Rome, so the victory was more complete. Roman tradition and religion were finished by Christianity. Happily, Cicero's became the one living voice from the Roman past. From obscurity in the early Empire his reputation now revived to such a degree that for the Church Fathers he became the exemplar of classical humanism. The abiding elements of that humanism were the Latin classics, a memento to later ages that this existence can be ennobled by man's creative gifts and a monument to an imperial people whose finest ideal was that of *humanitas*.

The book's charm derives from the author's effortless style, his talent for putting the familiar in a new perspective, and his determination to let the Romans speak for themselves. In fact, I count only eleven references to the modern literature among the hundreds of notes. Some might wish that Clarke had given more of his own or other's views where use of primary sources leaves the question

unsettled, as in the reasons given for the popularity of Epicureanism in the late Republic (pp. 21 f.). Others might want references to the modern authorities where treatment of an important topic is elemental, as in the discussion of the meaning of Cicero's *rector* (p. 48). But bibliography and extensive discussion of individual topics plainly were not part of the author's plans when he wrote this book, and therefore such criticisms are pointless. The notes are collected at the end and there is an index. Slips in proof reading are few: *chauvism* for *chauvinism* (p. 93), and for *are* (p. 143), and *relevation* for *revelation* (p. 149).

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LUIGIA ACHILLEA STELLA. Il poema d'Ulisse. Firenze, "La Nuova Italia" Editrice, 1955. Pp. xvi + 444. L. 2300. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 47.)

One feature of contemporary Homeric scholarship is a tendency to widen our horizons by urging upon our attention relationships and influences from the non-Greek world. Just as Carpenter in his brilliant and fascinating *Folk Tale, Fiction, and Saga in the Homeric Epics* (Berkeley, 1946) suggested that we turn our eyes to the North, and Germain in his most interesting *Genèse de l'Odyssée* (Paris, 1954) drew our attention to North Africa, so now Stella asks us to look to the East. Similar suggestions have, of course, recently been made regarding the origins of Greek philosophy by Cornford in his *Principium Sapientiae* (Cambridge, 1952) and by Güterbock regarding Hesiod (*A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 123-34). The importance of applying to Homeric problems the learning of Orientalists has been urged and illustrated by Albright (*A. J. A.*, LIV [1950], pp. 162-76), and many of the matters treated at length by Stella in this book have been briefly touched on by Gordon (*A. J. A.*, LVI [1952], pp. 93 f.). An important element in Stella's emphasis on possible Eastern influences on Homer is her scepticism about the "popular" and "oral" origin of the formulaic Homeric style and about the utility for Homeric studies of the attention currently being paid to South-slavic songs. Remarking that, since the epics of the Near East are earlier than Homer, there can be no possibility of Homeric influence on them, Stella devotes a good deal of space to discussions of Near-Eastern parallels to Homeric ornamental epithets and other formulaic phrases, to the similes, and to the "typical scenes." She argues that these are characteristics of Bronze-Age poetry with a written tradition extending back through centuries and that this makes highly dubious the notion, now so widely accepted, "di un'epica greca tutta orale, popolare alle origini" (p. 121). She thinks it possible that translations of epic poems from the Near East may have come to Mycenae.

I am in no position to judge how thoroughly or how sensibly Stella has pillaged this Oriental material. Some of the lines and phrases she gives (in Italian translation) show interesting similarities to

Homeric usage; others seem rather far-fetched. When Stella goes beyond the smaller aspects of style, she is, I think, too much inclined to infer influences of one literature upon another in dealing with motifs and methods which could easily have arisen independently: the dream, for instance, as a means of communication between gods and men; councils of the gods; hostile and friendly divinities. Many of the similarities she points out between Homer and the older literatures of the Near East are interesting and seem worthy of further investigation, but for almost all of them the likelihood of influence remains at least doubtful.

Stella is convinced that the *Odyssey* must be studied from both the historical and the aesthetic points of view, and she has consequently divided her book into two parts: one devoted to the cultural background of the *Odyssey* and one to the poetry of the poem itself. A striking difference of procedure in the two portions is that the various sections dealing with the cultural background are equipped with extensive bibliographical notes covering in all more than seventy pages, while the aesthetic sections have no bibliographical materials at all. The bibliographical notes are pleasingly polyglot and, while I cannot judge the Oriental material, the citations of Homeric are generous and up to date. There are a number of small errors and misprints, especially in the English and German citations, but they are not serious. (It is a bit unfortunate that on page 175 Van Groningen's *The Proems of the Iliad and the Odyssey* should appear as *The Poems*, etc.)

Stella finds much more similarity between Homer and Mycenaean civilization than has seemed acceptable to many recent writers on the topic. She does not confine this likeness to material objects, but extends it to the realms of ideas and of speech. (In dealing with these subjects she has often had to go beyond Mycenaean evidence and cite examples from other Bronze-Age cultures of the Near East.) It is precisely here that her book suffers most from having been written just too soon to take advantage of the decipherment of Minoan Linear B by Ventris and Chadwick and of the numerous papers which have been inspired by their discovery. (She was able to comment briefly on this topic in a two-page Preface.) Particularly important to Stella would have been the papers by T. B. L. Webster, "Homer and the Mycenaean Tablets," *Antiquity*, CXIII (1955), pp. 10-14, and by L. J. D. Richardson, "Further Observations on Homer and the Mycenaean Tablets," *Hermathena*, LXXXVI (1955), pp. 50-65, which treat of some stylistic resemblances between Homer and the Linear B tablets.

Stella greatly admires the *Odyssey*, regards it as the product of a long tradition, and believes it is the work of a single personality (though the last book and Book 23 from line 297 on are later additions). It is not, she is certain, by the author of the *Iliad*. The criteria for her Separatist belief are in general of the sort favored by Jacoby and Fränkel rather than those recently presented so persuasively by Page. The originality which Stella finds in the way in which the author of the *Odyssey* handles epithets and repetitions seems to me most questionable, and her statement that some repeated lines are certainly "del Poeta," since they do not occur in the *Iliad*,

shows the common egregious fallacy of acting as though the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the only early hexameter poems the Greeks ever produced. Also, in her emphasis on the melancholy of the *Odyssey*, one can accept much of Stella's description of this feature of the poem without finding anything peculiarly Odyssean in this state of mind. For the author of the *Iliad* too the war at Troy was a "luttuosa guerra." Like many a Unitarian before her, Stella argues enthusiastically that the poetic excellencies of the poem require us to assume a single author. This kind of argument has in the past failed to convert Analysts, and it is unlikely that Stella will succeed here where so many in the past have preached eloquently but in vain. In the literary portion of her book also, Stella occasionally brings in Oriental parallels, but here only in an incidental way and regularly accompanied by remarks about the great superiority of the *Odyssey* in the use of motifs and techniques. Stella writes especially well and with especial fullness of the unforgettable women in the *Odyssey*. Her treatment of Calypso and of Nausicaa is particularly sympathetic and able. Homerists generally will read with pleasure what Stella has to say to illustrate her belief that the poetry of the *Odyssey* has the immortal youth which Calypso offered to Odysseus.

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GIORGIO BRUGNOLI. *Studi sulle differentiae verborum*. Rome, Angelo Signorelli, 1955. Pp. 382. (*Studi e Saggi*.)

Brugnoli's introduction (pp. 7-20) is basic even for those already familiar with the history and nature of the *differentiae verborum*, but it is especially so for the student whose acquaintance with the "genre" has been limited to the discussions in the literary histories. As is the case with the corresponding portion of Uhlfelder's *De proprietate sermonum vel rerum* (Rome, 1954) on which see review of the undersigned in *Classical Philology*, L (1955), pp. 215-16 (wrongly cited as in volume XLIII by Brugnoli in note 4, p. 155), much of this basic material will surely be incorporated in future histories of Latin literature. A brief summary of Brugnoli's introduction is definitely in order here. Whereas the Greek Stoics pursued the study of synonyms solely from the theoretical point of view, the Romans put such study to work in a practical way as a means of improving the *ars oratoria*. The abundance of synonyms, homonyms, homophones, and the like in the Latin language led them to stress distinctions (*differentiae*) between and among words even in the days of the "best" Latinity. Cicero had already distinguished between the *genus* and *species* of words and Quintilian had established the study of *verborum proprietates ac differentia* as one of the cornerstones of his instruction. It is clear from Fronto and other sources that the earliest forms of these distinctions consisted of no more than lists in which the words to be distinguished were juxtaposed for mnemonic and didactic purposes, lists taken down by students of

rhetoric in which there was little or no system and the main purpose of which was the memorization of rare and little used words which went to make up the *vetusculus color* of Fronto's rhetoric. Allusions to such scholastic sources are found in Servius, Nonius, St. Augustine, and other writers of later days. Brugnoli traces with great pains the evolution of these lists and makes the following points, not all of which are new, in particular: (1) genuine lists of *differentiae verborum* devoted solely to the examination of synonyms do not appear before medieval times, the earlier lists having left the true *differentiae* to be established by the student; (2) the medieval scholars, utilizing the random notes found in ancient grammarians and their own knowledge derived from oral instruction, were the first to systematize word-lists in which the *differentiae* were systematically treated; (3) several lists of this sort have come down to us under the names of distinguished ancients (Cicero, Palaemon, Probus, Pliny the Elder, Suetonius, etc.) and such attributions are to be regarded as decidedly suspect. It is Brugnoli's purpose to attempt an explanation of the reasons for which these attributions were made by examining for the first time all the series of lists in parallel fashion and *en bloc*. In the course of his study Brugnoli proposes to, and does, expand into the area of textual criticism. Wherever necessary and expedient the texts are reproduced and *stemmata* are provided.

In the body of the work the following are studied: (1) the *Synonyma Ciceronis*, (2) the *inter polliceri* and its minor redactions, (3) the *differentiae* attributed to Remmius Palaemon and Suetonius, (4) the *differentiae* of Palaemon, (5) those attributed to Probus, (6) the list bearing the name of Fronto, (7) the *inter aptum et utile*, (8) the other alphabetical collections, and finally (9) the forms of the indirect tradition. In each case the author provides a complete list of all the MSS which contain the material under scrutiny and, as promised, penetrates to the heart of the question of authorship. His conclusions in several instances are opposed to previous work. One reason given for discounting the attributions of authorship found in the MSS, for example, is that the content is so obviously medieval in attitude, procedure, etc. One of the outstanding merits of Brugnoli's work is his summarization of what had been done in the field before his own efforts were undertaken and his indication step by step of all the points with which he finds fault in these earlier investigations. To many the summaries of the contributions of Brugnoli's predecessors, the references, cross-references, arguments, and objections will be a source of some confusion and the thread of discourse will frequently be difficult to follow, as it was indeed to this reviewer. Fortunately, however, the author invariably leads his reader back to the point at issue and presents terse statements of his own conclusions at the close of the lengthy discussions. About one half of the volume (unnumbered pages from p. 186 to p. 375) is given to a listing of the *concordantiae* which exist between and among the several lists of *differentiae*, an invaluable aid to the student of this complex area of Latin philology. Brugnoli's most significant contributions are pointed out by Ettore Paratore, editor of the series of which the book forms a part, in his prefatory remarks wherein

he credits the young scholar with having placed the study of the problems involved on entirely new bases and with having really solved the problems of the origins of the *differentiae*, thus laying the foundation for the first truly scientific edition of the *corpus*.

Use of Brugnoli's *Studi* is greatly facilitated by the four indices which appear at the end (pp. 375-82), to wit: (1) index of MSS cited, (2) index of passages cited, (3) index of modern scholars cited, and (4) a general index.

The book is printed on reasonably good paper in large, readable type. Several *errata*, however, escaped the notice of the proofreader and since some of these might momentarily disturb the reader whose Italian is informal, inclusion of the following list seemed advisable: p. 13: *convizione* is printed for *convinzione*; p. 42: *numero* for *numero*; p. 45: *di di* for *di*; p. 49: *alfebetico* for *alfabetico*; p. 70: *tendende* for *tendenze*; p. 80: *inscribitur* for *inscribitur*; p. 101; *lo forma* for *la forma*; p. 102, section 33: *duos locos talos* should probably read *d. l. malos*; pp. 106-7: *testimoniale* is printed for *testimoniate*, p. 113: *termine* for *termina*; and on p. 137: the second word in the combination *differentiae spiritali* should not be italicized inasmuch as it is Italian, not Latin. The above *errata* were noted only in passing and are not necessarily all that appear.

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LOUIS JALABERT, S. J. (†) et RENÉ MOUTERDE, S. J., avec la collaboration de CLAUDE MONDÉSERT, S. J. *Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de la Syrie, Tome IV: Laodicée. Apamène* (Nos. 1243-1997). *Chronologie des Inscriptions datées des Tomes I-IV*. Paris, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1955. Pp. 378. 5,200 Fr. (*Institut Français d'Archéologie de Beyrouth, Bibliothèque Archéologique et Historique, Tome LXI.*)

As part of the international project of assembling the preserved inscriptions of the Greco-Roman world into regional collections, and so duly reporting progress with its fellows at the recent Epigraphical Congress in Paris, the "Inscriptions Grecques et Latines de la Syrie" was founded under the French Mandate to collect and publish or republish the inscriptions occurring within that territory other than those in a Semitic language. Professors Jalabert and Mouterde of the Université Saint-Joseph of Beyrouth took charge, and the first volume appeared in 1929 with inscriptions of the north, Commagene and the Cyrrhastica. The arrangement was strictly topographical. A few texts were illustrated by drawings made from squeezes, none by photographs. The bibliographies of known texts were complete, the commentary brief, and the editors did not restrict themselves to what they themselves had seen; so their number 1 was the great inscription of Antiochus I on Nimrud Dag, not then seen since

Puehstein. There was evident utility in this, especially in view of the high technical competence and devotion of the editors.

Thereafter things went a little slowly. Volume II, with inscriptions of Chalcis and the Antiochene, appeared in 1939, and, like the first volume, lacked an index. The second world war caused an inevitable delay, and the first part of the third volume, also devoted to the Antiochene (and to Antioch itself), did not appear until 1950. Then the tempo quickened. Part 2 appeared in 1953, with the index of the first three volumes, and now Volume IV, two years later, carries the survey south into the area of Laodicea and of Apamea. A splendid index, which extends in one particular to the first three volumes also, makes this a model epigraphical publication. Carrying on without Jalabert but with the addition of Father Mondésert as collaborator, Mouterde gives promise of a prompt accomplishment of his objective. Only the inscriptions from Palmyra and from Dura, in the region which was the French Mandate of Syria, will lie outside the *I. G. L. S.*

With all its value as a whole, it is inevitable that a publication of this type should contain much of little general interest. Texts are grouped neither by date nor by type, and the greater part are small and late; Christian texts are numerous, coming from churches and tombs, which often offer very little that is new. It is vital that this material be published completely and correctly. It must be correlated and understood, but it is seldom exciting. Great credit goes to Mouterde and his colleagues for their devotion to so self-sacrificing a project.

There is much of interest here nevertheless, although little that is absolutely new. If there is no single text of the value of the great Rhosos inscription which was the glory of the third volume, we have the interesting decree of the *peliganes* of Laodicea of 174 B. C., which throws some welcome light on that little known city in the third and second centuries B. C. The term itself is probably Macedonian, and they are councillors of some sort. They are concerned with a sanctuary of Sarapis and Isis, which Mouterde believes was founded by private persons, but which might also go back to the occupation of Syria by Ptolemy III at the time of the Third Syrian War (no. 1261); we know very little about the history of Laodicea at this time. Otherwise the Hellenistic period is represented only by a few weights; but Roman times are illustrated by a number of Latin military epitaphs, two good agonistic texts (no. 1265: a boxer; no. 1349: a tragic actor), a considerable number of imperial and other dedications, and poems of a certain merit in honor of wine (no. 1459) and of agriculture (no. 1597). A poem in praise of the Emperor Julian may be regarded as the leading text of the Byzantine period (no. 1490), together with a hymn in praise of the Trinity (no. 1599), but there are many scriptural quotations, prayers, and acclamations from churches of substantial importance to students of this field. Magic is represented by a number of gems and amulets (especially nos. 1284-94). There is a full discussion of the somewhat controversial god Genneas (on no. 1301). The rich collection of personal names shows us the mixed and changing population of the area, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Christian (with a fondness

for names from the Old Testament, and for those of a pious character, like Agapetus with its suggestion of the *agape*). The family of Antipater and Philip, like that of Antiochus and Demetrius, at Balanæa (nos. 1302 and 1303), recalls the Hellenistic kings, while Julia from the Tiber (no. 1364) like her fellow in death at Apamea, Julitta (no. 1366), recalls their western conquerors. The piety and affection of the epitaphs are often touching. In no. 1364, the writer laments that he was not taken along in death, and in no. 1366, the writer promises to come "there" and join the dead woman. As a survival of pagan concepts in Christianity, we find in no. 1599 an appeal to "the Trinity, God," to chase away the Evil Eye (*phthonos*).

The editing is exemplary. I have a question concerning one point only. Among the epitaphs of soldiers of the Secunda Parthica at Apamea is one (no. 1371) published with photograph by W. K. Prentice in the American Archaeological Expedition to Syria (*Greek and Latin Inscriptions*, pp. 142 f., no. 130). It is a stela, with the upper half of the face "occupied by the figure of a Roman centurion in relief." This remark is repeated by Mouterde and Mondésert ("relief représentant un centurion"), but in their commentary they write: "les défunts des nos. 1371 et 1372 ne sont pas des centurions." Why then was a centurion represented? The subject of no. 1371 was a Septimius Mucapor, *duplicarius*. After the name and titles of his legion, the inscription continues with the sign for *centurio* or *centuria*, followed by the numeral VI and the initials *pr pr*. That is the sixth cohort and the second century, called *princeps* or *princeps prior* (Domaszewski, *Rangordnung des römischen Heeres*, p. 90). Under these circumstances, it was natural to take the sigla to mean *centurio*; Mucapor was a centurion, and it is his figure which was carved on the tombstone—as Prentice thought. The editors here read "(centuria) (cohorte) VI pr(incipis) pr(ioris)," the logic of which escapes me. All of the *principales* were *duplicarii*, including the centurions (Domaszewski, p. 70).

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GISELA M. A. RICHTER. *Ancient Italy: A Study of the Interrelations of its Peoples as Shown in their Arts*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1955. Pp. xxiv + 137; 305 figs. \$15.00. (*Jerome Lectures, Fourth Series*.)

In this sumptuous volume, based upon the Jerome lectures, Miss Richter moves from the earliest monuments of Greek and Etruscan art in Italy down through the Classical and Hellenistic periods, and then considers the art of the Empire, both in its adaptations and copies of earlier Greek originals and in Rome's own contribution. Of these sections, those bearing on copies and adaptations (including an appendix on painting) show the master at her best; there is no need to point out her almost unique mastery of such matters, which she has broadened to embrace interrelations not only between individual works of sculpture, but between sculpture and all the other

arts save architecture. Reviewers in the archaeological journals with more space at their disposal will here find a great wealth of original points of view, many of which will be reflected in whatever new studies are made in the field of Roman art.

Since the book is based upon lectures, the author has had to tread the narrow line which separates the specialists from the informed public-at-large. This she has done extraordinarily well in the text, but perhaps not so well in the figures. At her disposal are 67 large, beautifully printed plates, into which are crowded 305 figures. Of these, somewhere around half are photographs the author has used before in readily available books. Here the scholar, and many a layman too, would have preferred to have larger and less usual photographs of the more unfamiliar pieces, with several views of each piece of sculpture. As an example, the first plate shows us various Greek works from Italy side by side with comparisons from the mainland, stressing the theme already dealt with in the author's *Archaic Greek Art*: that there is no difference between western and homeland style. Those who were not convinced by the earlier book will certainly not be by the few comparisons here given, which do not seem stylistically close at all (except for figs. 15 and 16, which appear to be terracottas from the same mold). Similarly, the comparison of various Pompeian paintings adapted from a single original has been made long ago; some freshly photographed *details* would have been more welcome. In general we feel too much the inclusion of lecture slides which might have better been weeded out before publication.

What Miss Richter has to say about original Roman contributions to art is very good, but there are other things that could be said. It is, of course, true, as the author has already contended in *Three Critical Periods*, that there was a vast amount of copying and adapting in Roman art of the first two centuries A. D.; and that a lot of what is original was the work of Greek artisans is today well known. What is not stressed is the electrifying effect which Rome had on Greek art in general, from her emergence in the second century B. C. as a major Mediterranean power on, for at least half a millennium. It is because of this startling change that we must speak of *Roman* art, no matter who the individual artists were.

Finally, one is disappointed in a book called *Ancient Italy* to find that the end is placed so early. Surely some of the most powerful and splendid of all ancient Italian works of art fall in the centuries after 200 A. D., and some of the greatest and most significant developments, significant for the arts of the Middle Ages, Byzantium and beyond, but basically ancient Italian. But perhaps the author is holding these back for yet another study. We may surely hope that the scholar who has made such enormous contributions to our understanding and appreciation of the Greeks as they strode step by step toward Realism will one day be our guide to the later Romans as they moved away from it once more in ancient Italy.

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